It already seems pretty clear that the bloodshed was a result of a series of bad judgments by the Serb and Albanian leadership, which, each on its own, at a certain moment decided that a little bloodshed could produce some political profit (see "Bloody Game", Vreme, March 14). Let us start with the Serb side: when the media started reporting about the first armed clashes in Drenica during 1996, warning that the events could easily spiral out of control, the regime ignored the warnings and tried to suppress the reports. "The Police controls every inch of Serbian soil," boasted Police general Radivoje Markovic less than three months ago while some of his colleagues publicly asserted that the security situation in the Province was "satisfactory". With time, the officials began to admit that something was going on in Kosovo, but were still trying to minimize the problem: nothing serious, terrorism is a global phenomenon, it will be resolved one day "the way it is done elsewhere in the world"... The opposition parties, mostly preoccupied with bargaining over seats in the parliament and ministerial portfolios, mostly tried not to spoil the game with unpleasant questions.
Then, as soon as the smoke above Prekaz dispersed, it suddenly turned out that the Police had for a while been pretty well informed about the local situation. The day after the raid on the Jashari family compound, pro-regime media published voluminous excerpts from Adem Jashari's file, which included details about his activities during the previous few months. These days in Politika, we can read in installments a Police report which lists all, even the smallest incidents between the Police and armed Albanian groups up to a few years ago. If the responsible state bodies were aware of all this at the time, one can only wonder why nothing had been done before Jashari and comrades managed to acquire arms, get organized and fortify their positions. "We had him in the sight of a sniper a few months ago, but at the last moment we were given the order not to shoot," a source from the Police told this journalist a few days ago.
This question brings back unpleasant memories of the "Spegelj case" in 1991 when the Army recorded on film a secret operation used to smuggle arms for HDZ [ruling party in Croatia], while the politicians prevented any action. The answer in both cases is the same: now, as well as then, the plan was to let the enemy arm himself and get organized and then use the forthcoming armed conflict to achieve political goals. As early as a few months ago, the pro-regime media asserted that the terrorism in Kosovo is not so bad for our cause "because then the whole world will see that Shqiptars are terrorists". We have seen the ending recently. True, the regime managed to make profit out of the game: Serbian public opinion has been homogenized as never before, and Milo Dukanovic, whose government includes Albanian representatives, has been seriously shaken on the eve of general elections in Montenegro. Now, it only remains to explain the justification for this strategy to the relatives of the dead policemen, whose number is, according to some information, larger than the official figure.
However, one shouldn't fall for the explanation that the Police simply did its job, while the politicians didn't allow them to finish it on time. The police effort to avoid civilian victims in Likosani and Prekaz was half hearted and essentially only symbolic. It is true that in Prekaz the Police gave the Jashari family an hour to evacuate women and children and to surrender but it is also true that they didn't really care whether the invitation was going to be taken seriously. Anyone with even superficial knowledge of the Drenica Albanians knows that for them it is great humiliation if a stranger even sees their women and it could have been guessed that women and children would not have been allowed to leave the family compound; therefore, they should have been treated as hostages, not as terrorists. Besides, what could the Jasharis, even if they didn't persist in defense of their home, expect after the incident in Likosani, when ten members of the Ahmeti family were taken alive from their home, only to appear dead two days later in Pristina mortuary? Taking into account that during the last few months the Police allowed to be ambushed too many times, it can be concluded that the way in which the Police acted testifies about the lack of care for human life and/or the total lack of knowledge of the terrain, customs and mentality in the field of action, which can only have catastrophic consequences.
Finally, one shouldn't forget the outrageous behavior of the judicial authorities which, breaking clear and unequivocal laws of the Republic of Serbia, failed to order an autopsy of the victims and start an investigation regarding their death. The law states that an autopsy must be performed if there is a suspicion of violent death, after which an investigation about possible criminal responsibility should follow. In Likosani and Prekaz, the dead were either left lying where they had been killed, or were simply delivered to the relatives to do with the corpses as they please. The fact that someone has officially been branded as a terrorists doesn't give anyone right to treat his or her corpse as carrion meat. A state which so blatantly and publicly violates its own laws shouldn't be surprised that no one believes when she claims to "follow the highest world standards".
As far as the Albanian side is concerned, it would be difficult to find on their political scene a single person who could with a clear conscience claim to have done everything possible to avoid an escalation of violence. Preoccupied with upheaval within his own party and tours of Western capitals, Ibrahim Rugova even today refuses to recognize the existence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) and to condemn their methods; until recently he claimed that UCK was only a front for the Serb Secret Service; then, he allowed that in Kosovo one could find "frustrated" individuals but they were apparently neither armed nor organized. In the meantime, other Albanian politicians, inside Kosovo Democratic League (LDK) and in other Albanian political parties have been openly flirting with UCK in hope that that could result in a nomination for the leader of a political wing of this organization: Bujar Bukoshi, Hidajet Hiseni, Adem Demaci and Llulleta Beqiri are the most obvious examples. When the photos from Likosani and Prekaz hit TV screens all over the world, all of them shouted in unison: "Ethnic cleansing!" and demanded armed intervention by the NATO. On Thursday, March 5, when Pristina shops ran out of flour and cigarettes and a shadow of war fell over Kosovo, none of them attempted to address the public with a call for restrain, nobody called for negotiations. On the contrary, pro-Rugova Kosovo Information Center (KIC) the whole day spread false news about tank columns, street fighting in certain suburbs of Pristina, burned villages and thousands of refugees from Drenica, additionally heating up already tense atmosphere. Similar behavior could be spotted the following week in synchronized efforts to portray the events in Drenica as "new Srebrenica", including persistent stories about rapes, mass graves and similar attributes of the war in Bosnia. Only when it became absolutely clear that there would be no foreign armed intervention, Rugova and the collaborators started to send signals that they were considering negotiations.
Finally, there is the greatest unknown in the Kosovo equation; infamous UCK, which after all can only claim that it is a step closer to its goal - total armed rebellion of the Kosovo Albanians. Using the Jashari clan UCK successfully applied in Drenica an old and tested Serbian police method: it was used in the initial phases of the war in Croatia and Bosnia, during the mobilization of rural Serbs for the fight against Croatian and Bosnian police. It goes something like this: armed "representatives" are sent to warn the villagers of a forthcoming police raid. The "representatives" distribute a small amount of arms and convince the farmers to ambush the "aggressor"; as soon as the first routine police patrol arrives there is shooting. The result are a few dead policemen, the "representatives" continue on their mission, and the village has no choice: it must prepare for the decisive battle. Simple and effective, this method proved to be equally successful everywhere in the Balkans, but it is strange that the same people who had so successfully applied in a different locale fell for it so easily.
These days, from reliable sources, one can hear that UCK is regrouping along the border between Albania and Serbia, around Dakovica, Decani and Klina. If they are succeed in that, the clashes in that region, in the proximity of the border and due to possible involvement of the Yugoslav and Albanian armies, will be much more complicated than those in Drenica.
The only remaining hope is that political leaders on both sides will realize that the time for cynical calculations has expired and that the fire in Kosovo must be put down immediately. The Serb authorities would contribute significantly to that goal if they suspended armed actions and initiated a serious investigation in the events in Drenica - government invitation to talks would then be given much more weight; the Albanians would have to understand that the NATO will not help them and that, if they opt for armed struggle, they will lead that struggle alone, and suffer numerous casualties while the outcome would be less then certain. Knowing who we are dealing with, maybe it is too much to expect even so little reason and responsibility.
We apologize to the readers for this omission.