This dialogue took place immediately after the conclusion of Short's testimony before the Armed Forces Committee of the US Senate, during which he complained that NATO generals' hands were tied and that he would have, during the first night of the bombing, "hit the head of the snake, knocked out the electricity, taken down the bridges on the Danube, targeted five or six political and military buildings in central Belgrade..." When we sought to learn more about the purpose of these "testimonials" before the influential American committee, one European diplomat did not beat around the bush:
"You don't really think these debates, which have received enormous publicity in the newspapers, are taking place by chance? And that general Short accidentally made use of this extreme, aggressive rhetoric, even getting involved in political questions such as the behavior of the French during the bombing, although that is inappropriate for an officer?"
Our source reveals:
"Western military organizations have been for months carrying out simulations of a new war with Belgrade, analyzing, far more seriously than before, different situations which may arise and, believe it or not, preparing plans for a 'campaign of revenge'. Within NATO there is an influential group of generals, headed by Wesley Clark and Michael Short, which even though the Alliance has been declared the victor in the war is unhappy with the criticism to which it was subject after the conclusion of the air campaign and therefore desires a new opportunity to demonstrate its military skill, strength and determination. They are wholeheartedly supported by the powerful arms industry lobby which thanks to the bombing of Yugoslavia succeeded in compensating for its losses during the past few years several times over. Both Clark and Short are due to retire in the spring. They are convinced that they have been set up - during the course of the bombing their hands were tied and afterwards they were accused of being ineffective. They desire new opportunities and chances to redeem themselves prior to their retirement. The only thing they still require is to convince influential politicians to support their plans".
In the opinion of our source, so far the war-mongering generals have succeeded in securing the support of other hawks on the American political scene, headed by Madeleine Albright, who even managed to get Yugoslavia included on the list of countries engaging in religious persecution!? The aggressive wing of the American leadership managed to have no-nonsense general Joseph Ralston who "longs for a conflict and an opportunity to prove himself" named to replace Wesley Clark.
Advocates of the new campaign to punish Serbia will have far greater problems with European members of NATO. This is the reason for the constant pressure on France and accusations that French wavering undermined the unity of the Alliance. Great Britain has already been rewarded for its unreserved support of the U.S.: George Robertson became the new secretary-general of NATO, replacing, by American criteria, overly soft Solana. There is no reason to doubt that the former British minister of defense can barely wait for his "five minutes of bombing", that is, for an opportunity to gain the image of an uncompromising military leader. The "International Herald Tribune" recently wrote:
"All preparations for the creation of a new, even more aggressive NATO pact have been completed. The only thing remaining is the carrying out of a baptism by fire to demonstrate how this mature NATO resolves crises more quickly and easily than the NATO which struggled for almost three months to defeat tiny Yugoslavia. One general described it thus: 'Then it took us 78 days, now we would finish everything in five days. We have gained a lot of experience'."
It is hardly a secret that it would be most practical for the Alliance to try out its "newly acquired experience" again against Yugoslavia which is "sufficiently wounded to represent an easy prey and has been sufficiently 'worked over' by the media" (in domestic slang: "vilified") so that it would not require a lot of effort to convince the world in the necessity of a new intervention.
The only thing needed is to find a concrete cause (and the selection is, according to Western analysts, sufficiently broad) and to "work on it".
Here is a review of possible causes, that is, justifications, for a new NATO intervention against Yugoslavia:
MONTENEGRO: A referendum [on secession from FRY] by the end of February, and afterwards, who knows? Even though the dialogue between the Serbian and Montenegrin governments has finally begun to address the demands of the smaller republic for a reorganization of relations within the federation, the West continues to believe that the tension between the two members of the Yugoslav federation will increase and represent the most likely spark for new conflicts in FR Yugoslavia. Political analysts believe that the current talks will be concluded without success this week and that Montenegro will conduct a referendum on independence, that the majority of citizens will support the policies of Milo Djukanovic and back independence (the "New York Times" foresees all of this taking place by the end of February 2000), that... This is where the dilemmas begin. How will Serbia react to this?
Vojislav Seselj recently announced: "My personal opinion is that the secession of Montenegro would initiate a bloody war within that republic, and it is possible that this would result in a new intervention on the part of the NATO pact."
If Serbia attempts to keep Montenegro in the federation by force (as it attempted to do with Slovenia) or if it uses, sooner or later, some other method to try to destabilize the regime of Milo Djukanovic, the West will not hesitate to strike against Serbia.
There is no reason to doubt that the Western hawks are even prepared to prearrange incidents which could, if accompanied by a suitable media campaign, be used to justify an intervention.
For example, what if an assassination attempt was made on the life of Milo Djukanovic? Will they wait until the conspirators are arrested or will a attack to punish Serbia be immediately carried out by the West against "the only logical perpetrator who is located in Serbia"? This is all strictly hypothetical but definitely not impossible.
THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA: Dodik is protected by the West. Tensions between the governments of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska are rising. The Serbian government is convinced that the entire political apparatus on the opposite side of the Drina River has been actively engaged in the plans of the West to topple the regime here. With the government in Banja Luka growing more and more distant from Belgrade, the Serbian government loses one of cards up its sleeve: the ability to propose the unification with Srpska, which would eliminate Dayton Bosnia, during the sensitive negotiations regarding the permanent status of Kosovo which are yet to come.
In a recent commentary entitled "The anti-Serbian role of Dodik", Politika concludes thus: "Individuals who are prepared to sell their heritage and their people for a fistful of dollars cannot survive no matter how powerful they appear to be and how much they are supported from abroad."
The West supports Dodik unreservedly. Every attempt to replace him will cause a violent reaction.
Exactly like the revision of the Dayton Agreement to provide for the unification of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska.
KOSOVO: An attempt to return the Yugoslav Army to Kosovo is a calculated risk. No more than a few days pass between the attempts of general Pavkovic and certain politicians in the Socialist Party of Serbia-Yugoslav United Left-Serbian Radical Party coalition to return our armed forces to Kosovo. Even though everything is proposed with great emphasis on the word "if" and rather diplomatically, it is no secret that FRY has prepared plans for "limited engagement" in Kosovo at the right moment (winter, most likely) the purpose of which would be to attempt to defend Serbs in at least one part of Kosmet.
This would also create a basis for negotiations regarding the partition of Kosovo as well as represent the most favorable possible pre-election move on the part of this government.
Whatever would happen next would be favorable for this government. If the military engagement of our forces in Kosovo, even in a limited sense, is successful, there is no better preparation for the elections. If the gamble does not succeed and everything backfires, the government can count on a new and highly desirable homogenization of the people (especially if they are being bombed) and, of course, the enactment of new war-time, repressive laws.
It would not be easy for the NATO alliance to react quickly but it would certainly, in addition to a ground war in Kosovo, use the bombing of Serbia as a means of counterattack.
VOJVODINA AND SANDZAK: According to the Kosovo scenario, for a long time the West has been keeping the question of "the status of Vojvodina and Sandzak within Serbia" on the back burner. It is only a question of time before they decide to turn up the heat. The development of the scenario is well-known - we have already seen it enacted in Kosovo with the difference that now everything will move far more quickly. "Preparation of the groundwork", that is, of public opinion in the West, has already been completed. The Serbs have for years represented a synonym for evil and another "crime" in the series would be "completely normal".
Exactly like a new bombing campaign against Serbia.
THE DEPARTURE OF MILOSEVIC: Collective punishment. It is a public secret in Washington that the opposition in Serbia has been given a deadline of January to "do something about Milosevic", that is, to take over the government. If this does not succeed, plan B will be implemented.
In simplest terms, it says: "You have not replaced the man whom we do not like, therefore, he is supported by the people and it follows that the people are responsible for the government which has been causing nothing but problems in the Balkans." Collective responsibility implies collective punishment.
NATO would initiate an attack against the "evil empire" with the help of a minor incident of some type (for example, a crash of a foreign civilian airplane above Yugoslavia or a killing of a large group of foreign soldiers in Kosovo), most likely way before the accident is even investigated.
At the beginning of the summer, as foreign media reported recently, American emissaries proposed to president Milosevic to resign, offering him in exchange asylum in one of ten countries (from Argentina to South Africa, to China and Russia) and the right to access his money. He firmly refused. Robert Gelbard, who spoke with the leaders of our opposition in Montenegro, related the following conclusion to this story:
"We were contacted after a certain period by Yugoslav diplomatic circles who asked whether this discussion would be continued. We refused. We had nothing to talk about any more. The real answer is, if something does not change in Serbia by the beginning of next year, then you will all suffer."
Those present say that this threat reminded them dangerously of the tone which Richard Holbrooke used in October of the last year when he announced the upcoming bombing in which no one at that time wished to believe.
NT: Would NATO intervene if Serbia were to oppose the secession of Montenegro?
In the event that Montenegro were to secede there would be another type of situation which is not connected with human rights and the ethical question. If they decided to establish their own sovereignty outside the federation and if president Milosevic decided to intervene in some manner in that democratic process, I believe that in that case, without doubt, NATO would defend the democratic aspirations of the Montenegrins. In that case, there would be the possibility of renewed bombing of Serbia, as well as that of Belgrade. It is even possible that the Montenegrin government would call on NATO to assist it.
NT: Would a new NATO military intervention be targeted exclusively at Belgrade?
The bombing of Belgrade, nevertheless, would remain the final option. There are few military targets there besides the government and other targets of special significance to Milosevic. Another possibility for bombing to resume would be, without doubt, if Serbian forces attempted to enter Kosovo by force. In that case, however, Belgrade would not be attacked but there would be a direct, very powerful military campaign against the aforementioned forces.
NT: Would the U.S. again be the greatest advocate of military intervention?
What the Americans are trying to do at the moment is to remove president Milosevic from the political scene. I think that they will continue to attempt to do this but using other means, through international pressure and not by military intervention. NATO will be involved in the future of the Balkans for at least another ten years. They will not leave from Bosnia nor from Kosovo for a long time to come.
NT: In your opinion, did NATO burn its fingers during the military operation against Yugoslavia or is it now emboldened to take on new and similar campaigns?
They think they have carried out an excellent campaign, they had no troop casualties and lost only two airplanes... Since they are convinced that they were successful, it is possible they will soon do the same thing again at a different location. They are also encouraged by the fact that 14 countries took part, contributing troops and weapons and that some semblance of unity was maintained. It is not essential, however, that this "positive experience" be repeated in the same location but there is no doubt that at some point in the future it will be repeated.
NT: Will NATO pursue a more aggressive politics with its new secretary- general, George Robertson, at its head? Based on his statements during the war in Kosovo, he is not particularly fond of Serbs...
I don't think that anyone hates the Serbs, especially not in Great Britain. The world simply does not like the government of Slobodan Milosevic. Robertson is representing NATO as a defensive alliance, he is concerned with its expansion, he is striving to keep the Russians and the Ukrainians in the game but, as well, he would like to see the Alliance remain an international military force forever, he would like to see it present in the Middle East, in northern Africa...
NT: Do you believe that Serbia has an opposition which is sufficiently powerful and capable to lead the country toward prosperity if it gets a chance?
If you had had an opportunity to review the results of the latest surveys in Britain, it would be clear that the great majority of those surveyed believes that Serbia does not have good opposition politicians who enjoy the support of their people. That is the reason why Milosevic remains relatively popular. I do not see an individual, a political party or a coalition which is capable of winning the support of the majority in Serbia. I do not see a solution.
NT: Is the West counting on someone in the Serbian opposition?
I don't think that they are playing that card. They are waiting for winter to get so bad that the people themselves will want something to happen, something to change. They are counting on the economic factor. Yugoslavia is now the poorest country in Europe. Western politicians expect that the Serbian people will have had enough of everything by March of next year and that they will take action against the Milosevic regime.