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Apathetic People

After Zagreb, everyone understands: Europe is far away, and Balkan in hand! That is why only the pro-regime media are celebrating

by Josko CELAN

Slobodna Dalmacija, Split, Croatia, November 29, 2000

The Balkan Summit in Zagreb is the last in the series of events from which one can read the status of the idea of the populist (or as it used to be said, patriotic) Croatianism. Its status differs, based on which Croat country we are talking about. In Herceg-Bosna, the patriotic Croatianism, as the recent elections have demonstrated, is going as strong as during the most glorious days of the national democratic upheaval. In Dalmatia, as the gathering in Gripe and the promotion of Ivankovic's book about president Tudman in Split indicate, Tudman's Croatianism is still very much alive. In Zagreb, however, as could be seen from the failed protest against the Balkan summit, that Croatianism hardly enjoys any support. How come and why?

Fiasco

Among the reasons of the Zagreb failure, various sorts of Croat patriots mention the unclear message of the protest, weak organization, and some even a sort of "treason" by the leaders of the protest. It is likely that there is a bit of truth in all of that. It is not easy to mobilize people using the slogan "down with the Balkan butcher" without also shouting "down with [Stjepan] Mesic [the president of Croatia] and [Ivica] Racan [the Prime Minister]" and "down with Europe", which is pushing us back to the embrace of the Balkan butcher. Another problem is probably the tardiness of the protest. The protest should have been called the moment Mesic and Chirac proclaimed the creation of the "western Balkans" instead of now when the whole thing only received its official promotion.

Organization is definitely among the causes of the fiasco. Namely, Headquarters for the Defense of the Homeland War do work on, so to speak, amateur basis and their work will improve with time. In normal societies (patriotic) political parties take care of such business but, as we saw, in Croatia they exclusively send press releases or use paid advertisements. However, a party is not made up from its leadership, but from its grass roots support. In other words, the strength of a party lies in its capability to move its members and supporters to action and we saw that even in pro-regime public opinion polls the protesters could count on support of about 40 percent of the public. In that sense the Zagreb defeat is above all a defeat of the HDZ and political forces close to it. The HDZ and these forces should, if they do care about that, draw certain lessons from the defeat.

The importance of political professionalism is revealed best by the previous occasion on which Zagreb residents went out to the streets, the demonstrations in support of Radio 101. Unlike the recent ones whose goal was the preservation of Croatian sovereignty, the old demonstrations were in practice organized after an American request and against Tudman's Croatian authorities, but Zagreb residents responded en masse. However, the political professionalism of a handful of well-paid Soros', i.e. Cicak's agents and paraagents, who perfectly organized everything, was a decisive factor.

The success of those demonstrations additionally reveals the origin of the failure of the recent ones. The organizers at the time had at their disposal media who daily spewed out propaganda supportive of the protests, while the recent protest hardly had any media support. The Zagreb Euro-Balkan regime had united support of not only Soros' media (Novi List and their ilk), not only Pavic's EPH [Globus and Jutarnji List], but also of not so long ago "patriotic" Vecernji List.

All in all, Zagreb residents did not come out in front of Intercontinental hotel, and various Croats who have to spend a whole night in crowded train cars of the Croatian Railroads only to face hostile Police, indifference of the locals and spitting of the media, said "this time without us!"

Therefore, what conclusion can be drawn? Croats are, above all, divided according to ideology, but also by geography, to the Euro-Balkan north (Zagreb), and west (Istria and Rijeka) and the Croatian south (Lika, Dalmatia, and Herceg-Bosna). That, one could say, is natural, even "European"; aren't the most hard-line Germans in Bavaria, fiercest Austrians in Carinthia, most patriotic French in Provance, and then the most Croatian Croats in the south of Croatia!

Besides, we were recognized as such by the hardest working regime's guard dogs. Last week the front page of Novi List carried two headlines, similar to political arrest warrants: "Split, haven for Croatian europhobes" and "Mostar, ideological and logistic center of the HDZ". Soros' lot naturally realized who their opponents are; Dalmatia and Hercegovina.

The way Istria breathes can be surmised from the most recent Feral's headline for an interview with Ivan Jakovcic: "Yes, I would be glad if Istria, Rijeka, and Trieste were in a single region!" That "Europeanism" of the Croatian minister for Europe is very similar to that of Dobrica Cosic [Serbian writer, considered to be "the father of Serbian nationalism"] and very lively Italian separatists, now disguised in European colors. But, with the chief of the state who behaves as a British spy, one cannot expect anything better from a minister.

Deputy Capital

However, at the moment the biggest Croatian problem is called Zagreb. The city that persistently refuses to become the Croatian metropolis, and is heedlessly striving to become the capital of the western Balkans (obviously, one century was not enough for it to discover all the advantages of that status!). After the Zagreb summit the past is also becoming clearer. Out of those ninety and something percent who voted in the referendum, only a portion voted for Croatia, and the rest for a better "European" life. It is an indicative paradox that exactly the most impoverished Croats, from the Croatian south, are standing in defense of the country, while those richer, from the north and the west are running away from it. We, from the south, somehow instinctively feel that the first thing we are likely to get from Europe is the mad cow disease, while the avalanche of cash that some Croats await so painfully, will appear "soon". After Zagreb, everyone understands: Europe is far away, and Balkan in hand! That is why only the pro-regime media are celebrating.

It would be best for us to face the truth: we Croats are mostly a pale, apathetic people, increasingly a gathering of disoriented individuals without color, taste and smell. If we do not find the strength to be our own, proud and happy to be what we are, no promised European wealth will pull us from the most recent Croatian silence and depression.

Translated on January 5, 2001