by Josko CELAN
Organization is definitely among the causes of the fiasco. Namely, Headquarters for the Defense of the Homeland War do work on, so to speak, amateur basis and their work will improve with time. In normal societies (patriotic) political parties take care of such business but, as we saw, in Croatia they exclusively send press releases or use paid advertisements. However, a party is not made up from its leadership, but from its grass roots support. In other words, the strength of a party lies in its capability to move its members and supporters to action and we saw that even in pro-regime public opinion polls the protesters could count on support of about 40 percent of the public. In that sense the Zagreb defeat is above all a defeat of the HDZ and political forces close to it. The HDZ and these forces should, if they do care about that, draw certain lessons from the defeat.
The importance of political professionalism is revealed best by the previous occasion on which Zagreb residents went out to the streets, the demonstrations in support of Radio 101. Unlike the recent ones whose goal was the preservation of Croatian sovereignty, the old demonstrations were in practice organized after an American request and against Tudman's Croatian authorities, but Zagreb residents responded en masse. However, the political professionalism of a handful of well-paid Soros', i.e. Cicak's agents and paraagents, who perfectly organized everything, was a decisive factor.
The success of those demonstrations additionally reveals the origin of the failure of the recent ones. The organizers at the time had at their disposal media who daily spewed out propaganda supportive of the protests, while the recent protest hardly had any media support. The Zagreb Euro-Balkan regime had united support of not only Soros' media (Novi List and their ilk), not only Pavic's EPH [Globus and Jutarnji List], but also of not so long ago "patriotic" Vecernji List.
All in all, Zagreb residents did not come out in front of Intercontinental hotel, and various Croats who have to spend a whole night in crowded train cars of the Croatian Railroads only to face hostile Police, indifference of the locals and spitting of the media, said "this time without us!"
Therefore, what conclusion can be drawn? Croats are, above all, divided according to ideology, but also by geography, to the Euro-Balkan north (Zagreb), and west (Istria and Rijeka) and the Croatian south (Lika, Dalmatia, and Herceg-Bosna). That, one could say, is natural, even "European"; aren't the most hard-line Germans in Bavaria, fiercest Austrians in Carinthia, most patriotic French in Provance, and then the most Croatian Croats in the south of Croatia!
Besides, we were recognized as such by the hardest working regime's guard dogs. Last week the front page of Novi List carried two headlines, similar to political arrest warrants: "Split, haven for Croatian europhobes" and "Mostar, ideological and logistic center of the HDZ". Soros' lot naturally realized who their opponents are; Dalmatia and Hercegovina.
The way Istria breathes can be surmised from the most recent Feral's headline for an interview with Ivan Jakovcic: "Yes, I would be glad if Istria, Rijeka, and Trieste were in a single region!" That "Europeanism" of the Croatian minister for Europe is very similar to that of Dobrica Cosic [Serbian writer, considered to be "the father of Serbian nationalism"] and very lively Italian separatists, now disguised in European colors. But, with the chief of the state who behaves as a British spy, one cannot expect anything better from a minister.
It would be best for us to face the truth: we Croats are mostly a pale, apathetic people, increasingly a gathering of disoriented individuals without color, taste and smell. If we do not find the strength to be our own, proud and happy to be what we are, no promised European wealth will pull us from the most recent Croatian silence and depression.