A second wave of attacks came from abroad; it was further intensified after the case in Dusina. American administration was embittered with Mr. Alispahic's (AID director) claims that there were no foreign citizens in Bosnia which he had given only a few days before the IFOR soldiers raided the training center in Dusina [near Fojnica]. Although there was not too much evidence that the training center in Dusina was linked to the AID, the momentum of American criticism picked up not only Alispahic but also the AID. Consequently the pressure on the Bosnian Presidency was doubled.
At first, the Presidency members did not intend to change their decision. Dr. Nijaz Durakovic in one TV show said that he had voted for the founding of the AID, justifying his decision by the fact that every sovereign state in this world has an institution which is in charge of its internal security; he added that the establishment of that kind of an Agency is within the constitutional rights of the Presidency. Dr. Ivo Komsic at that time believed that certain procedural lapses shouldn't bring in question the basic task of the agency.
The sources consulted by Slobodna Bosna testify that the Presidency members, prodded by the Komsic's resignation, asked themselves what their rights actually were and whether the Presidency would be able to control the Agency's work. Specifically, if the Presidency is the formal founder of the Agency and has appointed its director, is that the end of its influence on this company? Why wasn't the Presidency consulted about the systematization of other positions in the AID? Certain Presidency members have only heard in the corridors that almost 1,500 people were supposed to be employed by the agency. In order to illustrate the size of that kind of a service, let us mention that the pre-war [communist] Bosnian secret service (roughly corresponding to the AID) employed approximately 600 persons. Or, when the Croatian president Tudman demanded to be told the number of employees in the [communist] Croatian secret service, he was shocked to find out that there were only 800 of them.
The presidency members were also denied the information about the financing of the AID and its future relation with the Bosnian police. There are reliable informations that only a few hours before the new federal Minister of Internal Affairs, Avdo Hebib started work at his new office, his predecessor had transferred the bulk of money, equipment, vehicles and all other "trifles" to the AID. This was one of the reasons because of which Hebib and Alispahic refused to communicate and why the government had to form a commission whose task was to establish which part of Bosnian police property belonged to whom. Presidency members also demanded equal access to all information obtained by the AID. They think that the members of the Presidency are not treated equally: while some of them regularly receive all, even top secret, informations from the AID, the others have to be satisfied with the informations they can read in the papers.
It is not a secret that, in the meantime (between the hospital visit and Alispahic's dismissal), the American pressure on the Presidency has significantly increased. State Department spokesperson, Nicholas Burns, stated in connection with Alispahic's dismissal that the American ambassador in Bosnia, John Menzes was the last one to demand that from the Bosnian leadership (Republican presidential candidate, Bob Dole also demanded the same previously, in his letter!).
It could be said that intense pressure from the American administration which demanded Alispahic's dismissal and the actions of the five Presidency members with the same goal corresponded both in time and content; however their motives are not the same. The American establishment couldn't easily brush off Alispahic's attempt to deceive American state secretary Warren Christopher during his visit to Sarajevo, when Alispahic claimed that there were no more armed foreign citizens in Bosnia (Christopher stated on that occasion the following :"Mr. President, ours and your informations are not the same." In diplomatic relations this portents a concrete counterstrike). The five presidency members tried with their atypical activism regarding the AID to save what is left to save in their constitutional position and personal and collective dignity. Although it is hard to believe that a personnel change at the top of the secret service could change the transformation of this institution into what it was, it seems, supposed to be from the start: a party secret police given a degree of legal and constitutional legitimacy by the Bosnian Presidency, that activism testifies that the Presidency members did not surrender without a "fired bullet" to the SDA [Party of Democratic action, the largest Bosnian Muslim party and the ruling party in Bosnia-Hercegovina] intentions to use the collective head of the state as its own legal alibi.
Of course, limited space doesn't allow us to discuss and analyze the behavior of the Presidency members during the war (the "non-SDA" members); it mostly followed that de Cubertain's joke "it is important to participate and not to make decisions". Maybe there is no need for that, since the general tendencies in the Bosnian society can hardly be discerned from the behavior of those who don't make decisions. Their behavior is, after all, the consequence, not a cause, of more than obvious Bosnian political charge towards the authoritarian and undemocratic society...