by Dejan JOVIC
However, I do not accept the assertion that nationalism in itself was sufficient to break up Yugoslavia, destroy the Socialist order and establish its own, nationalist order. Nationalists would have never, I repeat, never, come to power, nor get a chance to implement their programs, had the socialist Yugoslavia not previously broken up. Nationalism always existed - we agree on that point - but the really important question is - how did nationalism get a chance to come to power? - and - why precisely at a particular time? (rather than, for example, twenty, thirty, or even fifty years before). My answer to that question is as follows: nationalism did not get a chance to come to power in the former Yugoslavia either because of its strength, or because most residents of the former Yugoslavia were nationalists, or because of the existence of some "ancient ethnic hatred", or because it was assisted from outside, from abroad, or because nationalism in Yugoslavia was stronger than, for example, in Great Britain, Germany or Canada. Nationalism got a chance to come to power in Yugoslavia primarily because the ideology of socialist self-management, based on the anti-statist idea (and the practice it implied), weakened the state to the extent that it was unable to respond to the challenges of the alternatives - such as nationalism, liberal democracy, new world order, ordinary (non-political) crime etc. That ideology was not an empty word, a phrase no one believed in. It inspired those who had the decisive influence on the way Yugoslavia was going to be organized and developed, especially in the years after 1966. The weakening of the state opened the road to chaos and anarchy, and to violence and horrible crimes that took place after the break up of Yugoslavia. My book does not deal with the period after the break up and the war, although it offers (as I say at page 19) some "possible explanations", i.e. possible theories for further research. In the situation in which one state had disappeared while another one still hadn't taken its place, we got the typical state of disorder and chaos with ensuing war in which more powerful factors tried to exploit the opportunity and subjugate, destroy, or expel the weaker ones. Those who ended up in the weaker position unfortunately felt the meaning of the absence of state and its force as a controlling factor. That war, waged after the break up of Yugoslavia, perhaps would not have been possible at all, and definitely would not have been as bloody and violent, if some, any (even the least legitimate) state apparatus existed. Similarly, until the efficient state apparatus is established in the new, post-Yugoslav states, until the state becomes stronger than various private and semi-private violent groups, we shall not have either peace or freedom, justice or equality. In my case, the term "efficient state" does not imply "police state", just the opposite. Police states are not only inefficient, but as a rule weak and lack resistance to challenges. But every state, especially a legitimate liberal-democratic state has the right to use adequate force, violence, in order to confront private and semi-private bullies who endanger freedom, equality and justice, by terrorizing its citizens and others living on territory under its jurisdiction. When the state is unable to check private and semi-private violence, then citizens live in fear and face potential danger and death. Bosnia-Hercegovina is one example. Macedonia another, Kosovo yet another. Besides Serbia-Montenegro offers yet another example. In Serbia-Montenegro, the state authorities failed to establish monopoly on force and thereby overcome private violence, which led to the tragic murder of the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on March 12, 2003. That murder is a desperate attempt of private thugs (who deeply penetrated state structures) to prevent the establishment of the state apparatus with the monopoly on the use of force that would check and supplant their monopoly in that sphere.
My critic, however, fully ignores all of the above and claims that the break up and the war (which for her are simply two sides of the same process) took place due to the force of nationalism, which had always been great, and because the tradition of nationalism was "stronger than democratic tradition". But, she does not wonder how come only the country with the ruling concept of "withering away of the state" fell into the chasm of such tragic violence and multiple wars? How come liberal-democratic multi-national countries, for example Great Britain and Spain haven't broken up, while only Socialist federations, for example Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union did? And why did those two Socialist federations (and especially Czechoslovakia, where the socialism had been "imported") break up more or less peacefully, while precisely Yugoslavia (with its anti-statist concept) did not? Was the Irish separatism and British unionism in Northern Ireland weaker than the nationalism of unifying and separatist sort in the former Yugoslavia in the period described in my book, 1974-1990? Was the Basque nationalism a "paper tiger" without a chance to break up Spain? Or is the truth to be found in the fact that in only one of all of these cases nationalism stumbled upon a "state that was withering away" (or as Robert Badinter says "in the process of dissolution"), while in others it faced the liberal-democratic state that might have been minimalist and ultra-minimalist (as it was under Margaret Thatcher), but at no time did it occur to that state to "whiter away". On the contrary, that state strengthened cohesive elements, unified language and culture, kept and in all ways possible promoted the ideology of liberal democracy and the practice of capitalism and managed to split nationalist alternatives by separating violent nationalists from their non-violent counterparts. It banned the former kind and treated them as terrorists, while the latter sort was allowed to participate in the politics and run for office. Neither Great Britain nor Spain, namely, treated nationalism as something a priori negative, and did not treat equally those who advocated separatism and independence through political struggle and those who resorted to violence to achieve the same goals. We saw none of that in the Socialist Yugoslavia in its final years. In my opinion, that is the main reason Yugoslavia fell apart, while liberal federations haven't.
Or, let us stick with the example proposed by my critic, i.e. Bulgaria. My critic does not realize that precisely that example actually verifies my theory, rather than hers. Bulgaria was never based on the idea of self-management socialism, but always stuck with "state socialism". Secondly, Bulgaria always kept the foundations of its identity on "two legs" rather than on one only. While the first leg was "state socialism", the second leg was and remained Bulgarian nationalism. In Socialist Yugoslavia the elite (not necessarily the population as a whole), on the contrary, treated both the state socialism and "unifying" Yugoslav nationalism as its chief opponents. Finally, Bulgaria did not have the ambition to develop its own interpretation of Marxism, and treated that ideology as for the most part foreign, i.e. imported from the Soviet Union. Consequently, once the ideology became unpopular and pulled back to where it had come from, it could be rejected that much easier.
One cannot but wonder why my critic, who claims that nationalism was so strong that in the end it managed to break up Yugoslavia, does not see the fundamental difference - that only in Yugoslavia, and not in the countries of "state socialism" or in the countries where the ideology of liberal minimalist state ruled - unifying non-violent nationalism was banished from the public discourse and political action? Why does not she realize that only the former Yugoslavia promoted the type of nationalism that was by definition separatist, or as I emphasized, anti-statist? Only in Yugoslavia statism was the main opponent. Yugoslav Communists took Engels seriously when he claimed that "the society that organizes production on the basis of free and equal association of producers (sic! Sounds familiar? Where else have you heard that phrase?) will send the state apparatus where it rightfully belongs - to a museum". Besides, in the second chapter of my book, on more than 50 pages I analyzed Edvard Kardelj's work, the way in which he took the abovementioned and other Engels' ideas, developed them and then implemented them in practice, starting with 1967.
Unfortunately, my impression is that my critic did not carefully read that part of the book. Otherwise, she would not have claimed that I interpret Kardelj's ideas only on the basis of hearsay and rumors retold by suspicious witnesses, rather than on the basis of his writing and statements.
If my critic read the book more carefully, she would not have missed that I very explicitly (for example on page 37 or the Belgrade edition) reject the idea that Yugoslavia was an "artificial creation". Still, she asserts that I claim that "Yugoslavia was an artificial creation that was doomed the moment it was created, which implies that the break up of Yugoslavia was unavoidable". It matters not that on page 19 (therefore in the introduction) I say:
"The other theory I reject in this book has to do with the idea that the break up of Yugoslavia was unavoidable. Nothing in politics in unavoidable. The break up of Yugoslavia (and especially the war that followed) was not a God given natural catastrophe. It was the result of actions and expression of beliefs of relevant political factors".
Further, she cannot find anywhere (supposedly mine) claims that "one (ethnic) nationalism was for Yugoslavia, while all others were against it". Lacking at least one sentence that would (at least partially) confirm that assertion, she resorts to the method of "implication", claiming that I "imply" something like that by "creating artificial parallels between the non-existent Yugoslav nationalism and obviously present Serb nationalism," whatever that might mean. But, where do I do that?
Next, she says that I, describing one of the political rallies in Belgrade "naturally fail to mention that he (i.e. Raif DIzdarevic) was then (as a Yugoslav representative) booed, while Milosevic (as a Serb representative) was welcomed with ovations and chanting ‘give us weapons'". But, let us consider what I (on page 454) have to say about that event that I "naturally" fail to mention. "Serb, and not only Yugoslav character of the protest was illustrated by the fact that the rally did not quiet down after the public address of the then president of the Yugoslav Presidency Raif Dizdarevic but only after the speech of Slobodan Milosevic. That was the first time that a Serbian politician received the central, and a Yugoslav one peripheral spot in a public event. The rally ended with the promise of Slobodan Milosevic that those who organized the strike in Stari Trg mine would be arrested. Then Azem Vllasi and several other former political officials and managers in Kosovo were arrested".
Therefore, what did I "naturally" fail to mention?
Fourth, my critic objects that I only "pay attention to the date when the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) published the Memorandum, while ignoring the fact that the Memorandum had been published in parts, and as a whole (identical to the text that was later published by the SANU) several times before the official publication". However, she seems to have missed that on page 359, in footnote 38, I say that the text was "published for the first time in the magazine of the League of Communists of Croatia Nase teme [our topics], 1989, pages 128-163"?
Fifth, she says that my claim that the Memorandum defended AVNOJ [Socialist] Yugoslavia is "artificially constructed" only to admit in the following sentence that "such a sentence does exist at the end of the Memorandum", but the Memorandum also contains another sentence that claims that Serbia should have accepted during WWII solutions that opened wide possibilities for "their demolition" (presumably of those solutions?). I am surprised that my critic does not realize that those two sentences should be linked with "in spite of". Namely, the authors of the memorandum had a positive view of the AVNOJ solutions in spite of claiming that the then Communist partisan leadership of Serbia had accepted them in extraordinary circumstances?
Sixth, my critic wants to know "why the author ignores claims by Borisav Jovic" that in 1990 Milosevic's goal was to eject Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, while keeping a part of the latter's territory? That means that she failed to spot (or forgot that she had seen) pages 477 and 478 where I quite precisely quote those parts of Jovic's diary that I allegedly "ignore", notes from March 26 and June 28 1990. Moreover, on page 478 she will find the following sentence: "Slovenia could leave in one piece, Croatia could not". Therefore, do I really ignore the claims by Borisav Jovic that "Milosevic Milosevic's goal was to eject Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, while keeping a part of the latter's territory"?
Seventh, my critic claims that I never put the phrase "anti-bureaucratic revolution" between quotation marks, which obviously shows that I "accept that mass movement for the national homogenization of Serbs as a revolution against bureaucracy". First of all, it is not up to me to "accept" or "reject" any mass movements, or to give them arbitrary names that I may find more agreeable. It is true that I do not place the term "anti-bureaucratic revolution" between quotation marks, but I do italicize it (see page 75, 76, and 411), which in my book does not mean (as Dr. Milosavljevic implies) most important, but mostly irony, especially when quotes are concerned. The same applies to the term unity on the same page. Besides, I did use quotation marks three times for the term "bureaucracy" and words derived from that term on page 415, and once for "truth rallies". But, even if there were no quotation marks or italics, the conclusion that my failure to use quotation marks implies "acceptance of the whole mass movement for the national homogenization of Serbs" would still be totally absurd. Let me remind the readers that in the introductory paragraph of her review of my book Olga Milosavljevic claims that I am trying to prove my theory at all costs and ignoring everything that does not support that theory in the process. However, is it not true that her claim that the lack of quotation marks actually implies "acceptance of the whole mass movement for national homogenization of Serbs" prove that she is the one actually trying to prove her theory at all cost?
Eighth, my critic says that "the author forgets that Milosevic was merely a president of a Serb political party, never a federal official," and then only a few sentences later objects that I "view Milosevic exclusively as a political party leader". In this case she is obviously contradicting herself.
Ninth, she claims that "Milosevic's photos did not hang next to Tito's photos; they replaced them. And that switch did not take place later, but ‘earlier'". Dr. Milosavljevic is referring to the following sentences describing the situation immediately after the Eighth Session of the League of Communists of Serbia, in the autumn of 1987 (page 399):
"His photographs were now placed next to Tito's photographs, and songs that in the past celebrated Tito now had different lines, celebrating Slobo. Several years later, Milosevic will totally replace Tito in the world of symbols, remaining the only photograph on the walls of Serbs in Kosovo and many other Serbs".
I leave it to the readers to decide for themselves what specifically is wrong in these lines and when "earlier" (earlier than what? The Eighth Session? Displays of Tito's photos?) did this switchover take place. Also, it is unclear why Dr. Milosavljevic finds it necessary - after such a definite statement regarding the sequence and timing of events - to warn me that "later, on the eve of the war, his photos were nowhere to be found"?
Tenth, my critic asks me why I claim that Tito and Milosevic had seminal significance in different phases of Yugoslav history, that they were the most distinguished representatives of the political elite, and expression of the will of a significant part of population they ruled at the time. Then, she says:
"Here some fundamental questions seek answers. How did Milosevic become the central personality in Yugoslavia when he was merely a president of the Communist Party in Serbia? What gave him so much power?"
Well, I used no less than 520 pages of my book in an attempt to answer those - fundamental indeed - questions, from the first to the last page of the book. Just like I offer an answer to her question - how come that an "anti-state" managed to survive for so long. It seems my critic skipped the third chapter of the book, in which I describe reasons that led Serbia to accept Kardelj's concept? But she perseveres in her pop-quiz style and has yet another question:
"How is it possible to compare two so different personalities, one of whom symbolized all of Yugoslavia, while the other one symbolized only one Yugoslav state, and when was Tito a leader of a separate, national movement in Yugoslavia?"
As if I ever claimed that Tito was a leader of a separate, nationalist movement. And as far as the former question is concerned - Tito and Milosevic can be compared, if for no other reason than because both of them were presidents of Yugoslavia. Namely, it is not my fault that Milosevic chose to name the country whose president he was between 1997 and 2000 Yugoslavia. Is it not curious that he insisted on that name - Yugoslavia - rather than switching to Serbia? Did anyone prevent him from naming the country in which he did as he pleased Serbia? My critic responds to this question with a certain dose of naivete. She claims that this was "a fake identity and pragmatic continuation of the name with the goal of assuming the continuity of the respect enjoyed by the former state, membership in international organizations, its property". In that she forgets to answer the question - why did Milosevic care about the "continuity of the respect enjoyed by the former state" if, as she claims, he was a Serb nationalist? Why did not he want to go back to "the continuity of respect" enjoyed by Serbia in the early 20th century, which was at the time lauded by those who wrote in Serbia about the purported "golden age" of Serbia between 1903 and 1913, about Serb suffering in the Balkan wars and courage in WWI? Why did not Milosevic follow Franjo Tudman's example? Franjo Tudman thoroughly destroyed any thought of continuity between Yugoslavia and the new Croatian state, going so far as to promote ignominious Croatian past from WWII. Should not the answer be found in the fact that only convinced nationalists are never prepared to compromise with "non-national eras" and their symbols, and therefore never attempt to establish continuity with them? On the contrary, Milosevic was (as I claim in my book) a far more complex political phenomenon.
My critic, also, forgets that Milosevic would have found it much easier to secure respect, membership, and property (and much more) if he called his country Serbia, or at least Serbia-Montenegro, instead of insisting on the Yugoslav name, even when it was very unpopular both within the country and abroad. Besides, all others, that is all other Yugoslav states that opted for national sovereignty without "fake identity" secured continuity, respect, membership and property. Therefore, what pragmatic reasons could push Milosevic from one defeat to another, and so on, for years? The only driving force behind such behavior could have been his dogmatic ideology that could never give up the Yugoslav name, Yugoslav national anthem, Yugoslav symbols. Therefore, ideological fanaticism, rather than primarily pragmatism, took him on a path of no return.
I could add many more examples of imprecision, incorrect reading, manipulation of sentences, and simply fabrication (i.e. "implying"). Thus, at this point I stop with examples in order to go back to the fundamental source of disagreement between Olga Milosavljevic and myself.
Namely, Olivera Milosavljevic does not accept the basic rule of writing of everything but fiction - that it is equally important to decide what the book does deal with and what it does not deal with. She criticizes me for not dealing with the war in my book, the war that took place after the break up of Yugoslavia, because that war cannot be separated form the break up. She writes:
"It is impossible to separate the segment break up from the segment war; they do not follow each other; they go together and represent two faces of one and the same process".
I am not confident that that is assertion is true. Actually, in that sense, I find the conclusion by Michael Ignatieff more convincing:
"Recall the order of events. First, there was a collapse of the state, then Hobbesian fear, and only then nationalist paranoia, followed by fighting. Nationalist sentiment in the field, among ordinary people, is the consequence of political disintegration, a response to the break up of the state order and the inter-ethnic concord that was made possible by that state order... People become nationalists when they are fearful, when the only response to the question who will protect me becomes: my people" (M. Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor. Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, New York, Owl Books, 1998:45).
We saw the same order of events in the Yugoslav case, in which the collapse of the state started at the time of full promotion of the self-management concept. That process was gradual and took several decades. It started within the elite, and later spread to the "people in the field" (as Ignatieff refers to them), which does not imply that the people hadn't been exposed for a long time to nationalism, or that that nationalism, as concept and practice was totally alien to them. However, as far as my book is concerned, "the people" has only secondary importance. At the time the process of the break up was concluding, it still hasn't been formed as demos, so that its influence on political decisions was limited. (That is at the same time the answer to the question of my critic - why do I introduce term "people" in the analysis only towards the end of the book. Because "people" as a political subject had not existed until it was formed - informally, in the street, or formally, at the ballot box.)
Another thing missing in the final phase of the break up (as far as I am concerned, early 1990 and the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) is - war. At the time, let me remind, there was no war anywhere in Yugoslavia. Not even in Kosovo. The war came as a consequence of the collapse of the state, it did not cause that collapse. The order of events was - first weakening of the state, then fear and paranoia (for the most part deliberately fanned by "apocalyptic literature" and catastrophic exaggeration of the events in Kosovo, economic crisis and the crisis of the political system), then the aggression and war. These were not only two sides of the same process, but several phases that followed each other.
To claim, on the other hand, that the war and break up are one and the same event, means to promote an essentially fatalistic theory according to which the war necessarily followed the break up! That absolves political factors that became important after the break up of Yugoslavia from all responsibility for events that took place during their leadership. To make sure we don't forget - my critic "accuses" me of fatalism and "absolving" nationalist leaders. However, actually, by claiming that the war and break up are one and the same process and that nationalists bear most responsibility for everything that happened both before and after 1990, she not only promotes fatalism and the theory of unavoidability, but also fully absolves those who ruled Yugoslavia for 45 years of all responsibility. As if violent nationalism came out of blue, and as if it weren't true that nearly all nationalist leaders had earned their revolutionary skills within the Communist movement. And as if the concepts they promoted, for example "anti-bureaucratic revolution" - do not originate in the Communist discourse.
Therefore, when I decided to focus on the break up, rather than the war, I did not in any way mean to neglect the links between the two. But, based on chronology and methodology, the book about the break up deserves to be separated from the book about the war. In the book about the break up, chief roles can in no way be reserved for Franjo Tudman, Vojislav Seselj, Radovan Karadzic, and Mate Boban. Nor can the book about the break up be criticized from the point of view of anything that happened after the break up, that is between 1991 and 1995. Furthermore, I oppose encyclopedic approach that permits author to encompass "all history" in one book and offer some universal "knowledge". My book ends in 1990 - war and post-war period remain for another book. Besides, I emphasized that in several places in the book, including page 18.
There is another methodological problem separating me from my critic and causing serious misunderstanding. Namely, Dr. Milosavljevic does not respect my principle that "the sense of political analysis is not to judge or interpret nor to explain who was good and who evil, nor who is guilty and who should be commended" (page 21). In my opinion, a political analyst has no monopoly on political views nor to interpretation of ethics and morality - that right is shared by all citizens equally. A change of political paradigm, I hope, does not only topple untouchable authorities in the political and moral sphere, but also in the sphere of "knowledge". This change abolishes "immortality" and moral superiority of academicians and "scientists" with respect to their listeners, students, and readers. It does not only topple enlightened absolutists in the political but also in the intellectual sphere. The book was written with that principle in mind, based on that methodological concept, and inspired by that desire. It is based on the premise that my readers, thanks very much, are adults and capable of deciding on their own who is "good" and who "evil". They have their own minds and the full right to use them. My task is to explain what happened and why, neither more nor less. It is up to the readers to reach conclusions on their own.
My critic does not accept that, but expects from me to condemn or commend those she (and myself, perhaps) does not or does like. When I fail to do so (deliberately, of course), she denounces that as unacceptable moral relativism. She keeps listing names of those I "condemned" and "absolved", and then pontificates whether I condemned the just and absolved the guilty. Finally, once she realizes that such reading of the book is frustrating and pointless, she concludes that I actually claim that "no one is to blame", and objects my naivete (I wonder how harsh her criticism would have been had she decided that I had ill intentions?)
But, I never say that "no one is to blame". Instead, I state that the answer about guilt and credits "must be found within by each one of us". On page 22 I also say that I sincerely hope that "this book offers sufficient elements that will make it easier to respond (individually) to such questions". Individually! Not me for them! Isn't the real problem of my critic that after reading the book she is not anymore sure about her own explanation of the questions raised here, including that of "guilt" and "credits"? And now, instead of trying again, she blames the author for disturbing her clear, simple and clear cut explanation?
From that perspective without perspective, she criticizes my book for its alleged lack of consistency. How can I claim, she wonders, that Milosevic was both a convinced Yugoslav and a Serb, communist and nationalist, separatist and unifier, violent and non-violent? As far as she is concerned, it is simply impossible that Milosevic before coming to power, for example between 1984 and 1987, was a determined opponent of Serb nationalism, only to become towards the end of that period a distinguished protector and ally of that nationalism, who never fully rejected Yugoslavia (whatever his motivation for that may be). She simply finds it impossible that Milosevic was prepared to reject quite a lot, while on the other hand still dogmatically protecting his most important beliefs. For her, I assume, even Ivan Stambolic (a reliable witness of Milosevic's character, almost always at his own expense) is unintelligible, when he says that there was one Milosevic before the speech in Kosovo Polje and a different one, totally incomprehensible for Stambolic, after that incident. Such things, according to my critic, never happen.
Her criticism of my "lack of consistency" most clearly reveals that dogmatism, that black-and-white view of the world. She does not allow that people may change, that their convictions may change, and that consequently their actions may become different. As far as she is concerned, once a nationalist, always a nationalist. They may have been "latent", may become "inside white, outside red", but always and above all - nationalists.
That dogmatism and monism, that absence of history, that exalted position of a moral and intellectual authority and omniscient sage, are most clearly revealed in the following assertion:
"The author should know that there never has been the idea ‘of any Yugoslavia'. There only was the idea of Yugoslavia as the community of Yugoslav nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians...), everything else is a lie..." Here, my critic is transformed from a strict teacher who stares down this ignorant author into a policeman who takes into custody of the court of history those individuals who carry in their pockets forged personal documents, and then into a judge who harshly sentences and sends them "to the dustbin of history". From one authoritarian profession to another.
Since I am not convinced that I want to be part of a discussion in which one of the participants prescribes to the others what they "must know" (or do), I shall stop here, aware that, no matter how I respond to her questions, my critic will continue asking more, and more, and more, and more... Therefore, allow me to conclude.
It is easy to now say - "No!" - and persist in claiming that crimes were committed only by nationalists: Serb, Croat, Albanian and others. It is politically correct to state that we on the good side have absolutely nothing to do with Milosevic. He was an ordinary dictator, he usurped power, people did not want him nor did they ever support him. He ruled using trickery and repression, not because he won elections three times (first time winning against Vuk Draskovic, at the time an advocate of Greater Serbia). He was never a convinced Yugoslav nor Communist - all of that was "a lie". His Yugoslavia was not the true Yugoslavia, nor was his socialism the true socialism.
But, has it not occurred to my critic that such explanation if not "individualizing guilt" (as far as I know she has adamantly opposed that in her other public appearances), at least fundamentally narrows down the basis from which it is allowed to seriously discuss causes of the catastrophe? Namely, such an explanation does not require from the past advocates of the concept of "withering away of the state" to reconsider their responsibility for that historical process. Thus, her call for reexamination of guilt stops half way.
Namely, Milosevic's evil specter does not only knock on the door of nationalists and anti-socialists, but also on the door of his ideological compatriots. Some accept that, other do not. The latter are convinced that the scepter has made a mistake and come to a wrong door. Unfortunately, he hasn't.