Using centralization of state authority, political and propaganda pressure and even political repression, the Serbian regime tried to establish jurisdiction on the whole territory of the republic, in the process reducing jurisdiction of the autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina); Albanian leaders in Kosovo and Metohija demonstrated equal passion for state-making in their "Political Declaration" and the so-called Kacanik Constitution, approved in September of 1990 at the secret session of the ethnic Albanian representatives from the Kosovo parliament which had previously been disbanded by the Serbian regime (Janjic D., 1994: 145).
Political leaders of Kosovo Albanians, inspired by the events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, opted for self-isolation in political and public life of Serbia and responded to the repression of the Serbian regime with the tactics of non-violent resistance, at the same time radicalizing their political demands. Many were surprised with the decision to engage in non-violent resistance, since until the end of 1989 the dominant inclination among the Albanians was for revenge: "The Albanians were waiting for mass mobilization to start a general armed uprising" (Malliqi Sh. 1994: 221).
Although "Ghandian resistance" didn't turn out to be very efficient in the sense of direct control of power, indirectly, in the sense of propaganda effect, it was very efficient, since the Albanians managed to internationalize the Kosovo problem. The basis for the internationalization and support found abroad was the image of "a victim of the Serb aggression". The neighboring Albania also contributed to the internalization even before the break up of the former Yugoslavia by claiming that the "Albanian question" was not an ethnic minority issue, but a result of the unresolved Albanian national problem. Later, that attitude will become the basis for the national movement of Kosovo Albanians.
The Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) appeared as the chief ideological and operational promoter of the common Albanian strategy in Kosovo; soon the DLK became the most influential political party among Kosovo Albanians. The key characteristic of their program was the struggle for the national interests of Kosovo Albanians, chiefly through the struggle for the adequate status for Kosovo. That struggle, as we will later show, will take various aspects: from the demands for true autonomy for Kosovo in the Spring of 1990, to the demand for equal status with other nations in the former Yugoslavia, open demands for the Republic of Kosovo within restructured federation to, finally, demands for independence which would be achieved in one of several ways: through temporary UN protectorate in Kosovo, confederation with Albania based on the Bosnian model and lately (after the Dayton Agreement) similar to the current Baranja model based on the agreement between Croatia and Serbia under the auspices of the United Nations.
In the Spring 1990, once DLK occupied virtually all the political space in Kosovo and Metohija, the formation of other parties and movements began "in order to demonstrate that Albanians support democracy and real plurality" (Malliqi Sh.: 274). However, it turned out that the newly founded political organizations in Kosovo were not political parties in the true sense of that word, but rather a national movement disguised in democratic costume; the main goal of that movement is the unification with Albania, or if that is impossible, the establishment of an independent state: independent Kosovo.
In parallel with the repressive measures of the regime in Serbia "the Albanian alternative" slowly established its institutions which became the basis of the "parallel" daily life in Kosovo and Metohija. An Albanian Ministry of Education and a network of primary schools, high schools, vocational education and even an alternative Albanian university were established. Also, the "parallel" Ministry of Finances is active, and a taxation system which enables the functioning of the whole "parallel system" has been established (Schmidt F./Moore P., 1995: 76-99).
Based on the instructions by their political leadership, the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija boycotted the first multi-party elections in Serbia in 1990. Instead, between September 26 and 30 1991 the "Albanian alternative" organized a referendum for the "sovereign and independent state Kosovo" supported by 87% of those who voted.
In mid 1992 (May 24) "semi-secret" elections for the 130 seats (actually 144 including directly elected representatives) in the Parliament and the president of the Republic were held under tight police control; the DLK and its leader Ibrahim Rugova obtained overwhelming victory (762 257 votes, or 99.7%) and achieved "total success". The DLK press service reported that the turnout was 89.32%, or 762 267 out of 853 432 registered voters (according to the official estimate from 1992, the Albanians make up 11.8% of voters in Serbia, or 829 663 out of 7,028,302 registered voters). 511 candidates from 22 parties competed in the elections. DLK won 96 seats (76.44% of votes), Parliamentary Party of Kosovo 13 (4.86%), Peasant Party of Kosovo 7(3.29%), Albanian Christian-Democratic Party 7 (3.15%) and independent candidates 2 directly elected seats. According to the ethnic composition of the population, Muslims (Party of Democratic Action SDA) were allocated 3 seats and won one directly elected seat in coalition with DLK, while 14 seats were not filled since they should belong to ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins. With these elections the Albanian leaders let it be known to the Serbian authorities and the International Community that they were not interested in any sort of autonomy, nor the elections for the new provincial parliament; their exclusive goal was the establishment of their own authorities which would chart a route for the secession from Yugoslavia (Lutovac Z., 1995a: 148-150).
However, the Kosovo Parliament elected in these elections has not convened until today, so that formally it is impossible to speak about Albanian parliamentary authorities and opposition. It is actually difficult to talk about the existence of the "position" and "opposition" in the conditions of state of emergency in Kosovo
Kosovo Albanians boycotted all elections held in FRY and Serbia for the benefit of non-Albanian parties, above all the ruling SPS and its allies; these parties with small number of votes won large number of seats in Kosovo and Metohija. Thus, for example, SPS, in the Serbian elections in 1992 with only 42,396 votes won 13 mandates [which would normally require about 400,000 votes]; the Serbian Radical Party which was at the time SPS' ally, won 5 seats, with 18,735, as did Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan (also SPS ally), with 17,352 votes, while the Democratic Reform Party of Muslims won 1 seat with 6336 votes.
The boycott of the Serbian elections in December 1993 by the "Albanian alternative" was even more beneficial for the ruling SPS since it won 21 out of possible 24 seats in Kosovo and Metohija (two were won by SRS and one by DEPOS). In these elections the coalition between the Party for Democratic Action (PDD) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) with 29,342 votes won two seats in the National Parliament. The participation of this coalition in the elections does not undermine the boycott of the other Albanian parties because the coalition only ran in several municipalities in the south of Serbia, which are not a part of Kosovo and Metohija. Actually, this coalition with its participation in the elections for the national parliament, followed the strategic goal that the Albanians in the south of Serbia [proper] and in Montenegro try to achieve their political goals in those regions through participation in the legal institutions; these goals are the establishment of political and territorial autonomy and local administration
In the federal elections in 1996, the ruling SPS won 12 out of possible 13 seats in Kosovo and Metohija, while the SRS won the remaining seat. The Albanians again boycotted "Serb elections", and Rugova announced the second multi-party "Kosovo elections" for 1997.
Unlike in Kosovo and Metohija where the ethnic Albanians are an overwhelming majority of population
In the November 1996 elections for the Montenegrin Parliament (which were held in parallel with the local and federal elections), DS CG received 5289 votes and won 2 seats, as did the other Albanian party, DUA, after receiving 3849 votes. In the local elections (in 21 municipalities) DUA won 2 seats out of 51 in the local assembly in Podgorica [the capital], 8 out of 33 in Ulcinj, while DS CG won 2 seats out of 35 in Bar and 14 seats in Ulcinj; the DS CG also won 11 out of 32 seats in the local assembly in Plav in coalition with the SDA of Montenegro.
SDA participated in the first multi-party elections in Serbia and, with 84,156 votes (1.7%), won three seats in the National Assembly (1.2% of all seats). At the elections for the president of Serbia, which were held at the same time, SDA leader, Sulejman Ugljanin, received 109,456 votes, which put him in the fourth place.
However, with the establishment of new states at the territory in the former Yugoslavia, the question of constitutional and legal status of the Muslims in FRY became prominent. SDA began to significantly deviate from its 1990 program. The leadership of the party formed the "Muslim National Council" (MNVS) on May 19 1991; SDA leader Sulejman Ugljanin was elected as the Council's president. On August 16 1992, at its session in Novi Pazar, the Council adopted a Declaration with two proposals for the solution of the Sandzak question: 1. If Serbia and Montenegro separately declare independence and request international recognition, MNVS would demand "special status" for Sandzak in accordance for the respect of the principle of inviolability of international borders; 2. If these two republics request international recognition as a single state, then Sandzak would demand to become a sovereign territory.
The clash between SDA and the regime in Serbia reached its peak during the campaign for the elections in December 1992, when the leader of SDA called for a boycott of the elections. The new strategy for political struggle was similar to the strategy of the Albanian parties in Kosovo and Metohija: a withdrawal from the Parliament and an attempt to internationalize the problem of Muslims in Sandzak and resolve it together with other ethnic problems within the Conference on Yugoslavia and other international institutions.
On June 6 1993, at its session in Novi Pazar, MNVS, influenced by the events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the Conference on Yugoslavia, adopted the "Memorandum about the Establishment of the Special Status for Sandzak," which envisages that all authority within Sandzak belongs to the local authorities, "except for cases specifically mentioned in this Memorandum". Sandzak would have the right to establish international relations and its own Constitution. The legislature of Sandzak would be its legislative body and the governor and government, and the Police under their supervision would be its executive authorities. The special status would also include independent judiciary under the control of the Sandzak legislature. All disputes about the special status would be resolved within the "Special Committee for Sandzak", International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and Sandzak would become a permanently demilitarized zone, under the supervision of UN and EU ("Memorandum", 1993: 1-5).
The federal and republican authorities rejected the "Memorandum" in totality, not accepting that it become the basis for any sort of negotiations about the "special status", and asserting that the Muslims in FRY can protect and develop their cultural, religious and all other ethnic rights within the existing institutions, Constitutional and legal solutions.
The initial impression of consensus among the Muslims regarding the "special status" as described in the "Memorandum" was quickly dispelled after appearances by a small number of Muslim intellectuals. Thus, Sefko Alomerovic (at the time vice-president of the European Movement in Serbia) reminded that Muslims do not live only in Sandzak
Clashes within SDA regarding the strategy and tactics for political action, and the very concept of the party, reached critical phase after the elections for the Serbian Parliament in 1993. The then SDA secretary general, Rasim Ljajic, asserted that the election boycott was a failure which harmed the interests of the Muslims in Sandzak. While Ugljanin, because of an outstanding arrest warrant, was outside the country and led the hard-line faction of the party, Ljajic's "moderate faction" announced participation in the next elections and announced before the federal and local elections in 1996 that its driving principles would be to: 1. Involve the International Community into Sandzak problem, 2. Establish political contacts with "the other Serbia", i.e. opposition political parties with civic orientation, 3. Engage in negotiations with those with whom one must negotiate, i.e. the Serbian authorities, and, finally, 4. Establish confidence at the local level and free Muslims from fear of participating in public offices and political life. The leaders of this party labeled their political activities as the establishment of balance between emotional links with Sarajevo and political reality which directs towards Belgrade.
The Muslim political scene in Sandzak became very confused just before the federal and local elections in November 1996. Besides SDA (led by Rasim Ljajic), on the eve of the November elections several other political parties were formed: Sandzak SDA with headquarters in Sjenica, Original SDA led by Esad Dzudzevic and SDA for Yugoslavia; all of them entered the coalition "List for Sandzak, Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin". In addition, in Montenegro, there is SDA for Montenegro and Independent SDA which was founded on the eve of the November elections by the former vice-president of SDA for Montenegro, Cazim Lukac. Besides confusion caused by the real inflation of the parties whose names included the acronym SDA, the real havoc was caused by the return of Sulejman Ugljanin to the country; he returned with the silent approval by the Yugoslav authorities, although a warrant for his arrest had been issued for "the attempt at secession of a portion of the territory, and change of Constitutional order and terrorism". Even more confusing was a completely new, peaceful rhetoric of the former radical nationalist. Soon afterwards, the "political looser" as Ugljanin had been called because of his isolation abroad, again became the leading figure on the Sandzak political scene.
The result was, seemingly, paradoxical situation that those parties which supported a Muslim boycott of the elections actually ran in them, while those who promoted participation in the electoral process at the last moment pulled out "in order not to dilute Muslim votes". At the same time Ljajic announced the founding of a civic orientation party with a new name. At the federal elections in 1996, "List for Sandzak, Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin" received 61,500 votes and won one seat in the lower chamber of the Federal Parliament, in addition to absolute majorities in the local assemblies in Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin, which were secured in the first round of voting.
Unlike in Serbia, where there are 241,411 Muslims who represent only 2.5% of the total population and constitute more than 50% of population in only three municipalities in central Serbia - Novi Pazar (75.4%), Sjenica (76.1%), and Tutin (94.3%), in Montenegro Muslims with 89,614 inhabitants make up 14.6% of population. They are the largest ethnic group in two municipalities in Montenegro: Plav (58%) and Rozaj (87%), corresponding to 9.5% of the republic. SDA for Montenegro, the most influential party among Montenegrin Muslims (although it had earlier supported independent Montenegro) before the elections in November 1996 asserted that the survival of FRY is in the interest of the Muslims as its breakup would lead to their separation in two new states. This party secured one seat in the Federal Parliament, and in the Montenegrin Parliament it won 3 out of 71 seats, with 10,147 votes. Such electoral result was primarily caused by "electoral geography" which favored parties with territorially compact distribution of supporters, as is characteristic of those parties in Montenegro which represent ethnic minorities
Besides SDA, several smaller parties are also active on the Sandzak political scene; based on political situation these parties were more-or-less close to the most influential Muslim party. The former Muslim Bosniak Organization dropped the word "Muslim" from the name of the party opting for a civic orientation and became the Liberal Bosniak Organization (LBO). The influence of this party on the local Muslims is much smaller than that of SDA. At the November 1996 elections this party participated in the coalition "List for Sandzak, Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin", as did the Sandzak Reform Democratic Party (RDSS) which in 1993 won 5530 votes which wasn't sufficient for a single seat in the Serbian assembly. That party mostly gathers intellectuals and respected Muslims. The local Serbs used to think of it as an SDA twin, while the SDA supporters viewed it as a "traitorous" party because of its participation in the electoral process, party's program which doesn't question territorial integrity of Serbia and asserts that Muslim question should be resolved in a democratic manner within the system.
Therefore, DZVM believed that it was possible to achieve political subjectivity of the local Hungarians, through the establishment of the means for self-rule developed in the "Memorandum", without violating sovereignty and interests of the Republic of Serbia as a multi-national state. However, when DZVM specifies its demand for territorial autonomy, it only has in mind compact region in the north of Backa with Hungarian majority, and not the whole of Vojvodina, the region which has historical, traditional, economic and political basis for territorial autonomy (it already is an autonomous region in the Serbian Constitution from 1990, but with significantly reduced rights with respect to the constitution from 1974). Thus, the proposal reveals aspirations for the establishment of an ethnic territorial and political framework in a multi-national region (although almost half of Vojvodina Hungarians would remain outside the region). On the other hand, the authorities in FRY and Serbia maintained that the existing legal and Constitutional solutions offer possibility for the achievement of basic rights and freedoms and the protection of the identity of all minorities, including the Hungarian ethnic minority.
DZVM has participated in the political life of Serbia and FRY, taking part in all elections, even in the elections for the lower chamber of the federal parliament in May 1992, which were boycotted by the most important opposition parties in Serbia and Montenegro. At the first multi-party for the Serbian Parliament in 1990, DZVM won 2 seats (with 132 726 votes); at the federal elections in May 1992, it won 2 seats (106 831 votes) out of 108 that belong to Serbia in the lower chamber of the Federal Parliament. At the Serbian elections in December 1992, DZVM won 9 seats corresponding to 16% of all seats. At that time DZVM was at the peak of its popularity and received 140,825 votes, i.e. almost 50% of all registered ethnic Hungarian voters (279,665). At the same time (December 1992) DZVM won 2 seats (2.8%) in the Federal Parliament with 106,036 votes. However, the attractiveness of DZVM for the ethnic Hungarian voters in Vojvodina immediately fell at the following Serbian elections in December 1993, when this party won 5 seats with only 85,994 votes.
The main political goal of DZVM in Serbia and FR Yugoslavia was the establishment of an ethnic autonomy; at the start of the Yugoslav crisis this was justified as a defensive reaction to the nationalism of the majority while later, with the waning of the armed conflicts in neighboring countries and growing likelihood of peaceful solution of the crisis, the autonomy was interpreted as an act of recognition of the Serbian sovereignty; DZVM also claimed that autonomy (limited sovereignty) was "an honest compromise" between the right for self-determination and principle of inviolability of borders. Authorities in Serbia viewed all these activities as an attempt to endanger territorial integrity of Serbia, national (nationalist) Serb parties as an institutional preparation for the secession, while the intellectuals and political parties with civic orientation from Vojvodina (co-signatories of the Manifesto for Autonomous Vojvodina, document signed on December 6 1995 by 17 political organizations, parties and associations) criticized this concept because of its ethnocentric orientation, while pointing out that the autonomy for the whole of Vojvodina was an ideal solution for all its inhabitants.
Different interpretations of the methods for protection of the interests of the Hungarian ethnic minority in FRY led in 1994 to the appearance of a new political force in Vojvodina and Yugoslavia. The Association of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) was founded after a split in DZVM. This event opened the question of the legitimate representative of Hungarians in Vojvodina. Namely, until the appearance of SVM, DZVM was the unquestionable political representative of Vojvodina Hungarians. The establishment of SVM pulled a significant proportion of the members and even leadership from DZVM and the problem of legitimate political representation of Hungarians in Vojvodina emerged; it was expected that this problem would be resolved at the next Federal, Serbian, or local elections.
The differences in the programs of these two organizations (DZVM and SVM), according to Ferenc Czubela, first leader of the new party, were not fundamental, but rather of formal character - SVM supported different, more pragmatic approach to the solution of basic problems (Lutovac Z., 1995b: 129).
The appearance of the so-called internal ethnic pluralism influenced the "redefinition of autonomy" by DZVM through the "Initiative for the Achievement of the self-rule for Hungarians in the republic of Serbia" (Pal S., 1995) and a modified concept for autonomy with emphasis on personal autonomy ("Proposal for establishing personal autonomy", 1995). SVM prepared "Outline of the Agreement for the Self-organization of Vojvodina Hungarians" in January 1996, and the Civic Movement of Hungarians in Vojvodina, the third ethnic Hungarian political party in Vojvodina, established in March 1995 with the goal of "preserving national identity of all Hungarians in accordance with the existing laws in Serbia and Yugoslavia", prepared "Memorandum" about the rights of Hungarians in Serbia.
Plurality has destroyed internal cohesion among the Hungarians (unlike among the Albanians) which emerged with "political ethnification" at the start of the Yugoslav crisis. Although SVM was in principle prepared to form a coalition with DZVM and a part of DZVM leadership close to the then vice-president Sandor Pal expressed its support for the idea, the political leadership of DZVM led by president Andras Agoston decided for the clash with SVM in order to secure legitimacy to represent its concept of autonomy.
SVM came out of the Federal and local elections in 1996 as a convincing victor. Namely, SVM, with 81,310 votes, won 3 seats in the lower chamber of the Federal Parliament, while DZVM with 46,807 votes failed to win any seats. Out of 120 seats in the Vojvodina Provincial Assembly, SVM won 13 (10.8%), while DZVM won only 1 (0.8%). In the first round of the local elections SVM on its own won 18 seats and another 17 in coalition with the Reform Democratic Party, while DZVM won 19 seats. It is hard to tell whether such decision of the ethnic Hungarian voters was a punishment for the refusal to form a coalition by DZVM, or the lack of support for its autonomy proposal and the strategy and tactics used to achieve autonomy, or on the other hand, a reward for SVM's concept of autonomy and their pragmatic strategy and tactics and political orientation ( preparedness for electoral and post-electoral coalitions with Hungarian as well as non-Hungarian parties) .
Rifts in DZVM were a consequence of such electoral results. Clashes between two factions, the one that rejected coalition with SVM (Agoston's) and the one that supported close cooperation with SVM (Pal's) - led to the Pal's removal from his office by the former faction, and soon afterwards the calling of an Extraordinary Party Congress and the election of the new leadership by the second faction. The next national elections in Serbia, which will be held during 1997, will show which one of these two factions is stronger, and the true strength of the real victor in clashes between ethnic Hungarian parties - SVM.
After the changes introduced with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, new initiatives for the start of productive dialogue between the authorities and minorities can be expected, both because of the decrease in inter-ethnic tension and the interest of foreign powers for the accelerated solution of the Yugoslav crisis. On the other hand "the outer wall of sanctions" against FRY remains untouched and the lifting of sanctions is tied among other with the establishment of a true autonomy in Kosovo and Metohija and respect for human rights in FRY. In addition the "International Community" has sent clear messages that it would not support secessionist demands by ethnic minorities. Consequently, it can be expected that the support for hard-line nationalists both among the minority and majority communities will decrease, which would lead to the establishment of conditions for a democratic dialogue and tolerance.
2) At the elections in 1992 the two mentioned parties ran separately and failed to win any seats (PDD then received 17,172 votes, and DPA 10,242 votes), while at the first multi-party elections for the Serbian Parliament in 1990, PDD won one seat with 21,998 votes.
3) According to the estimate from 1991, made necessary by the Albanian boycott of the 1991 census (the estimate is based on the 1981 census and the data about natural growth of the population), Albanians constitute 17.1% of the population in Serbia and mostly live in Kosovo and Metohija where they are a majority (82.6% of population). In individual municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija, Albanians are a dominant ethnic group on 80.6% of the territory of the province, namely 25 out of 31 municipalities, while the Serbs constitute more than 50% of population in 5 municipalities corresponding to 16.1% of the territory of the Province.
4) In political circles, and with increasing frequency among the Muslim population in Sandzak, terms Muslim-Bosniak or simply Bosniak have replaced the earlier term Muslim. "Bosniakism" has slowly entered vocabulary of Sandzak Muslim politicians after the decision of the Bosnian Parliament in 1994 to rename the Muslims "on the other side of the Drina river" as Bosniaks.
5) The word Sandzak comes from the Turkish work "sancak" - meaning flag. It was the name for the main military and administrative unit in the Ottoman empire.
6) Currently, Sandzak consists of the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Nova Varos and Priboj in Serbia and Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja in Montenegro. The region of Sandzak has never existed as an autonomous political entity except for the two years under Communist Partisan rule during WWII.
7) The "Memorandum" envisages that Sandzak, apart from the above listed municipalities should also include the municipalities of Berane, Plav and Rozaje, all three in Montenegro. Muslims are in majority in only five out of 11 listed municipalities: Tutin (94.3%), Rozaje (87%), Sjenica (76.1%), Novi Pazar (75.4%) and Plav (58%). In the remaining six municipalities, Muslims are a minority. For example: Prijepolje (43.4%), Bijelo Polje (41.6%), Priboj (30.4%), Berane (30,2%) and Nova Varos (8.5%).
8) For example the Socialdemocratic Party (SDP) of Montenegro, whose voters are scattered all over the republic, failed to win a single seat in the Parliaments although it had received over 16,000 votes (5.67%; at the most recent elections the threshold for representation in the Parliament was 4%), while the ethnic Albanian parties, the Democratic Association with only 5289 and the Democratic Union of Albanians with 3849 votes, won 2 seats each in the National Parliament.
Janjic D., 1994, "Nacionalni identitet, pokret i nacionalizam Srba i Albanaca", in "Sukob i dijalog", editors Janjic D. and Malliqi Sh., Subotica.
Lutovac Z., 1995a, "Serbisch-albanische Beziehungen in Kosovo-Metohija," in Minderheiten als Konfliktpotential in Ostmittel und Sudosteuropa (herausgegeben von G. Seewann), R. Oldenburg Verlag/Sudosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Munchen.
Lutovac Z., 1995b, "Manjine, KEBS i jugoslovenska kriza", Institut drustvenih nauka/Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, Belgrade.
Malliqi Sh., 1994, "Samorazumevanje Albanaca u nenasilju - Izgradnja nacionalnog identiteta naspram Srba", in "Sukob ili dijalog", editors Janjic D. and Malliqi Sh., Subotica.
Malliqi Sh., 1995, "Jedan zahtev za nov status: Albanski pokret na Kosovu," in "Srbija izmedju proslosti i buducnosti", Radnicka stampa/Institut drustvenih nauka/Forum za etnicke odnose, Belgrade.
Memorandum uber die Selbstverwaltung der in der Republik Serbien lebenden Ungarn, 1992, Stiftung fur Sudlandische Ungarn, Budapest.
Memorandum o uspostavljanju specijalnog statusa za Sandzak, 1993, Novi Pazar.
Offe C. 1992, "Ethnic Politics in East European Transitions," New York School for Social Research, New York.
Schmidt F. and Moore P., 1995, "Die Albaner im ehemaligen Jugoslawien als Sicherheitsproblem", in Minderheiten als Konfliktpotential in Ostmittel-und-Sudosteuropa", (herausgegeben bon G. Seewann), R. Oldenbourg Verlag/ Sudosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Munich.
Pal S., "Koncept manjinske samouprave DZVM", paper presented at the scientific conference: Rights of Minorities in FR Yugoslavia, January 11-13 1995, Belgrade. Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.
Proposal for establishing personal autonomy for the Hungarians living in the Republic of Serbia, March 11, 1995.