By ZELJKO CVIJANOVIC
Actually, when one reads Silajdzic's Memorandum on Changes, one sees that he didn't say anything that he hadn't been saying for at least two years. There isn't even that much about the Dayton agreement that hasn't already occurred. So what's the problem?
Bosniakism: First, Silajdzic finally, unintentionally explained Alija Izetbegovic's Pythian sentence that "a democratic Croatia to the west and a weak Serbia to the east is a historic opportunity for BH". The second problem is, of course, Silajdzic himself, who is without question the most arrogant and the most capable of Bosnian politicians and, more importantly, the last unexposed nationalist in BH. How did he succeed in this?
Because Silajdzic represents the last stage of evolution of Bosniak (Muslim) nationalism, which moved with lightning speed from phase to phase during the past decade. To jog our memories, when Izetbegovic and Adil Zulfikarpasic parted ways on the eve of the 1990 elections because of differing concepts of Bosniakism, Silajdzic remained true to the former, who did not want to the separate the national term Muslim from the religion. At that point, Zulfikarpasic abandoned the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), declaring that it was a party of clerics, and founded the Muslim Bosniak Organization(MBO) with Muhamed Filipovic, then the strongest advocate of Muslim Bosniakism among Sarajevo intellectuals.
Silajdzic also remained loyal to Izetbegovic in 1994 when the latter accepted, along with peace with the Croats, the idea of Muslim Bosniakism. This time, however, a relativeely shy Izetbegovic was forced to follow Silajdzic's lead in accepting the idea of an integral Bosniakism which, unlike its Muslim version, crams the Serbs and the Croats into the Bosniak nationalistic and cultural context.
That is why Silajdzic, an one-time vice president of the nationalist Party for Democratic Action(SDA), and now the leader of the integrationist Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina, is talking about Bosniak state-founding integrationism instead of Bosniaks as one of three constitutive national groups. That is why, instead of Muslims, Serbs and Croats, he is talking about "Bosnian civilization" as an example of multiethnic tolerance, even though history not only remembers otherwise but one would be hard pressed to find a smaller area in Europe where more people have died in the past century precisely for nationalistic reasons. That is why Silajdzic does not mention the Bosnian Serbs and Croats in the Memorandum on Changes at all except in the context of the Serbian and Croatian empire-building idea which emanates from Belgrade and from Zagreb.
Motherland: Of course, Silajdzic is correct that empire-building ideas do exist but how to explain that Milorad Dodik and Kresimir Zubak would get more votes today in Belgrade and Zagreb than at home? Because for the Bosnian Serbs and Croats a feeling of closeness to their motherland is not something which exists only in propaganda from Belgrade and Zagreb; it is not a question of a single political option or leader, even when that leader may be Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudman. Quite simply, they are one nation, something that Silajdzic does not even mention in his Memorandum, although he is eager to deny Bosnian Serbs and Croats a special arrangement with their motherlands. After all, it still remains to be seen whether the Croat Democratic Alliance's demise in Croatia will have any effect on the election results of that party among Bosnian Croats, who found a vent in Tudjman's teachings for their nationalistic frustrations, which Silajdzic's integrationism simply exacerbates.
On the other hand, integrationist Bosniakism pays far greater attention to the Croat element than the Serb element, and that is where the racist declaration of Izetbegovic comes in: in order to have a strong BH, it is good to have a Croat democrat and a Serb only if he is weak. Unfortunately, the reasons for this are, like many other things in Bosnia, historical: Bosniakism without a Muslim prefix pays far greater attention to the Croat element because the Catholic Church, and especially the Franciscan order, have continuously favored the Bosniak idea, as long as, of course, Bosnia is primarily a Croatian land. The Serbs are not enthused by this idea and so they have been left, according to Izetbegovic, to support Bosnia and the Bosniak idea only if weak.
Language: Silajdzic's nationalism is very skillfully packaged in a story of tolerance and multiethnicity. Of course, this is borne out by the fact that Bosniaks are the majority of the population in Bosnia, in the same manner as, at the beginning of the 1990's, the advocacy of the fundamental democratic principle of "one voter-one vote" on the level of Yugoslavia permitted many Serb nationalists to tie their intentions to stories of democracy.
It is precisely this trick that permits Silajdzic to remain for foreigners the only unspent nationalist in Bosnia. Namely, he had introduced into the language of the Bosniak nationalistic politicians the same post-totalitarian, humanistic speech that has dominated Western political thought as far back as 1945 and was completely adopted upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, by using recognizable terminology from that school of thought - genocide, responsibility, multiethnicity, holocaust, denazification - Silajdzic, as far as the Serbs are concerned, represents the ideas of those extremists in the international community who would like to place exclusive collective responsibility for what has transpired on the territory of the former Yugoslavia on the Serbs. The Serbs, therefore, not only do not have the same rights as other nations but the Bosnian RS entity was created by genocide and the results of a holocaust, and as such, it should be abolished.
But one needs to be objective and admit that Silajdzic's multi-culti nationalism was best supported by Slobodan Milosevic and its very political existence, survival and language, in which, since we are already talking history, definitely nothing new has appeared since Yalta.
Scrap it: A second, even stronger, argument of Silajdzic are the politicians in RS who would have done far greater harm to his idea regarding the revision of Dayton if they had expressed support for it across the board instead of creating a circus atmosphere in the Parliament on Wednesday. Because the dilemma of Wolfgang Petritsch and any friend of RS after Wednesday goes something like this: "Either I will be a democrat and allow these semi-reformed nationalists to strut to power or I will break every rule which I would not dream of breaking in my own country and support the government of these dilapidated Serb reformers." That is why the continued presence of RS has been reduced to the question of to what extent foreigners will continue to violate democracy before they say: "Scrap it."
"Scrap it," Silajdzic would agree and that is why his idea should be understood very seriously and not sad eulogies in defense of the Dayton Agreement as the Serb politicians are currently doing, nor with nonchalant comments such as "Silajdzic is alarming the public" (M. Banjac); "his genocidal and fascistoid ideas" (Dodik); "he is threatening to sacrifice the Dayton Agreement for a unified Bosnia-Hercegovina" (Dokic); "he is announcing a dark development in the region" (Plavsic); and "it is a great shame that politicians like Silajdzic hold such responsible positions" (Sarovic).
This year will be a decisive one for BH and Silajdzic has grasped this on time, tossing into the barrel an uncomfortable, yet realistic option. At the same time, the Serbs are defending the Dayton Agreement, which they themselves say has been violated more than 30 times, and continuing to tell people that they will not permit this even though no one who steps on their toes bothers to say so much as "excuse me" any more. Why should Silajdzic himself do so? Most likely he saw them on Wednesday in the Parliament as well.