by Dr. Predrag SIMIC
All this would perhaps not seem absurd if roughly at the same time Vojislav Kostunica did not address the General Assembly of the United Nations, stressing relations in the so-called "Dayton triangle" (Yugoslavia-BH-Croatia) as one of the highest priorities of Yugoslav foreign policy and assessing that in the last two years much progress had been made in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and normalization of the relations between these three countries. For example, only during the last year the president of Yugoslavia met as many as four times with members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina, two times in Sarajevo, once in Belgrade and once in Slovenia; early in the year, the treaty on liberalization of trade between the two countries was signed; the first "mini summit" of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement was held recently in Sarajevo (where "Sarajevo statement", which reaffirms dedication to the principles of the agreement was signed), while Belgrade is supposed to be the host of the next summit. At the initiative of the president of Yugoslavia the issue of renewal of economic cooperation was included on the agenda of the Belgrade summit, as economic cooperation should contribute not only to the reconstruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina and assist the return of refugees, but also establish foundations for regional cooperation as one of preconditions for the accession of all three countries to European integrations.
If one resorts to more detailed analysis of relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo, year 2002 brought progress in many other areas as well. For example, out of total number of refugees and displaced persons in FR Yugoslavia the greatest number of returns is exactly to Bosnia-Hercegovina (43 ompared with 17% to Croatia and only 0.0560f displaced persons from Kosovo), economic cooperation is slowly but consistently improving (and not only with the Republic of Srpska, but also with the Federation BH), cultural and media links are increasingly frequent and regular, the cooperation is advancing in many other areas, including the fight against smuggling and organized crime. After first steps taken last and this year, the authorities in Belgrade and Sarajevo are working on a sizeable packet of inter-state agreements that should remove remaining obstacles to the movement of people, goods and capital over the common border. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia welcomed the accession of Bosnia-Hercegovina, early this year, to the Council of Europe, she also supports development of the links of Bosnia-Hercegovina with the European Union, while the decision that abolished last modes of financing of the Army of the Republic of Srpska by the Yugoslav government removed one of the last obstacles to accession of Bosnia-Hercegovina to the "Partnership for Peace". In these, as well as in all other cases, the official Belgrade based its actions on the view that Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia are multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious communities, which makes their international position similar in many ways, above all regarding preservation of the existing borders in the Balkans and orientation towards European and Euro-Atlantic integrations.
Naturally, all of this does not imply that the relations in the "Dayton triangle" have somehow miraculously moved beyond the legacy from the past and are today void of problems. Seriousness and extremely careful approach to the reconstruction of these relations indicate that all three sides are aware of what happened in this region during the last decade or, better said, during recent decades, and that the Dayton Agreement, whatever someone may think about it, is today the best solution for the relations of three nations in Bosnia-Hercegovina and three countries of the "Dayton triangle". Moreover, a lot of inherited issues cannot be overcome and many remaining problems cannot be resolved in the current context so that in this case it may be appropriate to apply the old maxim of Jean Monet that "if the problem cannot be resolved in the existing context, it is necessary to change the context". For Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia the only "new context" is accession to the European and Euro-Atlantic integrations and that is, besides the obligations accepted in the Dayton Agreement and confirmed by the Sarajevo statement, the starting point that can serve for development of mutual relations. In that context, it is possible to seek a solution for the most delicate problems of not only Serb, but also all other divided nations in this region without opening old and new ethnic and territorial disputes and in the manner that was used in many countries of continental Europe after WWII.
Sensitivity of relations within the "Dayton triangle" is the reason why somewhat different rules than in ordinary international relations apply. Above all, these contacts are, at least recently, much more intensive and it would not be an exaggeration to say that some sort of a "hot line" functions in practice, which was obvious during the recent border incident on the Danube, when presidents Kostunica and Mesic with their timely reaction put a stop on a series of accusations and counter-accusations that had recently as a rule brought relations between Belgrade and Zagreb to the boiling point. Secondly, it goes without saying that commentary in the media and, especially, official statements about events in neighboring countries are as a rule very cautious and that there are no public reactions without previous checking of information and discrete diplomatic consultations. It is highly unusual and unacceptable that diplomatic representative of these (as any other) countries give a public assessment of political events or political factors in his host country. For example, although views of certain politicians and public personalities in the Federation BH about a revision of the Dayton Agreement, "second Dayton" etc. met with disapproval in Belgrade, absence of comments of this sort by the authorities and media in Yugoslavia was notable. Third, obligations regarding the Dayton Agreement, as well as the fact that only in the "western Balkans" it is possible to renew economic cooperation without significant investment unavoidably give to the relations of these three countries multilateral character, as was confirmed by the recent "mini Dayton" in Sarajevo. Similar rules, in principle, should apply to the Dayton guarantors outside of the region.
It is not superfluous to remind that seven years after the Dayton Agreement, the process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia is over, that the existing internationally recognized borders are a reality and will not be modified and that economic reconstruction and democratic consolidation of states in this region and reconstruction of their relations require totally different methods of those that were used during the nineties. The policy of setting conditions is only another mode of policy of sanctions that had tragic consequences for the population of these states and only promoted political extremism and criminalization of these societies. Isn't it true that precisely war and international sanctions destroyed the most promising economic projects in former Yugoslav states, actually a whole legitimate economy, and left behind legacy of smuggling, corruption, organized crime in the region? Isn't the time when the European Union and NATO are preparing for acceptance of new members from the central and eastern Europe the right moment for more courageous opening towards these countries, which will in any case in the coming ten years be the biggest losers in the process of expansion of European and Euro-Atlantic integrations? Perhaps that would be the biggest contribution to the efforts of these countries to definitively leave behind the legacy of the past through development of mutual relations and entry into European integrations.
The author is a foreign policy advisor to the President of FR Yugoslavia