It is natural that the political promotion of another two generals has caused new clashes on the topic of Army's involvement in politics. The indoctrination of the Army was a topic for heated discussions a year ago in the Bosnian presidency. Without mentioning the immediate reason (Alija Izetbegovic's address to the Seventh Muslim brigade in Zenica), Nijaz Durakovic, Stjepan Kljujic, Ivo Komsic, Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic and Mirko Pejanovic [non-SDA members of the Bosnian presidency] signed a common statement. They distanced themselves from "the abuse of religion in some units of the Bosnian Army." They even threatened to submit a collective resignation, but the whole thing was cleared up very quickly.
It would be naive to expect that the Bosnian Army can be removed from all political interests. Pacifists despise all uniforms, but the Army was the one to protect the Bosnian people and Bosnia from destruction. It is true that the Bosnian Army hasn't won this war, but it hasn't lost it either. The Army hasn't grown out of the state or religious institutions, but as a result of a more or less spontaneous resistance to the greater serbian invasion. The flesh and blood of that effort were the Bosniaks [Bosnian Muslims], a people which for a third time in this century had a knife pressed against its throat. Nevertheless, the universal character of that resistance comes from those Serbs and Croats who crossed to the side of the victim and turned the resistance in the struggle of good against evil.
In the first phase of the war, the dark side of that resistance, at least as far as Sarajevo was concerned, came out of the twiglight zone. Jusuf-Juka Prazina , the commander of several hundreds of volunteers, was given a rank of general by the state Presidency. Juka defended and thoroughly looted besieged Sarajevo. At the peak of his power, he could have, if he wanted, without any significant danger for himself arrested both the government and the Presidency, including Mr. Izetbegovic. They were all afraid of Juka; that's why they made him a general.
The rule of Musan Topalovic Caco followed; Sarajevo residents will remember his terror for a long time. Caco despised all those not carrying a rifle. He militarized Sarajevo atmosphere to that extent that even those whose cousins and sons were important officials were afraid of every armed passerby. This was most often used by those who hadn't fired a single bullet at the Chetniks [derogatory term for nationalist Serbs]. The smallest example of how they terrorized the population was visible in water lines. They would come at the start of a line and shout:" Move away, I'm coming from the front!" Collective silence was simply an expression of a mentality which had for years been formed under totalitarian authorities and a soldier boot.
Circumstances have changed in the meantime. Civilian authorities have more or less consolidated their hold on power; the war has stopped and the Army isn't any more an institution which intimidates politicians. Nevertheless, an army is a powerful institution even in peace. Even in the countries with parliamentary democracy, relations with military aren't always smooth. Political history is full of examples of that kind. Even one De Gaul, unquestionable political and moral authority in France, in the late sixties, had difficulties in controlling the generals who refused to end the war in Algiers.
The control over an army is an imperative for every democratic authority. Also, it is an imperative for every dictator. Therefore, the nature of power determines the nature of control over a military force. In the example of Josip Broz Tito [Yugoslav communist era ruler], we could have seen what it means when an army turns into a pretorian guard of a deity also known as the Leader. Loyal to one man only, unnaturally large, privileged and indoctrinated, the former JNA [Yugoslav Peoples Army] broke all moral principles, betrayed all other peoples and sided with the most numerous one [the Serbs].
Regarding the Bosnian affairs, the necessity to establish and solidify control over the Army is undeniable. The question is who should be in control. Ejup Ganic sees the political promotion of Generals Dudakovic and Alagic as a most natural event:
"Generals should help to map out of the further development of the state. Fighting and dyeing is not their only role."
The opposition doesn't agree. It accuses the ruling party, whose political philosophy has a strong religious orientation, of militancy and militarisation; it claims that the ruling party wants to gain total control of the Army by including the two generals into the party leadership.
At first glance, this is a multifaceted clash: between conservative and modern, totalitarianism and democracy, ethnic and multiethnic, theism and atheism and even different visions of patriotism. There is a bit of everything in this.
But since the politics is a double bottom suitcase, one should think of the most immediate motives. The elections are coming. The Army is not only a huge source of votes but also a great backdrop for election commercials.