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Milosevic after Milosevic

by Fahro Memic

Oslobodenje-Svijet, Sarajevo-Ljubljana, Bosnia-Hercegovina, 12/19/96

"Popular protest" in Serbia has been in the focus of the world media attention for more than a month. The struggle between the opposition and the party in power, the Socialist party of Serbia [SPS], actually its leader, Slobodan Milosevic, who contested the opposition victory in the second round of the local elections, has developed into a massive protest against the totalitarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic and his despotism; this protest has pushed to the surface some new players in this party of the Balkan poker who were greeted with a lot of interest by the international community. Besides Vuk Draskovic, leader of the opposition coalition "Zajedno", increasingly frequently the world media and diplomats focus on Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia [actually just Democratic Party; Democratic Party of Serbia, led by Vojislav Kostunica, is a splinter party founded by those members of the Democratic Party who found DP insufficiently nationalist]. Zoran Djindjic is a youthful intellectual, a philosophy graduate from the Heilderberg University [in Germany] and has a European civic image.

Zoran Djindjic appeared at the Serbian political scene after a "coup" against the then leader of the DSS, Dragoljub Micunovic, on the eve of the Serbian elections in 1993, at which Djindjic secured places for himself and another 30 democrats in the Serbian parliament. With these electoral results he totally refuted the sceptics who had predicted a crashing defeat and disappearance of his party. He imposed himself on the Serbs as a desirable substitute for Milosevic and as a man who will be acceptable to the international political scene which finds other, aggressively nationalist, politicians unpalatable.

However, it is absolutely clear that the Serbian public will find in Djindjic a Milosevic after Milosevic. Because, he is a man who is no different, at least as far as the "Serb national problem" is concerned, from Draskovic, Seselj, Kostunica, and even Milosevic himself. On the contrary, we can say with some certainty that the Serbian opposition is more radical and nationalist than the ruling Socialists. Today Djindjic presents himself as a cosmopolitan and democratic politician, but he is in reality something completely different. Everyone in the former Yugoslavia, and even in the international community, knows that Zoran Djindjic strongly supported the war policy of Radovan Karadzic and his general Ratko Mladic in Bosnia-Hercegovina. For that, he was generously rewarded by these war criminals who, among other, financed his most recent election campaign; their goal was to assist Djindjic in his quest for power, because of the rebellion of the Bosnian Serbs against Serbian Leader Slobodan Milosevic. Zoran Djindjic is a fanatical supporter of the motto: "Wherever there is at least one Serb, there is Serbia"; he skilfully used this motto in his election campaign, during which he kept emphasizing that nothing had been "concluded" as far as the relations of Serbia with Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina are concerned. He puts the blame for the recent war on the two states who were the victims of the Serbo-Montenegrin aggression. After the victory of the "Zajedno" coalition, Zoran Djindjic was supposed to become the mayor of Belgrade, as criminal Seselj had already become the president of the largest of Belgrade municipalities, Zemun. There are speculations that Djindjic may become a prime minister of Serbia, which would be like a suicide for the Serbian population.

Undoubtedly, Zoran Djindjic has shaken a boring Serbian political scene, by concluding majority of the deals behind the back of his coalition partner Vuk Draskovic, and saving himself for the future when he will demonstrate his real nature of a sympathizer and accomplice of the Pale policy, the consequences of which are well known here in Bosnia. Having that in mind, perhaps it is not surprising that the "great democratic changes" in Belgrade were received in the western Europe, especially in England and France, with a lot of satisfaction and euphoria. They see two possible favourable outcomes of these demonstrations: potential Milosevic's fall combined with the assent of another, more sophisticated chauvinist; another four or five years and maybe even a new war will be necessary to unmask this Milosevic after Milosevic.


Translated on 2/7/97


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