interview by Ivana JANKOVIC
NIN: Since the sixth attempt to push through a new UN Security Council resolution has failed, the process of further work on the status of Kosovo has been moved to the Contact Group. Your comment?
Western countries have been trying for four months to replace in the Security Council Resolution 1244 with a new resolution that would, on the basis of Ahtisaari's plan, open the way to independence of Kosovo. Finally, they were forced to admit their failure and that Ahtisaari's plan is not a realistic basis for an acceptable compromise and that negotiations must be restarted in some form. That is a big success of Serbia and Russia, as well as of other countries that supported in the Security Council and in the UN in general a balanced approach and respect for international law. In the Security Council these counties were above all China and also South Africa and Indonesia, and outside the SC all counties that recognize that independence of Kosovo would create a dangerous precedent.
What is the importance of the return of the Contact Group in the game?
"Return" is too strong a term. Before unsuccessful negotiations led by Ahtisaari, as well as during the negotiations the Contact Group represented the international community. The so-called leading principles of the Contact Group from September of 2005, from the start were and until today remain the framework for negotiations about the future status of Kosovo. Since the Ahtisaari's plan failed, the Contact Group will naturally take upon itself to secure conditions for the continuation of negotiations. When these new negotiations with assistance of the Contact Group finish, the issue will again return to the Security Council, which will then work on a new resolution. Until then US SC Resolution 1244 remains in force and no one but UN SC has the right to change it.
The West would like to install in Kosovo as soon as possible an EU mission that would replace UNMiK, but in Brussels they emphasize that an international legal act is needed for something like that. Is there a way to obtain such an act outside UN SC?
No, since UNMiK administers the province based on a UN SC decision. Every replacement of UNMiK by some other mode of international administration, which is what an EU mission and its chief would be essentially (the chief of the mission would at the same time be a civilian international representative in Kosovo with very wide ranging authority), requires a new, specific decision of the UN SC. Consequently, in Brussels they've been thinking very intensely about a new "inter-resolution" of the UN SC, which would deal less with the future status of the province and more with new international civilian and military presence in Kosovo.
What would be implications of the arrival of such an EU mission to Kosovo at this moment for Serbia?
Serbia, as well as Russia, has rejected the idea that before new negotiations in Kosovo any new mode of international administration and control be established. There are at least three good reasons for that. First, every hitherto proposed version of that idea ignores the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo, which immediately makes it unacceptable for Belgrade. Secondly, we are facing a new round of negotiations. Consequently, it makes sense that a new UN SC resolution be based on the results of those negotiations, instead of preceding them. Third, already fragile political situation in the province could easily become chaotic if now we initiated a long ranging transfer of authority from the UN to the EU.
Nevertheless, lately it has been emphasized in Brussels that Kosovo is a European problem and that consequently the EU should play a much more prominent role in the determination of the future status of the province. In that context they frequently insist on urgent replacement of UNMiK by their mission.
If European role in the Kosovo process is lesser than they would like it to be, I would say that the culprit should above all be sought in Washington. Since they are supposed to take over responsibility from UNMiK, and the EU does not want to do so without a UN and SC mandate, if that mandate is lacking they do not see a basis for their mission since thereby they would abandon international law and return to the situation we had during the NATO intervention. Americans are far less sensitive to such concerns and that scares European politicians, especially since Washington has been insisting for months that the Kosovo knot should be cut as soon as possible.
One gets the impression that similar difference exist in the attitude towards the possibility of unilateral declaration of independence by Albanians?
That difference is not discussed much, but it does exist. Most European politicians unequivocally reject such possibility, while the US does not exclude it. On the contrary, the formulation that Kosovo "will become independent, this way or that", "with or without UN SC resolution" is persistently used in Washington and at this moment presents the chief hope of Kosovo Albanians. Of course, only time will show what this American formulation really means - only support to independence of Kosovo, which also exists in Brussels, or readiness to produce that independence at all cost, even at the cost of violence in the province and total break down of relations with Russia and Serbia. The second option has barely any support in Europe, but it is clear that in Brussels they haven't so far found a way how to fully exclude it as a possible option. Hence, it seems to me, we witness dissatisfaction of European politicians with the situation they face: they both dislike the attitude of Serbia, which refuses to give up Kosovo, and the possibility that independence of Kosovo be imposed outside of UN SC and, ultimately, by NATO military presence in the province.
Two main political goals of this administration are the continuation of initiated process of accession to the European Union and the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. Despite repeated assurances from Brussels that the negotiations about the accession of Serbia to the European Union are not directly related to the solution of the Kosovo question, part of our public apparently does not trust those assurances. Will the EU force Serbia to choose between the EU and Kosovo?
Statements you've mentioned only indicate that the linkage between accession to the EU and Kosovo is not at the forefront at this point. Essentially, the linkage does exist, if only because the EU will not seriously consider accepting as a new member a country that has an unsolved political and territorial problem of the sort Serbia has with Kosovo. It may be both in the interest of Brussels and Belgrade not to openly discuss this issue for a bit longer, but that does not change anything. As Kouchner recently said in Belgrade, the Kosovo question must be resolved before Serbia can join the EU. But I do not believe that that means that Serbia can only join the EU if it gives up Kosovo. On the contrary, imposed independence of Kosovo that would be recognized without a UN SC resolution by the US and the EU would produce much political instability in the region and block for a while European integration of the West Balkans. It is even more important that in that case Serbia would lack either constitutional of political possibilities to continue the process of accession to the EU. I am convinced that in Brussels they are aware of all of that and that among other consequently they have a somewhat different attitude towards the Kosovo problem than the Americans. A compromise solution for Kosovo would be as much in the interest of the EU as in the interest of Serbia. The problem is that Europeans praised Ahtisaari's plan and independence so much that now, even if it weren't for Americans, they would have a hard time to start to consider a different solution.
Why have certain differences between the American and European approach to the Kosovo problem and its solution become more pronounced recently?
Especially in the last six months in America the Kosovo question has assumed certain aspects that simply do not exist in Europe, or are at least far less important as far as the European Union is concerned. First, Kosovo is one of a number of contentious issues between the US and Russia, so that it is a matter of prestige for Americans not to seem to lose face by giving up something they have been promoting for a while. Secondly, while as far as Europeans are concerned Albanians are only another Balkan nation with frequently megalomaniac political and territorial demands, Americans cannot but appreciate the loyalty of Albanians towards the US which has been sincerely expressed on every occasion for more than twenty years. That is especially true today, when in Washington they are seriously entertaining the possibility that independent Kosovo, in accordance with Ahtisaari's plan, will become a source of troops that will be sent to peace operations of Iraq and Afghanistan type. Third, America is far from the Western Balkans and trouble faced by the EU in case of a unilateral declaration of independence is not high on the list of its concerns. Fourth, and perhaps the most important factor is that the American foreign policy, due to the situation in Iraq and forthcoming presidential elections has become very complex at the moment with possibilities that extremely peripheral issues (as is Kosovo as far as the US is concerned) also influence completely unexpected circumstances and the current political constellation in Washington.
Early in the negotiation process our position was very bad and there was very little hope that anything could be done. However, now the situation is much more favorable. What contributed the most to that change?
Two circumstances affected equally that change - constellation of international relations, which we interpreted correctly, and a realist negotiating position, which we defined from the start and consistently defended. One would be worthless without the other. Without the existing balance of power in the UN Security Council, where Russia and China were from the start a wall blocking encroachment on our territory, and key support by Russia on the international scene in general, we would have been impotent to stop the actions by the West aiming to "finish the job" started in 1999. But the favorable constellation of international relations would not have been important if our leadership did not know how to exploit it. Looking from the outside, that may look simple, but it was necessary to timely identify what in the orchestrated pressures for independence, driven by Ahtisaari, was real and what an ordinary bluff. Fortunately, our predictions from the start turned out to be correct.
It is still not known what new negotiations will look like, who will lead them, what will happen if an agreement is not reached. What do you expect? At this moment, while we are talking, it is still not known if Russia has accepted the Western proposal that the Contact Group be represented by a trio - the US, EU and Russia - that would take the role of mediator. That role would at first imply "shuttle diplomacy" between Belgrade and Pristina, and later also direct negotiations such as those that already took place in Vienna. The key issue, however, remains open, and that is whether the West will accept normal negotiations without deadlines, or, as seems more likely at this point, keep insisting on in advance given deadline (of four to six months). Once that is cleared up it will be easier to predict future developments.
Why is that issue so important, in your opinion?
If negotiations have a deadline, Albanians will continue to sit at the negotiating table and automatically reject all our proposals. That strategy proved to be fruitless in Vienna, and I am sure that it will be equally futile now, but for them it is very difficult both politically and psychologically to try anything else. Albanian leaders are convinced that the West has promised them independence and they have in turn convinced their population that independence is imminent in hope that, once independence comes, all other sins will be forgiven. With that in mind, it is not difficult to guess their reasoning once they return to the negotiating table. If negotiations have a deadline, then all they have to do is to persevere for another four or six months and keep saying "No!", independence will come somehow and everything will eventually work out. And even if independence is not there, they will find a scapegoat. On the other hand, if they try to negotiate, instead of courageously insisting on "No!" they will be accused of giving up at the time perseverance was essential and their political fortunes will plummet. Therefore, only once it becomes obvious that negotiations are not a formality that is supposed to waste another four or six months, Sejdiu, Cheku, Thaci, Surroi and others will take a break and start changing their strategy.
You do not seem terribly concerned by the likely intransigence of Albanians in the forthcoming negotiations?
You are right. In spite of what is customarily thought both in the West and here, Albanians have very little influence on the outcome and flow of negotiations about the future status of the province. There are several reasons for that, but I think that the economy is the most important factor. Kosovo, as a whole, essentially lives from economic aid from abroad, and the situation will remain unchanged for many years. Even if, carried by the extremist mood of the masses, Kosovo Albanian politicians tried to become independent from the West, they would immediately capitulate facing a financial ultimatum of Western governments. Palestinians are most frequently capable of finding alternative sources of financing and that allows them to promote independent policies, despite poverty. An expensive and irrational project of independent Kosovo has no alternative financiers. Consequently, Albanian politicians in Pristina will accept what the West and especially the US advise them to do, whatever that may be. If that advice in the end becomes to accept compromise and give up independence, they will not have an easy time to tell that to their people. But I have no doubt that with some sporadic protests, both the Kosovo Albanian elite and people would accept such a decision of great powers.
Judging by what you've just said, you seem to believe that in the end Europeans and Americans could give up the independence of Kosovo?
Many European politicians today understand that the price of Kosovo's independence for the EU would be much higher than was thought only a few years ago, just like the whole West realizes that Russia returned to the international scene on the coattails of the Kosovo question and will not sit passively while Washington and Brussels redraw borders of sovereign countries. At the same time, it is unclear how the West stands to benefit from independent Kosovo - that would be an extremely expensive and politically very risky endeavor, with unfavorable effects on regional stability in the Balkans and elsewhere. That is especially true since we have seen that the UN SC will not support the independence of Kosovo. Independence can be won only by open violence or threats of violence. But its negative consequences, especially for the Europeans, thereby obviously become significantly worse. In such a situation I don't see why the attitude of the West could not change, although I do not underestimate the force of inertia, nor the American reasons to support the current policy towards Kosovo. Of course, much will depend on the stance of Serbia in the coming negotiations.
In your opinion, to what extent will these negotiations differ from those mediated by Ahtisaari?
I think that negotiations will start with different proposals from the European side, initially certainly informal, to not give up independence of Kosovo, but that it be "stretched out" over several phases that would last 3-5 years, while at the same time speeding up the process of accession of Serbia to the EU. Such ideas have already been proposed (just recall the report of the Balkans Commission) and Europeans will naturally start with them, at the same time trying to convince parts of the current ruling coalition in Serbia that Kosovo "has been lost after all" and that it is "a stone pulling Serbia down", that Albanians "will never agree" to anything less than independence etc. If our side remains indifferent to such arguments and responds to them by reasonable counter proposals, with clear unity of the current coalition government, the process will enter a much more sensitive phase that has much higher chances of turning out favorable for us. At that point it is impossible to predict what will happen, except that for us it will be important - just as it was important during the whole process so far - that administration's policy has the full support of the Parliament. Consequently, it is extremely important that the Parliament adopted a few days ago with overwhelming majority a new resolution about Kosovo, which reasserts support for the administration's policy so far and gives general outline of Serbia's stance in future negotiations.
Much has been written about Vienna negotiations, but very little is known about what took place behind the closed doors. What were your personal impressions? How did Kosovo Albanians behave? How did Ahtisaari behave?
After the second meeting in Vienna, in March 2006 if I am not mistaken, Ahtisaari invited Slobodan Samardzic and me to a dinner and told us: "The decision that Kosovo will be independent has already been made; we can only discuss the status of Serbs in Kosovo." My response was: "As far as we are concerned, only a decision by the UN is valid, and it gives you the mandate to negotiate about the future status of Kosovo, and that's how we're going to behave. Besides, we have no authority to do anything else." Ahtisaari spent a whole year trying to talk as little as possible about the future status of Kosovo, but that in the end turned out to be futile. In the final, most serious part of Vienna negotiations, between February 21 and March 2 of this year, we - in the form of amendments to his plan - offered our detailed vision of Kosovo's status within Serbia and later presented that vision to UN SC members. UN Ambassador of South Africa, Kumalo, who was then president of the UN SC told us on that occasion: "Interesting - and they keep telling me that Serbia does not want to negotiate and that it hasn't offered any proposals or solutions". That statement, just like the dinner with Ahtisaari, are probably the best illustrations of those negotiations.
Original headline: "Srbija na potezu"