Twilight Zone

NIN, Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia, August 12 1999

The long awaited arrival of international police forces is not the light at the end of the tunnel for the remaining Serbs in the Province. The appearance, at long last, of these policemen in the streets of Pristina was accompanied by many reservations: for now, there are less than 500 of them; they are inadequately trained; many of the candidates were sent home... Marti Ahtisaari, the acting president of the European Union, also expressed his skepticism: "I am afraid that the role of the international police has not been completely thought through. The idea that 3,000 people can maintain order is unrealistic."

According to the scenario already seen in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the story on everyone's lips is about their desire to build a multiethnic society while on the ground ethnic cleansing continues without restraint. Again, there are delays and conflicting mandates, while mutual accusations among NATO, the U.N. and OSCE are gaining in strength. NATO has been accused of incompetence in establishing a safe environment, a narrow interpretation of its mission and focus on its own security. Some believe that General Mike Jackson's days as the head of KFOR may be numbered. The U.N. has been accused of using ad hoc work methods without a clear mandate, slow setting up of civilian police forces, lack of planning regarding the civilian portion of the mission, and the tendency of UNMIK head Bernard Kouchner to pose for the media and give impromptu statements, such as the one about 11,000 Albanian victims in mass graves. The OSCE has reportedly been ignored and is unhappy with its very small role in Kosovo, contrary to earlier agreements...

Besides systematic expulsion of the remaining non-Albanians in Kosovo, KLA is busily working on establishing its own government; the number of incidents with KFOR has been increasing; KLA has shown spotty compliance with the demilitarization agreement it made with KFOR, although KFOR maintains a gentlemanly largesse toward this paramilitary organization. Emboldened by the kiss of Madeleine Albright, KLA leader Hashim Thaqi nonchalantly announces how the French members of KFOR in Kosovska Mitrovica are behaving "arrogantly and undemocratically." Moreover, KFOR actions against his fellow veterans Agim Ceku, "the KLA chief of staff," and Rexhep Sellimi, "the minister of internal affairs," whose actions were blatantly in contradiction with all agreements to date, are interpreted by Thaqi as "KFOR provocations." "The territory of Kosovo is internationally recognized" and therefore his "government will not allow any kind of partition," says Thaqi.

Skillfully exploiting the position of victim, generously provided by the Belgrade regime, as well as the status of an informal ally of NATO in its shameful bombing campaign, the KLA is now putting KFOR troops in an impossible situation: to defend the Serbs without angering the Albanians. The idea that the Serbs also have human rights which the international forces should be defending at least as much as the human rights of Albanians is not only not registering with the Albanians but is also not sufficiently obvious in the actions of KFOR troops. KFOR chief commander, General Jackson, has found a solution worthy of King Solomon: the leaders of the KLA have lost control over their hard-line followers. Although it is possible that some kind of independent gang exist in Kosovo, Jackson's discussion with Thaqi regarding this topic is funny because it is hard to find a less compromising "hard-liner" than the self-proclaimed "president of the transitional government of Kosovo." It is enough to look at the fact that all key leaders of the Kosovo Albanians (Ibrahim Rugova, Veton Surroi) openly support the concept of an independent Kosovo, while Thaqi was the only one who sought to achieve it with a gun in his hand.

When one adds to all this the latest pronouncements of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Yugoslav United Left, who, instead of withdrawing all of their compromised leaders from the scene and waging a diplomatic offensive by experts to save what can be saved of the Serbian people and country's territory and sovereignty, are practically calling for a continuation of the war, the prospects become absolutely dismal.

Western analysts are finding many reasons which make it impossible for KFOR to enter into a direct conflict with KLA: a media campaign of many months has caused the Western public to feel sympathetic toward KLA and Thaqi himself, unfamiliarity with the terrain, the possibility of casualties, the approach of winter... Primarily political and military reasons which would lead to a disaster, as one think-tank wrote.

The international community in Kosovo has therefore found itself completely on the defensive. An exit from the twilight zone can lead in one of two directions.

The first is a slow, painful but decisive introduction of a transitional government and civilian administration. This would require the sacrifice of American darling Thaqi and the support for Rugova or Surroi, Albanian leaders who are capable of going further than pure rhetoric regarding the need for Serbs to remain in Kosovo, both because of their experience living in the West and also with Serbs in Kosovo.

The other possibility, which would become relevant in the event that the Serbian regime succeeded in surviving and prolonging the isolation of the country, is the one openly proposed by the "Daily Telegraph": Western refusal to recognize the Kosovo Albanians' right to secede would lead to their "alienation from KFOR and the United Nations" and therefore it is unacceptable for Kosovo to remain a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "Yugoslavia must go" the renowned British daily claimed in its headline.

Must it really?