NIN: Your statement regarding the threat of terrorist attacks in Belgrade has gotten everyone pretty excited for obvious reasons. Are you still of the same opinion?
COVIC: I didn't make anything up. My warning was based on operational data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP). They have identified about 100 people divided into smaller groups and trained for terrorist activities. These men were born in Serbia; they know the Serb language well; and they are ready to carry out activities in cities throughout Serbia for the sake of certain Albanian separatist and nationalist goals. Belgrade MUP is aware of this and it is essential that we all exercise proper caution due to what some crazy minds may be planning.
We are also approaching November 17, when elections for the parliament of Kosovo and Metohija will be held; after them, it is possible that the Albanian majority parliament will unilaterally declare the independence of Kosovo. This possibility does not exist in UN Resolution 1244; however, many other things that are not in the documents have occurred nevertheless. Consequently, it is necessary to exercise caution because danger from terrorist activities certainly exists.
NIN: Are you referring to the forms of terrorism that we have seen previously or are there plans for some sort of spectacular activities such as those in America?
I do not believe that terrorist activities such as those in America are possible here. I think that we are talking primarily about conventional forms of terrorism: the possibility of planting an explosive device in a crowded public place, under a car, on a road or railway track. Or the assassination of certain individuals from the political establishment of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); there have been indications of this for months.
Terrorism has been present in our region for about ten years with the most striking examples occurring in the south of Serbia until just recently.
NIN: Recently we have seen a new wave of political and diplomatic activity by the Belgrade governments represented, among other things, by your activities at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and the UN Security Council in New York, to which the Kosovo Albanian press has already reacted with the claim that this is a new Serbian aggression. Why are you, too, now being denounced as an aggressor?
Of course, there is no aggression of any kind involved. However, the reactions of the Albanian media in Kosovo and Metohija are the best evidence that we are successful in diplomatic activities, from London, Berlin and Brussels to New York and Washington. Our plan is completely clear. It is based on something in which we had no choice and that is Security Council Resolution 1244, the Rambouillet agreement and the framework agreement for Kosovo. Even in this we found enough room to protect the Serb national community in Kosovo and Metohija: in the first phase, to ensure that those now living there are able to survive and in the second phase, to provide that approximately 250,000 expelled and displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija return to their homes.
We are not prejudging solutions with respect to the final status of Kosovo. In this phase Kosovo is a protectorate of the international community and after November 17 it will obviously have a limited autonomy under the control of the international community.
Our approach is unlike anything that our country has implemented in the past (the policies that brought us to this position where the Albanians have all the initiative). It gives enough room for a new Kosovo to be created on a multiethnic basis; however, there can be no multiethnic Kosovo if there is no freedom of movement, no safety and no members of other national communities there.
Since UNMIK assumed power on June 20, 1999, ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Kosovo has been obvious. Every year, ten to twelve thousand more Serbs leave Kosovo. This process is still continuing. On the other hand, in the past two years only 80 (yes, eighty!) Serbs out of 250,000 have returned to Kosovo and Metohija; this is unacceptable. If you compare this with Bosnia, where some 30,000 refugees returned in two years and where this number was considered to be too low and a sign of failure, then what is the problem here? In our plan and program we propose a completely realistic concept of a multiethnic Kosovo, in the first phase, according to the system of life in ethnic communities next to each other and in the next phase, according to life in mixed communities. Because right now we have a de facto situation where the Albanian national community is concentrated throughout most of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija while only small Serb enclaves appear as dots or small oases completely surrounded by Albanians and left without elementary conditions for survival.
We are also expecting that after the elections there will certainly be a necessity for talks between the FRY and the Republic of Serbia governments and the new government that will be formed under the auspices of the international community in Kosovo and Metohija. The fact that this did not occur earlier is not a fault of the new democratic government in Serbia because we were ready for talks but the Albanian political representatives were not. They are still not able to control their most extreme elements, which continue to perpetrate violence and are involved in criminal activities to a significant degree.
NIN: Your plan for Kosovo and Metohija has never been published in its entirety. Why?
You are aware that we published the complete plan for resolution of the crisis in the south of Serbia, in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja. However, due to the high degree of sensitivity, primarily among international subjects who have completely excluded Belgrade and the FRY as partners in the resolution of the problem in Kosovo and Metohija, it was determined that it is better for our plan not to be published, at least for now. However, I think that we will gradually find ourselves in the situation where this entire plan, too, will be accessible to the public. In general, the key elements of the plan deal with rebuilding of confidence because the Serbian national community - there is no need to hide this - does not have confidence in the international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and Metohija.
If the exodus of Serbs is continuing; if two-thirds of the total number of Serbs killed were killed after June 20, 1999; if two-thirds of the total number of Serbs and other non-Albanians kidnapped were kidnapped after the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK; if violence is continuing; freedom of movement has not been secured; no plan for the integration of Serbs into the system under the auspices of the international community has been formulated, then how can the Serb people possibly have confidence in international peacekeeping and military forces? Moreover, when you see the enormity of the ethnic distance between the Serb and Albanian national communities, then you can only conclude that it will take many years for things to get to the point where we would like to see them.
Also clearly defined in this plan is a method for discovering all perpetrators of crimes, both Serbs and Albanians, as well as a way of discovering the fate of missing and kidnapped persons. However, we still do not have all the necessary documentation on this, which is completely unfair because everyone involved is a citizen of our country. 2,900 Albanians and 1,500 Serbs and other non-Albanians who are citizens of this country have gone missing. Our plan also deals with the problem of biased court decisions, since there are presently no Serb judges in Kosovo. It is a fact that some international judges have arrived but there are very few of them. 44 Serbs are imprisoned and it is obvious that the great majority of them are innocent. Distinguished Serbs were simply accused of alleged crimes by someone in order to apply additional pressure to carry out ethnic cleansing and encourage the exodus of Serbs from this region. Not one court decision in a case where the accused was a Serb was based on material evidence and I am talking about court decisions that carry very heavy sentences of 10, 15 and 20 years. All these decisions were made exclusively on the basis of the testimonies of witnesses, Albanian witnesses, whose testimony was orchestrated beforehand and who were coached to testify. This means that this was a clear strategy.
It is completely normal for Serbs to be in the police force in locations where Serbs form the majority of the population, regardless of what that police force is called. Serbia provided a list of 200 candidates for the job but not one of them was accepted. What's going on? Former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), obviously a terrorist organization, are being integrated into the new police force and this does not bother anyone; but when they need to integrate former members of the MUP, this bothers them. Of course, this is not a good approach.
In any case, we are attempting to turn the biggest problem in this region into our greatest advantage, to create a new system in Kosovo that is in accordance with European standards and norms. We do not want to just sit and wait as some have been recommending.
NIN: The government in Belgrade has been saying the whole time that the possible participation of the Serbs in the upcoming Kosovo elections will depend on the actions of the international community, on the creation of conditions where they can freely express their will. However, obviously none of those expected conditions has been fulfilled to the present day. Does this maybe mean that someone in the international community really does not want the Serbs to participate in those elections?
We will see if that is the case. This is the sort of a problem where one should not lose one's head and move too fast, even though we do not have much time. It is very important that no one can say that we are to blame for the failures of others. And that is why it was important that the Serbs register. It is also important that we secure the verification of at least one political subject representing the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, and that is the Povratak (Return) coalition. Now it is the international community's move.
NIN: Why do representatives of the international community in Kosovo and Metohija act the way they do? Is it just a question of incompetence or perhaps of ill intentions?
In my opinion the main reason is indecisiveness and further inertia, as well as unwillingness to openly confront the violence occurring in Kosovo. This irresponsible approach to the problem of violence carried out by Albanian extremists and terrorists, of course, has been the cause of many casualties. Why did the international community come to Kosovo? To prevent the ethnic cleansing of Albanians. And once it was there, then it used Kosovo and the south of Serbia, as we saw for ourselves, for further destabilization of the Milosevic regime. But Milosevic is gone now.
NIN: It is obvious that the foreign troops in Kosovo are afraid and that they want to avoid confrontation with the Albanian terrorists at any price. Will a change in the doominant military philosophy in America itself, where they are now beginning to realize that casualties are unavoidable in the war against terrorists, perhaps have some influence on the actions of the international forces in Kosovo, too?
Absolutely. It is obviously that the American approach with respect to terrorism is undergoing a profound change. I think that we should not miss out on this opportunity because what we have is a comprehensive global coalition against terrorism. That means that we can no longer have the situation where someone is a terrorist in New York but that the same person is only an "extremist" over here or even a "freedom fighter".
In general, it is completely clear that their governments were not prepared to prevent ethnic, nationalistic, extremist and terrorist violence against other national communities in Kosovo and Metohija even at the price of casualties among their own troops and police. We know how the disarmament of the KLA was conducted. It was not conducted at all.
NIN: The man who is accused of planting the bomb under the Nis Express bus was arrested, imprisoned in the American military base Bondsteel and then allegedly escaped from prison. How do you interpret this?
I will tell you very openly. I have been to Bondsteel; Bondsteel is escape-proof. You can only get out if someone lets you out. I have said the same thing to KFOR generals and the people from UNMIK to their face, quite bluntly. And now the former commander of the former Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac from the south of Serbia, Lirim Jakupi, aka Nazi, who is presently imprisoned in Bondsteel, is supposed to be released as well because allegedly his jail term is up! Why would he be released? He needs to be transferred so he can be held accountable for crimes he committed in the south of Serbia. You cannot have double standards.
NIN: Has his extradition been formally requested?
Of course, and we provided complete documentation, too. That is why I am expecting that he actually will be extradited because many people in the world are slowly beginning to understand what we are talking about. The UN Security Council discussed problems in Kosovo and Metohija for three and a half hours.
NIN: Mr. Haekkerup described that discussion by the UN Security Council in one way and you described in a different way. What, in fact, was the outcome of the discussion?
I spoke for half an hour. Mr. Haekkerup spoke after me for half an hour. I used facts, numbers and I expressed criticism regarding certain issues and problems that have not been resolved, I also proposed constructive solutions and made proposals on how we can accomplish them, all within the framework of Resolution 1244.
Mr. Haekkerup had a somewhat different story, a more general one.
After that we engaged in a discussion with ambassadors of the member countries of the Security Council for another two and a half more hours. Not one of those ambassadors failed to express support for the necessity of cooperation between the foreign factors in Kosovo and Metohija and the FRY.
It is, therefore, completely logical to interpret this as the support of the Security Council for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and our approach. In the end, Mr. Haekkerup was forced to remove a number of Albanian terrorists and extremists from the election ballot. He really had to do this because there was great pressure. Is this a favorable development for us or not? Albanian violence is becoming the key factor of instability in the entire region of Southeastern Europe. This region will be unable to embark upon a system of self-sustaining security until we confront Albanian violence and terrorism, and that is a fact that cannot be hidden any longer.
NIN: There have been some indications that the violence is gradually spilling over into Montenegro. In your opinion, are these just isolated incidents or is something far more serious going on?
We need to be very, very cautious with Albanian violence, extremism, terrorism and nationalism because it has nothing to do with the protection of Albanian human rights. If we Serbs were the bad guys for the last 10 years, say we were because we did, in fact, have a bad regime, the Macedonians were the good guys. So what happened to the Macedonians? Obviously there are ambitions toward the creation of a Greater Albania that is completely ethnically homogenous. This must be stopped before it becomes a crisis in Montenegro tomorrow, a crisis in Greece the day after.
We can only protect ourselves by joining European and global developments, first and foremost the Partnership for Peace. The next step is NATO. Other politicians may be afraid to say it but that is the reality facing Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And this must not become the subject of our political games and squabbles. With regard to this we must no longer divide into the so-called patriots and traitors.