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End Of Mythical Clash

In the less than one hundred days remaining until the Kosovo elections, the Coordination Center needs to do what neither the international community nor the Yugoslav government have succeeded in doing in two years

by Lidija KUJUNDZIC

NIN, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, August 9, 2001

The plan for resolving the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija is a state secret. That is what representatives claim in the office of Dr. Nebojsa Covic, the Serbian deputy prime minister and president of the newly established Yugoslav and Serbian Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija.

"The plan had a seal and everyone, including federal and state ministers, had to return his copy," said Oliver Ivanovic, a member of the Yugoslav and Serbian Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija.

At a meeting of both governments, federal and state, held on September 2, "[t]he plan was classified as a state secret due to some of its components," said Igor Jovicic, the deputy of the secretary general of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, adding that the Federal Government does not need to ratify and publish a special decree in the Yugoslav "Official Gazette" in order to classify the plan as a state secret.

Common Front

In the less than one hundred days remaining to the Kosovo elections, which will finally seal the fate of the remaining Serbs and other non-Albanian population, the Coordination Center needs to do what neither the UN civilian administration and peacekeeping forces nor the Yugoslav government have succeeded to do in two years.

"The plan in essence contains the idea of division into entities which Covic first proposed in May. This solution was somewhat controversial but it seems to me that at this moment it is the only possible solution," said Professor Dr. Predrag Simic, the foreign policy advisor to the Yugoslav President. "The plan will be worked out in detail in the near future but at this moment the most important thing is to establish normal communications with the international community."

The plan foresees three phases, of which the first, "the establishment of trust," is perhaps the most significant. In addition, the establishment of the Coordination Center has unified all Serb forces from Kosovo, who in the past were in frequently in conflict due to their totally opposed positions.

"A common front has been created; however, there are indisputably great challenges before us, such as the upcoming elections which we cannot prevent," said Ivanovic, one of the leaders of the Serbs from Kosovska Mitrovica.

There is even hope that the almost mythical clash between Gracanica and Kosovska Mitrovica will be overcome now that the Coordination Center is making the last attempts to secure elementary security and at least a little more freedom of movement through Kosovo for the Serbs. One of the members joining the Coordination Center is Rada Trajkovic, a member of the Serb National Council who is most controversial due to her attendance of the meetings of the Interim Administrative Council of Kosovo. Her membership, for the first time, was not criticized by Kosovska Mitrovica, at least not publicly. Whether Rada Trajkovic should withdraw from the IAC is a question to be decided by the Coordination Center, first and foremost, by its president. On the one hand, for the Serbs this would mean reduced access to useful information and political self-isolation, something UNMIK would not welcome; on the other hand, the most hardline faction of Kosovo Serbs, which still enjoys considerable influence, could convince the Serb population that the Coordination Center, that is, Serbia and Yugoslavia, have betrayed them once again.

Slow Start

UNMIK's response to the establishment of the Coordination Center and the appointment of Covic was in the form of a threat, just in case. The head of the UNMIK information service, Simon Haselock, said that he hoped that the plan does not propose cantonization, division into entities or anything similar, which is not in accordance with Resolution 1244. No discussions regarding the establishment of parallel institutions in Kosovo will take place, at least as far as UNMIK is concerned, although it remains ready "to contact with a serious mediator" regarding all issues which UNMIK thinks need to be discussed.

However, what UNMIK's needs are and to what extent they are related to the basic demands of the Serbs which the international community took upon itself when it adopted Resolution 1244 was obvious during the adoption of the current Constitutional Framework of Kosovo and Metohija. At that time, UNMIK showed no understanding for a single provision or amendment proposed by Serb representatives, despite the fact that they included even the most extreme of Albanian demands.

"Hans Haekkerup, as an experienced diplomatic administrator, is taking the path of least resistance. He is attempting to follow a safe path and, in principle, he does not represent either Albanian or Serb interests but those of the institution which gave him his mandate," said Simic, noting that UNMIK has no precise guidelines regarding what the international community actually wants in Kosovo and Metohija, and that the danger exists that, in accordance with the logic Haekkerup is currently following which is most favorable to the Albanians, the Security Council at a certain point in time will simply verify the existing state in Kosovo.

Adding oil

Immediately preceding Nebojsa Covic's first visit as president of the Coordination Center, UNMIK issued a decree according to which Serbian politicians must give at least 96 hours notice of their intent to visit Kosovo and Metohija. That UNMIK and KFOR, which directly implements this and similar orders in Kosovo are all-powerful became apparent to a few advisors to the Yugoslav president and to Nebojsa Covic himself. At the checkpoint near the village of Merdare (Gate 3) Covic waited and waited, as the Serbian Patriarch Kyr Pavle had previously waited, while KFOR troops checked his documents. The only thing Covic could do after the fact was to protest and to note that he did not need anyone's else's protection in his own country.

The Albanians reserved a unique "welcome" for the Coordination Center and to Covic. First, the president of the Albanian Democratic Party, Hashim Thaci, repeated the position that the future of Kosovo will be decided on only by those who are living in Kosovo and that the Albanian people will continue to fight for an independent Kosovo. Then the Albanian National Army (the surviving part of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja) shot up a police checkpoint near the village of Muhovac. Two policemen were wounded, two were killed and Covic lost his patience for a moment, stating: "I don't want to hear any more talk about human rights because the Albanians are not honoring those rights. Whoever doesn't like it here can go anywhere they like."

Even though the new Yugoslav government has shown the desire to improve relations with UNMIK, not much has been accomplished. UNMIK opened an office in Belgrade but at the political level problems are just multiplying.

Recently, on August 3, the Federal Government was forced to further strain relations with UNMIK by adopting a Statement on illegal attempts by UNMIK to usurp the authority of FRY federal units in the domain of elementary, secondary and higher education in violation of Resolution 1244.

The remaining Serbs in Kosovo, especially families of the kidnapped who have been protesting for almost a month, were horrified by Haekkerup's indifferently uttered claim that the majority of the missing Serbs were probably killed.

Covic and the other members of the Coordination Team will need a lot of wisdom and patience, first, to explain to the Serbs from Kosovo (including those who are displaced) that it is essential that they register and that this does not mean that they will participate in the elections. Covic is hard pressed to fulfill the promises he made to the Serbs in Gracanica. It will not be easy to get access to UNMIK's databases, first and foremost, on the kidnapped.

"It has never been as difficult for the Serbs in Kosovo," said Ivanovic.

It will likely be even more difficult after the elections if the state does not do everything it possibly can during these one hundred remaining days. While it still can.

Sixteen of them

The president of the Yugoslav and Serbian Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija is Nebojsa Covic; vice presidents are Rasim Ljajic, the federal minister for national minorities, Sandra Raskovic-Ivic, the Serbian commissioner for refugees, Momcilo Trajkovic, the president of the Federal Committee for Kosovo and Metohija, and Slobodan Samardzic, advisor to the Yugoslav President.

Other members of the Coordination Center are Zoran Andjelkovic, the secretary general of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Marko Jaksic, a vice president of the Democratic Party of Serbia, Oliver Ivanovic, Predrag Simic, advisor to the Yugoslav President, Rada Trajkovic, a member of the Serb National Council and the Interim Administrative Council of Kosovo, Nebojsa Nikic, Svetislav Djurdjevic, Branislav Krstic, Milo Gligorijevic, Zoran Lutovac and Svetomir Stefanovic.


Translated by Kosovo Daily News
NIN