Big words are typically used here to hide the truth. If the Montenegrin authorities really cared about the interests of the state, and even Strugar himself, they would have urged the general to travel to the Hague seven months ago, when they received sealed indictments. Then, the chances that the general would be released from custody until the start of the trial were greater, and Montenegro could have demonstrated that it was truly cooperating with the international community. This way, this allegedly voluntary departure to the Hague was actually forced upon the authorities and Strugar, and the Montenegrin authorities demonstrated a trivial political game. They publicly swore to cooperate with the Tribunal, while at the same time they were hiding the general in Montenegro. Because of the local public, to preserve their political rating, they decided to drag everything out as much as possible.
In the meantime, while the departure of the general to the Hague received tons of media attention, the state controlled media timidly informed the public that the High Court in Podgorica had acquitted thirteen young men from Novi Sad, Belgrade and Podgorica of charges of terrorism. The prosecutor indicted them in 1997 on charges of arriving in Podgorica between two rounds of elections with the goal of organizing terrorist attacks. Precisely that indictment was used in the political showdown with the party led by Momir Bulatovic, at the time viewed as the public mentor of all activities against Montenegro.
Then, everything sunk into oblivion. After full four years a Montenegrin court realized that the defendants were charged without any evidence. And that's it. The prosecutor is left alone, the state will calmly pay the defendants for the time they've spent in jail. Sort of, what's done is done, it worked while we needed it.
Almost at the same time as when the acquittal was announced, one senior state official spoke out about the danger of his job. This had nothing to do with terrorism. He was talking about Montenegrin economy. "The struggle for the legalization of the import of cigarettes is difficult and dangerous," Zarko Rakcevic, deputy Prime Minister of the Montenegrin government, explained. This is why one can still not buy any legally imported cigarettes in Montenegro. According to Rakcevic, the state loses annually between $20 and $25 million because of smuggling. Or, to be more specific, the people involved in cigarette smuggling earn that much every year.
Three months before Rakcevic, then also the deputy Prime Minister, initiated an uncompromising struggle against the gray economy. Today the deputy Prime Minister humbly admits that he has touched a wasp's nest. But, he does not wish to say who is so powerful that he can prevent the government from working legally.
These three cases may only at first glance appear unrelated in the Montenegrin mosaic of gray daily existence. They are tied together by one thread. The cooperation with the Hague stops the very moment individuals from the state leadership are endangered, independent judiciary faithfully serves the ruling party, and the struggle against gray economy focuses on small fry. Private and political party interests always have priority in comparison with the interests of the state and the society. That is why the images of the state presented by the politicians and those witnessed daily by ordinary citizens are so different.
Perhaps, that is why no one is surprised that Montenegro talks so much about reform and does so little on its implementation.