Although at first glance contradictory, these two conclusions are the essential summary of the public opinion poll conducted in January by the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM). Now we can expect increased production of political fog. The independence supporters will emphasize the fact that they are expected to win an independence referendum, while their opponents from the coalition "Together For Yugoslavia" will celebrate the finding that the voter support is switching to their side. It is possible that the CEDEM will be exposed to the shocks of the alternating political current; now its findings will without reservations be trusted by the pro-Yugoslav faction, while the advisors of the pro-independence block will dismiss its findings.
But, when the obfuscation inherent in the daily politics is removed, the importance of the latest public opinion poll conducted by the CEDEM is that it captures prevailing trends on the political scene in Montenegro. This is the first publicly reported opinion poll conducted since the parliamentary elections in May 2001.
The first findings will "chill" many supporters of Montenegrin independence. In comparison with the CEDEM's April opinion poll the supporters of a joint state with Serbia have pulled closer to the supporters of independence (in April the ratio was 49.3 vs. 39.5 and in January less than five percent of difference, 46.7 vs. 41.9 for independence). The increased support for the parties from the pro-Yugoslav coalition mirrors this trend. Above all, the SNP and SNS have more supporters now, while the standing of the DPS has fallen (although the DPS is still the party with most support, its rating has fallen 4 percent in eight months). According to the current situation, coalition "For Yugoslavia" would end up being slightly ahead of the coalition between DPS and SDP in an election, and this will be a significant psychological boost for Bulatovic, Bojovic, and Soc.
The other side needs to explain why it is in defensive. Definitely a part of the answer to this question can be found in the strongest party of that block, the DPS. Even though at the latest congress they rhetorically abandoned their former support for Yugoslavia, such decisiveness was not demonstrated within the party ranks. The leadership of the DPS did not react to Mitrovic's rebellion in Bijelo Polje, nor to political slaps coming from the mayors of Budva and Danilovgrad, Pribilovic and Kadic, respectively. That, no doubt, was reflected in the behavior of the party members. A part of the party has listened to the call of the "rebels" and switched their support to the joint state of Montenegro and Serbia, or decided to abstain from voting.
But, the real explanation for the fall in support for the pro-independence block is, above all, in the fact that that alliance does not actually exist. It is enough to read daily press releases. Although the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG) formally supports the minority government of the DPS and the SDP, it is actually still fighting a battle for the supporters of independence of Montenegro. Mutual distrust of the party leaders and political showdowns between the parties are not a good fuel for the strengthening of the pro-independence block. On the contrary, that is yet another reason for apathy and possible abstinence of the supporters of that idea. How else should we interpret the finding that the trust in the current minority government (which has so far enacted more reform laws than all governments before it) is lower (all together 37.8 percent) than in the previous, which was responsible for a series of illegal acts (in April 45.1 percent of poll participants believed that the government was doing well)?
In the meantime the pro-Yugoslav block has the appearance of a harmonious team, in which jurisdiction and roles are precisely allocated. Bulatovic's SNP is undermining the DPS with corruption-related affairs, although they participated together in many of them. Soc's People's Party is always in touch with Kostunica, although they ignored him in the last federal elections. While those two parties are trying to provide the democratic veneer, Bojovic's SNS has the role of the "bad guy", in charge of instilling fear of civil war in the voters. Together, all of that works well. In one place we have anti-Communists and Milosevic's supporters, atheists and religious people, Chetniks and hardline Stalinists, fighters for the "absolutely equal Montenegro" and those who would like to see Montenegro as merely one of the regions of Serbia. Perhaps one could respect these "alliance building" efforts, if it wasn't for the truth. They win only if the idea of separate Montenegrin identity is buried.
The consequence of such policy is - the best Montenegro can do is a region in Kostunica's and [Dobrica] Cosic's Yugoslavia. Data back that up. The number of those supporting Montenegro as a region of Serbia has increased (from 4.7 percent to 6.7 percent). The number of supporters of the conservative policies of the president of FRY is also on the increase (Kostunica today enjoys a lot of trust of 28.3 percent of poll participants, while in April he had the trust of only 16.2 percent), and every third poll participant also trusts the democratic nature of the Serb Orthodox Church.
In other words, it turns out that the axis President of Yugoslavia - Yugoslav Army - the Serb Orthodox Church has more influence than during Milosevic's rule. Perhaps the leader of the SNP, Predrag Bulatovic, should take that into account. His story about proud and self-governing Montenegro is actually not supported by many of the supporters of his party, which could seal his fate. If he defeats Djukanovic, he could, paradoxically, end up being a target of Belgrade.
CEDEM's poll will probably draw attention of analysts from abroad. They can draw interesting conclusions. Insistence on "democratic Montenegro in democratic Yugoslavia" has weakened the pro-independence block - almost every third (29 percent) poll participant believes that all suggestions of the international community should unconditionally be observed. However, the problem is that that also as a byproduct strengthened the backward forces in Montenegro; one hopes that Dr. Bozidar Bojovic is not the next trump card of the international community.
But, everything mentioned above cannot hide the message that the basic problem is within Montenegro. CEDEM's poll is actually the last warning for the pro-independence block. Something akin to the first round of presidential elections, when the Serb-Yugoslav option prevailed by a hair's breadth. In the second round of the election, the mistake was corrected. A joint campaign secured a victory. However, the problem with a referendum is that there is no second round and a chance to correct mistakes.
The biggest changes have occurred within the so-called pro-Serb block. As was to be expected, the SNP, assisted by the logistic support provided by the DOS, has within eight months picked up, like a magnet, almost all supporters of Momir Bulatovic's NPS. However, Dr. Bozidar Bojovic, the leader of the Serb People's Party has a lot of reason to be satisfied. It turned out that nationalist rhetoric, threats and blackmail, still find fertile ground in Montenegro. The SNS has become a spokesperson for the radical pro-Serb attitudes and moved away from the political margins. At the same time, leaders of the People's Party will have a lot of reason for thought. The number of their supporters has been almost halved (from 7.8 percent in April to the edge of census needed for participation in the parliament [4 percent] - 4.3 percent).
However, parties from the so-called pro-independence block have a lot of reason for concern. The Democratic Party of Socialists has lost four percent and the Liberal Alliance about three percent of supporters. Only the SDP has registered an increase in support, but of only 0.5 percent. Djukanovic's party can seek reasons for its drop in rating in its own inability to timely get rid of "pro-Yugoslav trouble makers" in its own ranks. But, when they rewind the tape and admit that most of their pre-election promises about better life haven't been fulfilled, and that they were marked as main protagonists of most corruption scandals, then the DPS leaders can even be pleased. However, it is questionable - if they do not achieve independence - whether they will be able to reverse the negative trend.
On the other end of the pro-independence block, the leadership of the Liberal Alliance should reconsider consequences of the recent political choices of this party. Above all, the decision not to join the coalition government. How will their supporters react in the future if they continue with rhetoric directed against the DPS and the SDP, while at the same time professing support for their minority government?
Momir Bulatovic's popularity has evaporated. While some eight months ago, although ousted as the leader of the SNP, he had a notable role, now he has become irrelevant as far as the public is concerned. Just like Slobodan Milosevic, who in April was in the ninth spot of the list of the most popular politicians in Montenegro. That can be interpreted by the fact that Bulatovic is not in the parliament and Milosevic is in the Hague. However, it is more likely that their spots were filled by other leaders of the Serb-Yugoslav option (Predrag Bulatovic, Kostunica). In the meantime, Dr. Bozidar Bojovic has surged to the fore, even though in April, 2001, no one counted on him. The president of the SNS has almost caught up with Dragan Soc, and is standing significantly better than Predrag Drecun.
It is interesting that the first six spots on the list are reserved for the leaders of the DPS and the LSCG, while the president of the SDP, Krivokapic, is in the tenth place. Perhaps that is an indicator to what extent the pro-independence block could count on additional support in case of an electoral alliance (synergy).
The political logic of the coalition "Together For Yugoslavia" is rather simple. So far the public opinion polls indicate that their chances for victory against a united pro-independence front are minimal, and that, although assisted from Belgrade and encouraged by the attitude of the international community, they can only count on a honorable defeat in the independence referendum. And a defeat, even a minimal defeat, would be a beginning of an end. The pro-Yugoslav coalition has been cobbled together as the last line of defense of the joint state. Without that goal, the triple alliance is likely to fall apart and lose the logistic support from Belgrade.
That is why, within the pro-Yugoslav coalition, the interlude during interminable negotiations was used for recruiting of all available forces; starting with open support by the Serb Orthodox Church, through support provided by Montenegrins who live in Serbia, to the political influence of the DOS. Recent events reveal the strategy of that block - a combination of the political activities with the goal of discrediting the regime (formation of the "Committee for Nacional") and spreading of fear (threats to minorities and "Docleans", recruitment of the members of the Seventh Battalion in "Berane incident").
It is more difficult to discern the tactics of the other side, above all the ruling DPS. First, Djukanovic started, unprovoked, to defend himself from accusations of corruption. Thereby he showed nervousness, and earned the label of a persecutor of journalists in the international community, while among the ordinary citizens he awakened doubt that he was trying to shut up his political opponents by force. The fact that his party left him to fight on his own in "the cigarette smuggling" affair threw gas on the fire of rumors about disagreements in the party leadership.
Then the state prosecutor suddenly recalled that former Government Minister Dragan Soc once upon the time committed a crime of abusing his office in the "Koding" case. The prosecutor, mixing up apples and oranges, threw in representative of the SNP Momcilo Vucetic with the demand for stripping off immunity of the president of the People's Party. According to the prosecutor, Vucetic committed a verbal crime in the parliament. Thereby the state prosecutor demonstrated influence of the political leadership on his office. The DPS should engage in political struggle against its opponents instead of leaving that task to the state prosecutor. On the eve of the referendum campaign political trials against political opponents will not strengthen the authorities, nor do these types of moves convince that the authorities know what they are doing.
Instead of turning towards unification and creation of a firm block of pro-independence forces, the leaders of the DPS showed that protection of their reputation is their number one priority. And in the protection of their reputation they turned to the methods that appear to be pulled out from the archives of the formerly united DPS.
Thereby the ruling party has accepted the game in which the SNP and its coalition partners are much better. Increase tension, instill fear of uncertain future, and, even worse, give priority to personal interests instead of to the goal of achieving independence of Montenegro.