Opponents of the Montenegrin independence may say that that is not enough, while the supporters claim that this is an unstoppable process. The Montenegrin paradox is that at this point both of them are right.
Trends indicate that the Montenegrin society has recently experienced changes regarding the state status. Three years ago advocates of independence could only dream about so many supporters. Public opinion polls show that in early 1998 only 21 percent of citizens supported independence, while late that year the number of supporters of independence increased to 25 percent. After the NATO bombardment, in September 1999, somewhat more than 32 percent of Montenegrin voters supported independence.
A sudden increase in the pro-independence mood matches the turnaround of the authorities regarding this issue. When the ruling coalition, late last year, came out with a proposal about an alliance of independent states, the independence finally obtained more than 50 percent support in the electorate.
The trend of growth of support for independence continued in the first months of this year, despite changes in Belgrade, the international recognition of FR Yugoslavia and open opposition of the international community to the plans of the authorities in Podgorica to achieve independence.
The joint state of Montenegro and Serbia has lost any remaining legitimacy in these elections. An expert for constitutional law from Belgrade, Slobodan Vucetic, also indicates that in his analysis. "Today after nine years of the common state, while in 1992 65 percent of eligible voters supported Yugoslavia, on April 22, 2001 about 164,000 voters voted for the prolongation of the joint state. That is only 25.3 percent of the overall number of eligible voters in Montenegro, which means that the number of supporters of the common state has fallen from two thirds in March 1992 to one quarter in April 2001. That objectively delegitimizes the Yugoslav federal option, and it is a radical change of the attitude of citizens of Montenegro towards Yugoslavia," says Vucetic.
However, although the idea of an independent Montenegro has de facto won by ten percent, it is still uncertain how her status will be resolved. Aware that they are in minority, Serb-Yugoslav parties fear a referendum and have already announced a boycott. That is simply a political manipulation. Based on the current law, a referendum can only be valid if the turnout exceeds 50 percent of all registered voters. Thus it could become that a majority becomes a hostage of a minority, which would increase tensions in the Montenegrin society, as well as in relations with Belgrade.
The Montenegrin block has in this election won somewhat more than 190,000 votes. And the turnout of 225,000 voters, somewhat more than a half of all registered voters, would be necessary for a valid referendum. Of course if the registrar of voters has really been cleansed of phantom voters. According to some opinions the real number of voters in Montenegro is smaller than the official figure.
But, based on the current situation, if the Serb-Yugoslav block boycotted an independence referendum, it is hard to believe that a majority of registered voters would participate in it. The block opposing independence for Montenegro can count on those abstaining from voting, about 20 percent of all registered voters in the last election.
Which path will Montenegro take?
In the analyses after the elections it is emphasized that Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic and the pro-independence block are facing a stale-mate. They have a majority, but an insufficient one, so that is unclear what they will choose to do.
In the election campaign Djukanovic promised to his supporters that a referendum will be held during the summer. In the post-election statements the president of Montenegro still insists on independence, but he has stopped mentioning any specific dates.
It is clear that the victorious coalition will face pressure from several quarters. In Montenegro it will be pressured by the Serb-Yugoslav block and Belgrade, both of whom proclaim their defeat in these elections and the defeat of the Yugoslav idea for a triumph. It is obvious that a boycott would be the main trump card of the Serb block. On the other hand, the Liberal Alliance has already stated that it would only join the coalition government if Djukanovic and his alliance "Montenegro's Victory" agreed to quickly hold an independence referendum. Is it possible to recruit more than 50 percent of all registered voters in such a short time?
Besides internal pressure, the new Montenegrin government, if it is formed, will face strong pressure form abroad. During the election campaign the international community started meddling in the internal Montenegrin affairs with its statements about "democratic Montenegro within democratic Yugoslavia". With such attitude the West is siding with the recent Milosevic's allies [the Socialist People's Party], the People's Party, but also with the DOS.
In the first statements after the announcement of the election results representatives of the international community insist on negotiations with Belgrade and abandonment of "unilateral acts" by Podgorica. Although that hasn't been mentioned in the first reactions, it is clear that the economic assistance to Montenegro will be conditioned on the postponement of the resolution of her state-legal status [euphemism for the declaration of independence in the pro-independence Montenegrin press].
How can this stalemate be resolved? The April elections showed that Yugoslavia is "clinically dead" in Montenegro, but Montenegro is still not "alive". A partial answer to that question could come in the coming weeks after the formation of a coalition government and coalition agreements. According to all predictions, the number of supporters of independence will continue to grow. Public opinion polls indicate that the Montenegrin elite, educated classes and young population, support independence.