"The coalition 'For Yugoslavia' achieved unexpectedly good results. Again, they have lost the elections and remain in opposition. Belgrade, also, does not have much reason for satisfaction, as it turned out that a majority of citizens in Montenegro prefers the idea of independence. Therefore, currently we are in an undefined situation, which is very bad for reforms, because a clear state framework is necessary for reforms. The international community can be satisfied as the results of the election give credence to their view that things should not be changed quickly," emphasizes Darmanovic.
MONITOR: Was it a mistake that a single Montenegrin coalition was not formed before the election? Perhaps in that case the election results would not be interpreted according to the results achieved by parties and coalitions, but according to the support for ideas?
DARMANOVIC: I think that that was a mistake. Had such a coalition been created, a certain synergy could have been expected, which would probably get a percentage point of two more. That would also produce a different impression after the elections. For example, the CNN had a report in which it was said that the pro-independence block won 42 percent and the anti-independence block 40 percent. No one took into account votes won by the Liberal Alliance and one could get the impression that the difference between the two options was only 2 percent. However, neither the DPS nor the Liberal Alliance showed sufficient decisiveness and readiness to enter such a coalition. Perhaps they also displayed a lack of vision. If the coalition were created, now we would not face uncertain negotiations about the composition of the new government, as such issues would have been agreed before the election.
Could it be, then, said that the Yugoslav-Serb block now has a sort of psychological advantage?
No. They are also waiting with uncertainty to see what will happen. But, they are definitely encouraged by their support, which is probably bigger than they expected.
Coalition "For Yugoslavia", and even the Liberal Alliance are questioning the results of the elections and announcing that they will not officially recognize them. What can that produce on the Montenegrin political scene?
Firm evidence is needed for such claims. All relevant international and domestic observers claim that the elections were regular. Claims about irregularities could herald demands for new elections, but I do not see that a new election would produce significantly different results. As far as the Liberal Alliance is concerned, they have made it their custom to proclaim the results irregular and state that they were a victim of vote rigging, with the explanation that their results had been agreed before the elections in some sort of secret negotiation. Regarding the coalition "For Yugoslavia" it would not make sense for them to boycott the results, as these results are favorable for them. The coalition that receives so many votes can hardly talk about vote rigging.
Where do you see the space for a continuation of the campaign for the independence of Montenegro? Does that space exist, and what would be target groups?
Some states fight for independence through several election cycles and several referendums. Perhaps Montenegro will have to pass through the same procedure. But the precondition for that is the formation of a stable pro-independence government. Another issue is when such a government would decide to hold an independence referendum. And whether that government would decide that in the meantime constitutional negotiations with Serbia would be necessary. I think that Liberals will insist on a quick referendum. And a quick referendum implies a risk of confrontation with the international community. Then there is also the risk that the turnout will be under 50 percent of registered voters and that the referendum will be lost. A postponement of the referendum brings another set of risks, that the idea of independence is pushed in the background, or it could imply the impossibility of establishing a wider coalition.
The campaign for independence lacked clear indicators of economic advantage of independence. Here the general attitude is that political views about independence are sufficient, but people want concrete reasons. Almost everywhere in the world, in pro-independence movements, economic elements are very important. The independence campaign in Quebec was based on economic calculations. On the other hand the pro-Yugoslav block very efficiently used that social argumentation. I am not going to discuss how correct it was.
The referendum is now uncertain?
Djukanovic's coalition will be exposed to strong pressures. On the one side, the Liberal Alliance will insist that the referendum be held immediately, while on the other hand the international community will insist that everything be slowed down, because by that they buy time to define the status of Kosovo. In order to have a valid referendum, the turnout must be at least 50 percent of registered voters. That is about 224,000 voters. If you take into account all the parties that could support independence, you get 194,000 votes. That means that at least 30,000 votes are needed for a successful referendum, and for the tightest possible results. Therefore the pro-independence majority in Montenegro cannot easily make that decision and hold a referendum. It is even more difficult to make the decision to return within the federal legal order and to seek an agreement about some new Yugoslavia with Serbia, whatever that may mean.
On the one hand, here is a mandate for independence, but on the other hand, that mandate cannot be easily implemented. Most likely, two processes will continue in parallel, preparations for the referendum and negotiations with Belgrade and the international community. I think that some sort of parallel dialog with Belgrade will start, because of the obligations taken upon itself by the victorious coalition before the election, because of strong pressure by the international community and because of the fact that, after all, you still have to talk about such an important issue.
What could be the outcome of negotiations with Belgrade?
It is important to know what the subject of negotiations will be. Are they going to talk about a minimal federation? About the platform from 1999 or an alliance of independent states? I am not convinced that it is possible to maintain status quo for a long time. After all, Kostunica will certainly take initiative. He can again call federal elections. Serbia will then say - if you do not want to participate in the federal elections, hold a referendum. If Montenegro wants to return to a community with Serbia, then we need elections, adoption of a totally new political strategy and temporary postponement of independence. If the DPS is even considering such an option, it will not find allies in the current coalition, and it is very unlikely that it will be able to turn to its political opponents.
Kostunica can use the federal elections as a form of pressure on Montenegro and perhaps on his partners in the DOS. Polls in Serbia indicate that he has a huge advantage with respect to other partners in the DOS. By doing that he would strengthen the position of his party in Serbia. He also has personal motives to resolve the situation in Montenegro before new presidential elections in Serbia. If he is not the president of Yugoslavia, he shall run for president of Serbia.
Is referendum now the question of survival of the current ruling elite in Montenegro?
No, it is not exactly the question of survival. But now, after clearly opting for independence, the DSP will find it difficult to simply dismiss that goal. It can postpone or modify it, it can temporarily push it off the agenda, but it will find it very difficult to totally reject it.
Is there a pro-independence majority that would guarantee a stable post-referendum situation in Montenegro?
60 versus 40 percent for independence would be the result that would have to be accepted by all. Including the international community and the opponents of independence in Montenegro. That would be the result whose credibility and legitimacy would be beyond doubt.
What was the influence of the official Belgrade in the election campaign and what will be their influence after the elections?
It turned out that militaristic threats of the Milosevic's regime were less effective than the political, financial, marketing and I would add even diplomatic assistance by the current authorities in Belgrade. True, in a theoretically common state you have the right to assist your allies, although not always in the way that was done. But, I cannot imagine the situation that any government in Montenegro meddles in a similar manner in the elections in Serbia. From Belgrade's point of view that was a combination of strategic lack of involvement, as really all political factors in Serbia said that they would accept any result in Montenegro, and a rather successful tactical involvement and assistance to their allies. That will continue in the future. Otherwise, I believe that the People's Party had the key role in the good election result of the coalition "For Yugoslavia". The People's Party was the main link with Kostunica's ruling structure and the party that by its defection strengthened already big mass of SNP supporters. They also provided the ideological groundwork for the campaign, by investing their credibility from the anti-Milosevic period.
What are your predictions regarding the outcome?
I predict an exhausting tactical struggle. Of course, if the coalition with the Liberal Alliance is formed. If selfishness wins on either side, we shall have the prolongation of a political crisis with an uncertain outcome.