by Dusan BOJCEV
This was not the first time that terrorism was used as a method to direct the attention of the international public to a certain problem. Usually before important international meetings, such as the one in Zagreb. In the situation where none of the ethnic communities from Kosovo had representatives in Zagreb, including the Albanian community (this Yugoslav province was represented by the chief of the UN mission in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner), obviously "someone" felt tempted to at least push "the Albanian topic" to the agenda of numerous formal and informal conversations in Zagreb.
Just before the summit, the highest circles of the Republic of Albania announced that they would represent in Zagreb the interests of the ethnic Albanains living outside the mother country, especially in Kosovo and the south of Serbia. Therefore, can the specifically timed "activity" of the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac, exactly before the Summit, be treated as a random "action" of a separate group, or should it be viewed as an agreed, coordinated and well-thought out effort of organized political structures? And not only in Kosovo?
After the recent changes in Belgrade, starting with the fall of Milosevic, after clear signals from the international community that it accepted and supported the new Yugoslav president Kostunica, after the recent local elections in Kosovo and their outcome, after Kostunica's invitation to Rugova to initiate negotiations, it seems that militant structures among the ethnic Albanians are getting nervous. It could be that their anxiety is the explanation for the wave of violence in the south of Serbia, the recent attack on the Yugoslav representative in Pristina, and even the murder of Xhemail Mustafa, the close collaborator of the moderate Kosovo leader Rugova. From the strategic point of view, the intention of the militant circles to prevent any sort of dialog between Belgrade and Pristina is obvious. On the other hand, they are "fighting" for the parliamentary elections in the province and the annexation of a part of the Southern Serbia, namely municipalities in which the Albanian population dominates, to Kosovo. In order to achieve these goals, they are respectively undertaking tactical activities, most of whom can be described as terrorist actions.
At the Zagreb Summit, the chief of the UN mission in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, "diplomatically" warned that "if the Kosovo Albanians end up cornered, they will fight". Several days later, the French president Jacques Chirac, not only diplomatically, but also in a manner of a responsible politician and statesman, qualified the violence of the "liberators" as terrorism.
Unfortunately, UNMiK and KFOR cannot fully control the situation in Kosovo. They cannot prevent violence, threats, and hatred. They can hardly stop possible preparations for terrorist actions or militaristic "excursions" outside Kosovo. Therefore, one can absolutely understand Mr. Kouchner's fear of his mentioned "dead end" and "struggle" of Kosovo Albanians. There are many (but obviously not enough for full control) international peacekeepers in Kosovo and their lives could easily be endangered. The socio-political picture of Kosovo is such that it forces us to be cautious. Namely, during the last ten years a significant population group has been formed in the province. This group consists of young people who have not seen any other "personal perspective" besides "struggle". A good part of these young men have recently moved from rural areas to the cities. Without an opportunity for work, carried by the "enthusiasm of the victory" and desire to make quick profit, they have become main factors of criminal activities, from smuggling and distribution of drugs, over forced prostitution and trade with women and weapons, to terrorist acts. The trouble is that the power of certain political circles that are trying to direct the political developments in the province and achieve their planned and strategic goals is based exactly on those criminal structures.
Kosovo Albanians (and not only them) are still "swimming" on waves of international understanding and support dating from the time when they were under the pressure of Milosevic's regime. Will they lose that support and understanding with their stubborn refusal to adjust to the new changes in the region? Or, perhaps, they are trying to with violence provoke Serb retribution in order to achieve the desired goal, discredit Kostunica and "prove" that nothing has changed in Belgrade with the fall of Milosevic?
Tirana was disappointed with the Zagreb Summit. Obviously, Tirana is not alone in its disappointment. All those who have not understood the essence of the changes in the Balkans and with the Balkans, expressed in the basic messages from the summit (the EU gives assistance and support for democratically oriented governments in the region, devoted to democratic values and development and mutual cooperation in all areas, rather than for extremist forces focused on to violence, naked struggle for territories and change of borders) were disappointed. The same is true for certain signals in connection with the changes in Belgrade (invitation sent to the newly elected Yugoslav leader to meet western leaders; their "fight" to have their photograph taken with "the man who managed to overthrow Milosevic"; "haste" to visit Belgrade and offer assistance; quick acceptance of FRY to many international organizations; offers for quick reestablishment of diplomatic relations with FRY; unequivocal qualifications of the terrorist character of the attacks in the south of Serbia).
Accidentally (or not?) the violence of the so-called UCPMB in the security zone in the south of Serbia comes exactly at the time of the announced break up of the ruling coalition in Macedonia. Accidentally (or not?), many Yugoslav citizens headed to the border crossings on the Macedonian-Yugoslav border, in search of a secure shelter. They were going to visit their friends and relatives. Accidentally or not, only in Macedonia. Accidentally, not, for example, in Kosovo. The effect would not be the same. It seems they do not have friends and relatives in Kosovo. Not accidentally. But there, there is no possibility of a fall of the government. Accidentally (or not?), in ethnically cleansed Kosovo, there is no possibility to demonstrate some group's importance as a regional (rather than only a local) factor. The importance regarding stability or instability. It has already been tested, in Macedonia there is such a possibility. And more deliberately than not, that possibility is being used. Accidentally, or not, with threat of refugees, with threat of a possible instability and new uncertainty. With a clear message (to the West as well) that the government and parliament crisis in Macedonia would not be desirable in the conditions of a threat of a new refugee crisis. Completely by chance. Or maybe not? And it is well-known that big powers do not like uncertainty. As is well-known that the threat with controlled instability is a tested and frequently applied tactics.
Unfortunately, we are witnessing a several-years-long march of the factors that are a part of the problem across the Balkans. Where are the factors that can be the factors and a part of the solution? Of solutions in the direction of the messages from Zagreb and the European perspectives of the Balkans. Western and eastern. Together with the south.
The author is a diplomat