However, even a superficial examination of the prepared Election Law Proposal reveals that this document will provoke a lot of controversy, probably even more than the temporary election rules. It is obvious that the most controversial part of the Proposal will be the part regulating the election of the members of the Presidency of BH. Unlike in the current procedure, where each nation elected its representative in the three-member Presidency, the Proposal for the Permanent Election Law envisages that all voters vote for all members of the Presidency and that the members are elected "in package".
Citizens will vote for a list, using preferential voting. Simplified, in practice that would mean that for example, if Ante Jelavic wants to run again, he would have to be proposed with another two candidates, a Serb and a Bosniak, and the voters will vote by circling the list of three names, instead of only one candidate as until now. Jelavic's list, in order to win, would have to get more votes than for example the list led by Zlatko Lagumdzija or Haris Silajdzic.
If these articles remain in the Permanent Election Law, that would be yet anther proof that the international community is trying to establish a pure civic state in Bosnia-Hercegovina. After the decision by which ethnic groups do not elect on their own their representatives in the Chamber of Nations, this election rule would be another blow against the structure of Bosnia-Hercegovina with three constituent nations. The least numerous nation, in this case Croats, will thereby merge its votes with the Bosniak-Serb electorate, which is several times larger.
Actually, if this rule is included in the Permanent Election Law, the BH Presidency will become obsolete. Why would we at all need the Presidency if its members are to be elected based on simple majority vote. In that system, Croat votes would serve for "balancing" between Bosniak and Serb electorate. In theory, even if all Croats voted for one presidential list it could not win if it did not include favored Bosniak and Serb politicians. Furthermore, in this case it would almost not make any difference if the country were ruled by a three-member Presidency or a President of the state. The essence of the Dayton Agreement would thereby be totally lost, and only the form would be satisfied by keeping a Bosniak, a Serb and a Croat in the Presidency. The realistic possibility that the Croat member of the Presidency may receive support of only 1 or 2 percent of Croat voters does not concern the creators of the Permanent Election Law.