THE AGREEMENT CONTAINS NO SECRET ANNEXES

Interview with Mate Granic, Croatian Foreign Affairs Minister

In Geneva on 19 January 1994, the foreign affairs ministers of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Mate Granic and Vladislav Jovanovic, signed the first agreement on the normalisation of relations between these two states. The result of this was the opening of offices in Belgrade and Zagreb and the beginning of serious negotiations on the relations between the two conflicting sides. The climax of the negotiating process was reached on 23 August when the Agreement on the Normalisation of Relations Between the Republic of Croatia and FRY was signed in Belgrade, according to which both states mutually recognised each other within their international borders. We spoke to Mate Granic who has been at the head of Croatian diplomacy since the very beginning of the mentioned process and who has been an active participant in all the bilateral meetings of the Croatian and Yugoslav delegations.

How did the agreement come about?

The road was a long one. The first time an agreement which included mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations was discussed at all was in Dayton. This, of course does not mean that there was no mention of it at all before. For instance, during the meeting between President Tudjman and Cosic and later when the Geneva Declaration was signed. However, it is clear that until now the conditions were not ripe for such an agreement.

Does this mean that Dayton was the turning-point in the negotiating process?

In Dayton the Croatian side insisted on the normalisation agreement as a precondition for the start of talks on the solution to the B-H crisis. In the same way, Croatia requested an agreement on the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube Basin into the legal system of the Republic of Croatia. For this reason, this was the main topic of conversation in Dayton the first four days.

Was it necessary to first reach an agreement on these questions which you have just mentioned before turning to the problems connected to B-H?

Correct.

For what reasons?

Primarily because of the historical and geopolitical aspects, namely, it is well known that the Republic of Croatia at that time, after operation "Storm" and after several successful operations in B-H, which were legally established by the Split Declaration, was twice in the situation to solve the problem of the liberation of Banja Luka. The international community, however, prevented the Croatian Army, the HVO and the B-H Army from accomplishing this. This issue was the subject of serious discussions with the United States which was interested in keeping Serbia and Milosevic as negotiators. On the other hand they did not want the destabilisation of the whole region, particularly south-eastern Europe and the southern wing of the NATO alliance. It is important to emphasise that they wished to maintain a balance in the region because of their relations with the Russian Federation. And finally, the mass humanitarian exodus of the Serbian inhabitants from that area was also unacceptable to them, the reason being that Milosevic would at that time have been placed before a choice - total war or loss of power. The Republic of Croatia then showed complete co-operation in its relations with the international community. It showed that it knew how to liberate its territory when it estimated it necessary and to stop all actions when this was in agreement with the international community. In this way, along with the mentioned actions and the sanctions against FRY, as well as NATO attacks in B-H, we arrived at the negotiating table.

May we conclude therefore that Croatia because of its co-operativeness and the situation on the ground had, at that time, a strong geostrategic position in the region and a strengthened negotiating position?

It does seem so. If this were not so, Croatia would never have been able to impose its condition in Dayton, which was that the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube Basin be discussed first. Our position has not changed since then. In Dayton, therefore, the basic agreement was reached and apart for this, the normalisation of relations was agreed on.

A long time, however, passed before it was signed. What are the reasons for this?

In Paris, Belgrade was unwilling to sign because of Prevlaka, namely, they suggested a three-way exchange of territory which we did not even wish to discuss. After that there were several other meetings within the Peace Conference in Geneva between presidents Tudjman and Milosevic and between Minister Milutinovic and myself, which however brought no result or agreement. It is necessary to add though that the reintegration of the Croatian Danube Basin went its course and was within the predicted time limits. The demilitarisation process was particularly successful. When we bear this mind, then it is clear that this could not have been undertaken without the support and co-operation of Belgrade. These were truly positive signs.

How to interpret Belgrade's readiness to co-operate?

For some time we had been evaluating and expecting to receive a suggestion from Belgrade for the full normalisation of relations and for mutual recognition because of the situation within FRY and its international position. This evaluation was confirmed by the arrival of the initiative from Belgrade for the Athens meeting.

Why was Athens chosen?

Belgrade suggested two states and we also gave our own suggestions. Finally we agreed the meeting be held in Greece, which although traditionally a friend of Belgrade, has in the last year or two played a very rational role towards Croatia in the European Union and the Council of Europe as well as in bilateral relations.

Certain circles attempted to portray this meeting as some sort of new "Karadjordjevo"?

This was not a meeting at the expense of a third party but exclusively of a bilateral nature. It lasted about four hours and we attempted to find a way to bridge those obstacles which had previously prevented us from reaching an agreement.

What exactly?

Prevlaka, the continuity of statehood and the problem of missing persons. As far as Prevlaka was concerned, the statement was very clear, that is that this issue was for us primarily a security dispute, while for Belgrade it was a territorial dispute as well. The statement states that we must draw demarcation lines on the sea with FRY and allow the free passage of vessels into the Boka Kotorska Bay. This will be regulated by an agreement and stipulations of international law also exist. It is also clear that Prevlaka is a security problem for Boka Kotorska and a part of Dubrovnik. And fourthly, we must emphasise the existence of the observer system established by the UN mission. When we solved this, we found the corresponding formulations and removed the obstacles to the signing of the agreement and we turned to talks on the continuity of statehood. We agreed on a solution by which not only Croatia, but also Slovenia, B-H and Macedonia should be pleased with. It is necessary to add that Macedonia was the first to have solved this issue with Belgrade.

The first article of the Agreement uses the phrase that both states respect each other as sovereign states within their internationally recognised borders. Why is the term "recognised" not used?

Because Croatia has been recognised by the UN. In this way, Belgrade respects us as such an independent and equal state. This is an even stronger formulation and there is not a trace of ambiguity. The same applies to Article 2 which states that both states will respect each other in accordance with international laws. These two articles together leave no room for any speculation.

According to this article, FRY has, for the first time, admitted that the former state fell apart, that is, there was no secession. Is that correct?

This is how we interpret it and so does the international community.

When did Belgrade consent to not mentioning Prevlaka as a territorial dispute in the agreement?

The question of Prevlaka was solved in the manner stated in the Athens Agreement of the two presidents. Belgrade has, however, until the last moment fought for a better formulation. On our part, we knew how far we could go.

The Croatian version of the Agreement mentions the term Croatian Danube Basin, whereas the Serbian one mentions eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem. How did this difference come about?

A complete consensus was reached on this issue. It was agreed that we use this formulation and they theirs. Although we are completely concordant with their formulation, ours has more significance to us.

As for the problem of the return of Serbs into Croatia, the international community is putting great pressure on the leadership. Will this agreement change anything?

As far as pressure is concerned, it has always existed from all sides and has never stopped. We have always maintained that individual return had never stopped and in fact 9,500 people have received permission to return so far. We estimate that some 12,000 have returned all together. We do not agree, therefore, with the estimates of Ms Rehn that only 1,500-2,000 persons have returned. On the other hand, we have constantly warned that real obstacles for their return exist. One of them is the question of the public, second their security, in particularly because of the regions which still remain mined and the third is that it is only after the signing of such an agreement that conditions are created for the safe return which will be accompanied by an added amnesty law.

How much is it in Belgrade's interests for these people to return?

Belgrade has another type of problem. Firstly, about 35% of FRY's inhabitants are non-Serbs. Kosovo is also a problem with which they are burdened and the international community is also placing pressure on them. There is also the question of international isolation and the problem of entering international institutions and associations. For this reason their estimations as far as return is concerned are quite rational and there is no difference in this between Croatia, the international community and Belgrade.

What about the return of Croats to FRY?

This question will be solved in the same way. I must emphasise that this will be a voluntary act on both sides.

Belgrade wished to remove the formulation about war crimes from the agreement. What was its aim?

Because of pressure on their side concerning this problem. This pressure is really great - from the international community to the Serbs in the Croatian Danube Basin. Our stance was firm in regards to this and we could not give in. Not only because of our public but also because according to international law those who have committed a war crime may not be amnestied. Apart from this, Croatia signed the Agreement and passed a law on co-operation with the International Tribunal for War Crimes in the Hague.

It may be supposed that the normalisation of relations will give new momentum to the process of peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube Basin. What is most disputable is the possibility that one side might request the extension of the UNTAES mandate. Since Croatia's stance is well-known, what may we expect in the near future?

It is possible that the Serbian side will request an extension but it won't necessarily be accepted. The decision on this will be brought in agreement with the Croatian government, the UN and Mr Klein. Croatia has already begun negotiations and President Tudjman has clearly let it be known that three months are the most we'll allow after which time the take-over of government must be accomplished in accordance with election results which must be held by mid December. After this period an extension of three months will be allowed, but this time period refers only to the physical departure of international units who are deployed there.

What are the dynamics of the return of non-Serbs to that region?

The first displaced Croats will return in September. This refers to pilot projects in five places and later this process will be extended. On the other hand, there is the fact that for example in Beli Manastir, 382 Serbs waited in line to receive Croatian documents on the very first day. This also is part of the process of peaceful reintegration. Also this reintegration means the opening of roads, railway lines, water ways, opening the border crossing into Hungary, the reconstruction of houses, the return of people, etc. This process will soon become unstoppable.

When may real return be expected?

In 1997. Namely, it is clear that this will occur when we take over complete control of the borders because then we will be able to guarantee the complete safety of people and property.

FRY has been buying up the debts of the former state. To what extent will this fact influence the process of succession?

This presents no problem for Croatia because it regulated its relations with the Paris and London Clubs. By signing this Agreement, Croatia no longer has anything to do with the former state.

What will happen to the property of ordinary citizens?

This problem will be solved through bilateral agreements between the newly formed states. This refers to property of citizens and companies of the Republic of Croatia in FRY and vice versa. The third category is property damaged n the war and for this we shall establish our own requests. The Agreement allows us to ask for compensation for war damages and there is also a special category for the property of refugees from both states which is also regulated by this Agreement.

Can you tell us briefly what significance the Agreement has for Croatia?

Well, we must emphasise several facts. The first one concerns the international public. There is not one significant person in the world who did not explicitly support the Agreement - from the USA, China, Great Britain, the Russian Federation, Germany, France,, Italy, the European Union and our first neighbours, B-H, Slovenia, Hungary, etc. Secondly, this Agreement will aid the peace process in B-H and it is in no way an Agreement against a third party, as some would like to portray it. Furthermore, I wish to emphasise that there are no secret annexes. Apart from this, the Agreement significantly strengthens Croatia's international position together with the successfully solved crisis in Mostar and the agreement on the simultaneous transfer of authority of the B-H Republic and HR Herceg Bosna to the B-H Federation. And finally, it strengthens Croatia's position towards the European Union and its main strategic partners, members of the Contact Group, and opens the doors to the EU. On the domestic scene, the Agreement speeds up the process of solving the missing persons problem. When we bear all this mind, we may say that the Agreement confirms all the strategic aims Croatia has had since 1991 - territorial sovereignty, independence, integrity, equality, the right to development, etc. Therefore, with this signature the war has de facto ended.

To what extent may we say that this agreement marks the definite separation of Croatia from the rest of the Balkan territory, and will there be any decrease in the pressure for the restoration of Yugoslavia?

This Agreement is the final chapter of the former state and of any kind of association. It will enable us to withstand any kind of global regional approach of the European Union and leaves us the possibility of creating our relations with our neighbours according to our own interests. I would like to add that no one can force Croatia to do anything, and this mood is prevalent in Macedonia, B-H, Hungary, etc. In other words, all states in the region are of the same opinion when it comes to this issue.

The B-H elections are important for Croatia as far as the process of joining international associations are concerned. A decision has been brought to delay municipal elections with which the already complicated situation has become even more so, and the international community for its own reasons is forcing the elections no matter what they are like. How will they contribute to the stability of the region?

These elections will certainly not be held under ideal conditions because they are the most complicated elections in history. It is clear that the B-H state according to the Dayton Accords is a state consisting of two entities and three constituent peoples and this alone makes it a highly decentralised state. Within this framework, we firmly support the elections because without them there is no Dayton B-H. Without the elections the peace process for this region is postponed. The delay in the municipal elections was requested by the Croats several months ago because they claimed the conditions were not right. They, however, subsequently agreed and current opinion is that the election results should have been annulled only in those places where more serious irregularities were reported. The decision of Mr Frowick is, nevertheless, completely legitimate and the Croatian side accepts them in whole.

There has been much talk of a "new European order" and the stability of south-eastern Europe. Croatia and FRY appear here as guarantees of peace in B-H. To what extent is FRY necessary to Europe in this process and may we say that there will be aims for FRY to enter the Partners for Peace programme?

Croatian-Serbian relations are a vital factor in the stability and peace of southern Europe. Without the normalisation of these relations it would be impossible to attain the mentioned aim. FRY has also accepted Croatia as an equal state. It is only then that the application of the civilian part of the Dayton Accords will be facilitated. As for FRY and its orientation it has never declared whether it wishes to enter the programme or not. The same may be said for its membership into the Euro-Atlantic integration. So far it has clearly stated that it wishes membership into the UN, the C.S.C.E and international financial institutions. What is crystal clear is that the West wants a stable and democratic FRY so as to have stability in the region and in NATO's southern wing.

Finally, I would like to ask whether you believe that there is a possibility that now after the normalisation of relations and the elections in B-H new conflicts in B-H will reoccur?

We believe that IFOR will not completely leave B-H and that certain international forces will be present for some time to come.

This partially means that B-H will become a protectorate of the international community. To what extent is this fact acceptable to Croatia and the Croatian people in B-H?

This cannot be called a protectorate, but for the complete stability of B-H the presence of the international community will be necessary for a certain amount of time.