GEOPOLITICAL GAMES: Serbian Secret Plans for Prevlaka
by Mladen Klemencic
Hrvatski Obzor, Zagreb , Croatia, 4/1 1996
The question of Prevlaka, or more precisely the peninsula and
point of Ostra, is one of the most persistent territorial
questions to arise from the break-up of the former Yugoslav
federation. It is characteristic that since the autumn of
1991, when it first became a topic of interest, practically no
development towards an agreement has been made. For Croatia
this question no longer exists since it is "de iure" perfectly
clear and "de facto" we are close to a final solution. The
other side, however, consistently attempts to keep the
question open from which we may logically conclude that it is
of particular importance to them. To mention the "other side"
means to address not one but at least three actors. One is
Montenegro and Podgorica (Montenegro's capital), which borders
with Croatia in that region. The second is Serbia, i.e.
Belgrade, which, thanks to the Serbo-Montenegrin Federation,
represents the federation on the international field. Finally,
there is the "Serbian republic", i.e. the Serbian unit in
Bosnia-Herzegovina which has recently acquired a certain
international legitimacy and which has been included in the
"games" concerning Prevlaka since the beginning.
There are several standard "arguments" on the basis of which
the three Yugoslav sides are seeking Prevlaka. They are of a
different nature but their common feature is that all are
equally unconvincing. Montenegro's most often mentioned
argument is the alleged threat to the security of the bay
which would be jeopardised by Croatian presence on one of the
promontories which close the entrance to the bay. Allegedly,
the security of entering and leaving the bay by ship would be
jeopardised. To this argument is added the principle of
"geographic unity of the bay", according to which the entire
bay should belong to Montenegro, i.e. to "Yugoslavia". Not one
of these arguments has a valid basis. International law, which
has a very well worked out system of rules and instructions,
in particular in the area of maritime borders, does not
mention the above principle at all. For the political division
of a bay between two or more states, the decisive point is the
one on which the land border emerges onto the sea coast. If
this point is within the bay area, as is the case with the Bay
of Kotor, then there is no principle according to which a
coastal state could be denied participation over the expanse
of sea in the bay regardless of the configuration of the land.
In the same way, international maritime law does not recognise
the military-strategic reasons which would give one coastal
state the right to "throw out" another coastal state from the
bay. Above all, even if the entrance of the bay itself were
divided into two territorial seas, the Montenegrin, i.e. the
"Yugoslav" side would have half an entrance which is still
wide and deep enough for normal use.
"Three-way exchange"
If Croatia were to give up Prevlaka i.e. should Zagreb accept
a border change, this would be very significant to the other
side in terms of prestige. It would serve, namely, as proof to
the domestic and foreign public of Croatia's "guilt" and it
would justify the aggression of 1991. Montenegrins who follow
the Greater Serbia idea would also welcome it. In 1991, the
Montenegrins participated in quite large numbers in the
aggression on the Dubrovnik area and disgraced themselves to
boot; the receipt of Prevlaka would justify this obviously
thoughtless act. For similar reasons Belgrade could use some
good propaganda, however, since Belgrade needs an excuse for
an aggression of somewhat greater proportions, the question is
how convincing the Prevlaka story would be, particularly among
the Serbian public.
The most frequent and so far most detailed combination has
been the so-called "three-way exchange" whereby Croatia would
give up Prevlaka and gain the Dubrovnik hinterland. This last
combination was topical, hopefully for the last time,
immediately after the Dayton Agreement. This combination is
the most complex but also the most revealing as far as the
real intentions of the other side are concerned. In order to
realise this combination Croatia would have to give up not
only Prevlaka but also a part of the Konavle area. On several
occasions, the entire Konavle area east of Cilipi was
mentioned. (The "Serbian republic" simply would not be able to
emerge directly onto Prevlaka without at least a part of the
Konavle area because of the configuration of the terrain and
the formation of a border line.)
Croatia, of course, has no valid reason for accepting such a
transaction. Moral and fundamental reasons, as well as
international law, all speak in favour of Croatia remaining on
Prevlaka. There is no reason for accepting "Yugoslavia's"
proposal, particularly now that the internal borders of Bosnia-
Herzegovina have been drawn as determined in Dayton and
according to which a part of the Dubrovnik hinterland within B-
H borders has fallen under B-H Federation rule. It is
necessary to observe, however, the obstinacy of Belgrade and
its refusal to let go of the "three-way" exchange which is
"three-way" only because of Belgrade's interests. Montenegro,
namely, gains nothing since territorial gains are meant for
the "Serbian republic".
This obstinacy is somewhat incomprehensible because there is
no logical necessity for the "Serbian republic" to have access
to the sea. Its needs for the sea, which objectively speaking
are not much, may be satisfied by transit through its federal
neighbour Montenegro. Not only this, but the coast south-east
of Cavtat is anything but suitable for the construction of a
sea port. If we were to add to this the construction of roads
and railway lines, it is clear that the "Serbian republic"
could not possibly find sufficient financial means in the near
future for such a venture.
The significance for Montenegro
At the end of the review of the existing arguments it is
necessary to mention the fact that the current situation on
Prevlaka and around it is actually perfectly acceptable for
all sides. Prevlaka is formally Croatian, however, UN
observers are present on the peninsula itself. Their presence
does not bother Croatia since in the nearest Konavle village
of Vitaljina, everyday life is in no way limited by the
observers. All the while, the Montenegrin, that is the
Yugoslav side, is enjoying unrestricted blackmarketeering.
Since Croatian border posts are not on Prevlaka itself they
cannot obstruct Italian and "Yugoslav" blackmarketeers in
their important business, and neither do the observers. The
current situation is also satisfying to the international
community since a small and therefore cheap observer team
(approx. 25 people) maintains complete peace thereby
fulfilling its task in at least one location.
The analysis so far has shown that real reasons for
controversy do not really exist. However, the obstinacy of the
Yugoslav side seems to point in another direction, and this
means that apart from the already mentioned arguments there
must be other less public ones for Prevlaka to be important.
We may understand these reasons if we look at the entire story
from a somewhat broader context and from a different angle as
far as space, idea and strategy are concerned. If it is all
considered within the context of permanent plans for the
formation of Greater Serbia, then the Prevlaka story gains a
new dimension, with the issue being less on the amputation of
Croatian territory (although this remains a part of the plan)
and more on the pacification of their insufficiently reliable
federal partner - Montenegro. How Montenegro is vital to
Belgrade was testified to by the recent BBC Television
documentary series "Death Of Yugoslavia". We must remember
Jovic's comments on the situation in the autumn of 1991 when
the Montenegrin president Bulatovic for a short time accepted
the Carrington plan, in other words turned his back on
Belgrade. Jovic called this the "deepest crisis among our
leadership". From Zagreb's perspective, Bulatovic's infidelity
seems far less serious.
Two "Montenegrin flanks"
In the scenario of the final pacification of the federal
partner the key point is the main polygon of the "Yugoslav
Army" for which the Pester Plateau was chosen. The plateau is
bordered to the north by Mount Golija and to the south, more-
or-less, by the Serbo-Montenegrin border. In recent times, all
the more important military exercises are carried out there.
The polygon, as well as the entire territory of Montenegro,
according to the current division on military districts falls
under the zone of responsibility of the 2nd army with its
headquarters in Podgorica and the Pester polygon is the main
concentration point of the entire area. With its position, the
plateau cuts through the historic area of Novi Pazar's
Sandzak, distancing the eastern (mostly Muslim) part not only
from the western (mostly Serbian) part but also from the B-H
border which is even more important. The second direction of
activity, in case of need, is towards Kosovo as an added
support to the pacification forces already deployed in this
once autonomous province. The main observation target,
however, is Montenegro. From this point, namely, two flanks
are to run which would completely separate Montenegro from
Croatia on one side and from Albania on the other. In this
way, the Montenegrin core would be completely within Serbia's
"embrace" and a final blow could be given to any remnants of
the "greens", i.e. believers in Montenegro's independence. The
left flank of this "final embrace" would cross the "orthodox"
"Serbian Republic" and emerge on the coast over current
Croatian territory in Konavle, including Prevlaka. For this
reason, Belgrade needs access to the sea for the "Serbian
Republic" even more than it needs Prevlaka because it is this
tampon which will completely cut off Montenegro from Croatia.
In a sub-variation of this scenario, Montenegro may formally
annex the Prevlaka Peninsula but on the condition that the
"Serbian Republic" has access to the sea to the west of it.
It is clear that this scenario to Croatia means amputation of
not only Prevlaka but also the greater part of the Konavle
area.
The second flank of the "embrace" has as its aim the
Serbianisation of the border land between Montenegro and
Albania. It is a well-known fact that this part of Montenegro
is inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Since they are an unreliable
element, it is necessary to change the demographic structure
in an artificial way. This is to be accomplished by building a
new naval base in Valdanosa near Ulcinj; in fact, the removal
of the "Yugoslav" navy from Boka to Valdanosa has already
started. When the new base is ready, it will become a navy
stronghold. When all the departments are transferred, along
with the military personnel and accompanying services,
including their families of course, this will be a completely
new element, loyal to Belgrade, which will carry out
pacification and stop any possible anti-Serb connection
between Montenegro and Albania. Apart from this we also have
Podgorica, where a significant mass of those loyal to Belgrade
has been created around the army headquarters. From the Pester
polygon, though, a decisive blow is always possible in order
to break any Montenegrin resistance by "silent smothering".
Croatia is not the main aim
The described scenario explains Belgrade's interest in
Prevlaka and the importance of Prevlaka in a new dimension is
shown in its entirety. Since Belgrade is truly interested in
the pacification of Montenegro, pressure on Croatia concerning
Prevlaka will continue. The intensity of the pressure will
also show the validity of the described scenario. It is only
if Belgrade withdraws from its rationally inexplicable support
of access to the sea for the "Serbian Republic", if it
withdraws its request for a revision into the border at
Prevlaka, and if it recognises Croatia within its
internationally recognised borders, will it convince us that
it has truly given up on its Greater Serbia policy. Until that
happens, the described scenario is a probability and should be
borne in mind. Of course, Croatia is not the main aim, i.e. it
is no longer the main aim as it has been until now, so there
is no reason for alarm. In the past several years Belgrade has
surely provided us with enough proof that it cannot be
trusted, in particular after several symbolic and not too
convincing peace measures and words. What is much more
worrying is the naivet among international mediators who are
prepared to forgive Belgrade everything even before they are
truly convinced in its real intentions, i.e. the uncertainty
of the real situation in Montenegro and the readiness and will
of the Montenegrins to disclose the Belgrade scenario on time.
Translated by Branka Kovac bkovac@faust.irb.hr
