interview by Zivojin RAKOCEVIC
GLAS JUGA: Shall we see a compromise between the Albanian and Serb side, and what could that compromise be based on?
FATHER SAVA: If both sides stick to their maximalist goals compromise will hardly be possible and the international community will most likely impose a solution. It seems that many in Belgrade and Pristina would actually prefer such an outcome as otherwise they would find it difficult to explain to their own electorate why some concessions were made.
Why do, after six years of international administration of the Province, we see an increase in extremism that is used to blackmail the UN mission?
Simply because today violence, unfortunately, is accepted in certain cases as a valid political argument. The international community wants to avoid at all cost an armed conflict with Albanians and Albanians understand that very well and are exploiting that attitude. The disturbances from March 2004 very clearly demonstrated that violence is rewarded because not only were organizers of that pogrom never named and punished, but the violence in fact was used as an excuse to replace the strategy "standards before status" by a new one in which it is necessary to change status so that standards would supposedly also change.
Do the authorities in Belgrade have a realistic picture of the Province and can their actions provide security to the Serbs living here?
Generally speaking, political circles in Belgrade essentially do not care about the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. They only care about it to the extent it affects their chances of staying in power in Serbia. There is very little concern for ordinary people in Kosovo and Metohija and their problems. Actions of the authorities in Belgrade could better be described as efforts to calm their own conscience than as active statesmanlike strategy.
What is your opinion regarding the democratic potential of Belgrade authorities and what can they offer as guaranties to Kosovo Albanians?
Unfortunately, after October 5, 2000, democratic potential in Serbia was not utilized as much as it was possible. Above all the inability to get the Commonwealth of Serbia and Montenegro going is the chief argument offered by Albanians insisting on secession. Besides, animosity of Albanians with respect to any form of life within Serbia is so big that even the most democratic guaranties offered by Belgrade authorities would be irrelevant to Albanians. However, had Belgrade succeeded in exploiting better its democratic potential and avoiding the loss of energy after October 5 in internecine clashes and power struggles, Serbia would look much more credible in front of the international community than it does now.
On the other hand, what about the democratic potential of Kosovo Albanians and their ability to protect non-Albanian ethnic communities?
After six post-war years it is totally clear that the façade of the so-called democratic institutions in Kosovo and Metohija simply hides rule of warlike clans and mafia. Even the Kosovo Albanians understand that and after the solution of the status of Kosovo they will face huge internal problems. The likelihood of efficient protection of non-Albanian communities is slim and it is obvious that regardless of the ultimate status of Kosovo and Metohija some sort of international presence, focusing on monitoring of human and religious rights will be needed, while physical protection of the endangered population will be provided by NATO forces.
Can such institutions take the Province towards independence?
Such de facto mono-ethnic institutions naturally are not capable of creating and maintaining a functional democratic state. Consequently, in case it is decided that Kosovo and Metohija are granted independence there will be great danger that those institutions remain cover for general lawlessness and that Kosovo and Metohija officially turn into European Columbia. Leaders of Kosovo Albanians who have a vision of a modern European society and who understand that creation of the second Albanian country in the Balkans is anachronistic should find a mode of joining forces with moderate Serb politicians in the Province and by promoting pro-reform policies remove from political life those forces whose vision of the future is exhausted by mythologization of the nationalist past. Only such institutions could earn support of the moderate part of the population, regardless of its ethnic background. However, given the current situation, such solutions are still in the realm of fantasy. Unfortunately, we live in the time with very few, if any, visionary leaders.
After the signing of contracts on October 10, naming of oversight boards and setting up of building sites, initial work started at all locales included in the first group of tenders. In Prizren and Pristina the interior of burnt churches has already been cleared of debris. The clearing is conducted in presence of experts who are sifting through debris and classifying all valuable remains.
The slow pace of the reconstruction process has frequently been criticized?
As far as the Serb Orthodox Church is concerned we did all we could. Bishop Teodosije has been appointed representative of the SOC in the reconstruction commission, so that I am personally, through the bishop, informed about the developments. I can tell you that the church is doing all it can. We all know that it is much easier to destroy than to reconstruct, and the process of reconstruction employing tenders, especially when organized by the Council of Europe, as in this case, requires observation of a host of rules and unavoidable procedures. Only next year can we expect faster work and first tangible results, but we have to start somewhere.
Could that encourage Serbs and others who lived from those sacred sites to start returning?
I hope that the reconstruction will encourage Serbs to return. Lacking provocation, if local institutions, generally Albanian, do not obstruct the process of return, if safe environment is created, then that will clearly demonstrate to Serbs that they can start thinking about return. That is an important test for Kosovo institutions. The reconstruction of all 150 Serb Orthodox churches and monasteries destroyed since 1999 is a much longer process that will only partly be covered by currently existing funds and procedures.
Serbs who used to live in the old quarter, known as Potkaljaja, are currently living at the German military base and have signed contracts for the reconstruction of their homes. According to them, the reconstruction is not going well, so that it is unlikely they will be able to return to their homes since they are left with bare walls, no furniture or appliances of any sort. It seems there is a tendency to force Serbs to sell their property, which would be a big and strategic mistake. In any case it is important that our authorities get involved and help them in some manner and encourage them not to sell their homes. I have been told that certain Albanians have plan to turn Potkaljaja into an elite ethnic Albanian quarter, with homes built in the old style; however, we must remember that the old quarter of Prizren was the part of the city with overwhelmingly Serb population; that population has the right to return to their homes and continue living close to their churches, located in that part of Prizren. We expect that our Ministry of Culture will get involved through its representatives at the UNESCO and other institutions, but that requires general and close coordination because the issue of our cultural heritage is not only important for the SOC, it is not a matter for only one institution, it is a matter of general national interest.