Even though this abduction under the guise of extradition was carried out on the orders of both justice ministers, this arrest and extradition to the Hague tribunal represents a serious violation of the Constitution and shameless disrespect for the law. This can be easily demonstrated.
Article 66 Paragraph 2 of the FRY Constitution allows for the extradition of a foreigner (Stakic is not a Yugoslav citizen) but only to another country and, additionally, "only in instances foreseen by international agreements which obligate FRY". The current federal penal code also provides for the extradition of foreigners to another state but not to some transnational international court and this is further confirmed by Article 526 of this law according to which "the procedure for transfer of indicted and convicted foreigners is initiated upon request of the foreign state" (Item 1) which on such occasion must submit "an extract of the text of the penal code of the foreign country" (Item 4).
I know that those who ordered the extradition of Stakic to the Hague tribunal will say that the extradition of a foreigner to the international tribunal is a constitutional and legal vacuum, and that such an extradition is not banned and, consequently, that an analogy with extradition to another state should be applied. It should immediately be noted that in the domain of criminal law, which defines the encroachment of state authority into the most important human freedoms and rights, there cannot be and there must not be legal vacuums and that everything which is not explicitly permitted - the extradition of a foreigner to an international court - is certainly prohibited. And, what is even more important, in our criminal law, as in every other modern criminal law which rests on the principle of strict legality, no sort of analogy is permitted. Momcilo Grubac, who teaches criminal law, knows this better than anyone.
What is worst of all, however, is the fact that Milorad Stakic, on the occasion of his arrest and so-called extradition, was denied court protection of his freedoms and rights. His right to have the court decide on the validity of his arrest and extradition, his right to appeal the decision of the primary court and his right to a professional attorney to defend his rights were completely trampled on.
If by some chance the Yugoslav and Serbian justice ministers had at least allowed for the implementation, on the basis of analogy, of the legal process for the extradition of a foreigner to another country, Stakic would not have been sent off the same day he was arrested based only on the primary decision of the Yugoslav justice minister. Instead, after the issuance of the request for his extradition, his detention would have been determined by an investigating judge, not by the minister acting in the capacity of an executive organ. The investigating judge would have then directed him to engage a defense attorney or appointed a public defender to defend him, since the issue on hand is a serious criminal act, which requires a mandatory defense according to our penal code. Based on conducted investigations, the investigating judge would have submitted records to the judicial council of the district court, whose job it is to determine whether the legal prerequisites for extradition have or have not been satisfied. Stakic would have had the right to file an appeal of this decision to the Supreme Court of Serbia; only upon the decision of the secondary court would legal prerequisites for extradition have been satisfied and at that point the Yugoslav minister could have made the decision to extradite Stakic to the Hague tribunal.
Both Momcilo Grubac and Vladan Batic should know that a state based on law, if nothing else, at least assumes judicial control over the executive organs, especially in cases where a decision of the executive organ encroaches on the freedoms and rights of a man. Instead, they have chosen to usurp the right to decide on arrest and extradition for themselves and make it not subject to appeal and final. If this is what they mean by a state based on the rule of law, then it would be better if they were not among those leading that state.
The Atlantic Pact's response to this unpleasant question is unequivocally clear. A minimum of 13 dead Serbs in only two days is not enough for this military power to change anything. The secretary-general of the Atlantic Pact, George Robertson, expressed his deep regrets due to "the escalation of violence in the south of Serbia" and called on "those responsible on either side to be reasonable", thus disregarding every distinction between those who bestially kill and those who are killed, between the culprits and their victims.
He even, with the cynicism so typical of the English, praised the restraint of the Serbian side and expressed the expectation that it would "continue this policy". He thus informed the world that the Atlantic Pact would not use any form of military might against the Arbanas terrorists, whereas it would significantly change its policies toward the Serbian side if our police and army respond in kind. In other words, the Arbanas terrorists are allowed to continue to freely attack and kill, while our police and army are supposed to remain sitting ducks.
What is, however, surprising is the willingness of those steering our state to go on with the same "moderate" policy which is recommended by Robertson - without an appropriate response. At an allegedly confidential meeting held on February 18 of this year, an entire "series of measures for protection from terrorism" was agreed upon only to end with the conclusion that "FRY remains committed to peaceful policies and will undertake even more energetic diplomatic action" in order to resolve this crisis by negotiation.
And President Vojislav Kostunica gave recognition to the members of the Yugoslav Army and police for "managing, under unbelievably difficult conditions, not to be tricked into responding to provocations but carrying out the tasks entrusted to them with devoted self-sacrifice". In other words, they will continue to react defensively to the murderous offensive attacks of the terrorists, and they will respond to the disinclination of the powerful foreign key factors to oblige us by granting even one of our requests by launching a great diplomatic offensive.
It still remains to be determined what the Arbanas terrorists will do. Since they know full well - and they know everything in advance - that the Atlantic Pact will not attack them or use any effective means to thwart them in their murderous attacks on our army and police (not to even mention civilians), and that our officials for now do not dare to confront them with more serious offensive operations, the terrorists will continue to act as they have acted so far: they will continue to kill and wound our soldiers and policemen, and to carry out even more dangerous acts of sabotage and other efforts to murder, frighten and expel our compatriots from Kosovo and Metohija.
It is not excluded that they will eventually, with the help of "impartial" international mediators, get involved in some kind of negotiations about negotiations without a ghost of a chance of ever seriously negotiating, let alone supporting Covic's plan which, in general, enjoys unprecedented international support, all toward the goal of internationalizing the Presevo valley issue, buying some time, growing even stronger and, in the end, annexing these three municipalities also to a Greater Albania.
In this triangle - the Atlantic Pact, the Arbanas terrorists, our officials - the first two factors have no intention of changing anything. The only thing that can change is the position of our officials and it truly needs to change.
If 13 dead Serbs in only two days are not enough for the Atlantic Pact to significantly change its policies toward the Arbanas terrorists, while it took only about 20 allegedly massacred Arbanasi for it to go to war against our country, the following question presents itself: how many policemen, soldiers and civilians need to die in the Presevo valley for those steering our state to change their present policy? It would be beneficial if the number was publicly announced because, in that case, the Arbanas terrorists might even slow down in their murderous intents when they approach that number lest they risk losing their own lives on a larger scale. One thing, however, is clear: those who are occupying our state offices have no right to make sitting ducks of their soldiers and policemen.
The less vocal group, to which the writer of these lines also belongs, includes those who claim that both constitutions and federal criminal law prohibit the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to any foreign court, including the Hague tribunal. The first supporting evidence for this claim normally cited is Article 47 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Serbia which explicitly establishes that "a citizen... of Serbia cannot be extradited". The first person to foorget about this exceptionally clear constitutional provision, which is binding for all courts and other state organs in Serbia, was Serbian justice minister Vladan Batic.
The federal constitution, it is true, does not explicitly prohibit the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to the Hague tribunal, which did not even exist at the time this Constitution was ratified; it does, however, prohibit the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to the court of another state, and explicitly allows only the extradition of foreign citizens to another state, and only in those cases foreseen by international agreements (Article 66, Paragraph 2) binding for FRY. Since this is a provision of criminal law which must be interpreted in the narrowest sense in order to ensure the protection of essential freedoms and rights, the conclusion which follows from it that everything which is not explicitly permitted - and the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to any foreign or international court is not permitted - is undoubtedly prohibited.
It is interesting that this legalist viewpoint was until recently shared by our renowned critic of criminal procedure law, Professor Momcilo Grubac who, citing Article 17, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of FRY, in his Commentary on the Criminal Law (p. 846), intended first and foremost for an audience of judges, says no less than three times that any form of extradition of domestic citizens is prohibited.
The opposite view, that domestic citizens both can and must be extradited to the Hague tribunal, is represented today by the leaders of the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia, with the exception of Vojislav Kostunica and his political party friends. The reason which is cited in support of this "cooperation" is based on neither law nor realpolitik but on vassalage.
This reason was perhaps most clearly presented by Grubac when he said that the extradition of domestic citizens to the Hague tribunal must be legitimized "because of the insistence of the international community". He continues, it is true, to explicitly acknowledge that the federal Constitution "prohibits the extradition of domestic citizens to foreign judicial institutions", but immediately adds that what is involved here is not extradition to the Hague tribunal but a "transfer of another sort which is not extradition". No lesser scruples nor greater sophism.
The most convincing confirmation that both our government and our ministers have become clients of powerful international factors is the fact that Grubac did not send the draft Law on FRY cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal to either his constituents nor his deputies, but only to the Hague tribunal for its review and approval. When asked whether Milosevic would be extradited to the Hague tribunal, he answered that this will "depend also on our negotiations, agreements and cooperation with The Hague, its organs, as well as with the international community". In other words, we are no longer making this decision by ourselves; it will be made on our behalf by the patron whose clients we are.
In conclusion, we need to state the uncomfortable truth that because of such "cooperation" with the Hague tribunal and actions in accordance to dictates from abroad, we will no longer be a sovereign state but a vassal state. This is what little Serbia was like when Prince Milos sent Karadjordje's head to the Sultan as peskes [a required gift paid on the occasion of enthronement]. It would be good, therefore, if the fervid and impatient Zoran Djindjic would immediately advise how many Serb heads he is prepared to send as peskes to the Hague tribunal and how much money he will receive in exchange. It may well be the sum of four to six billion marks which he and his people already promised us on the eve of the last elections.
Confronted with this type of blackmail, Kostunica bent his neck beneath the yoke of necessity and readily announced that he would personally see to it that the law on cooperation with the tribunal is ratified by the end of May. He did not, it is true, say he would also seek the rapid extradition of Slobodan Milosevic but on the basis of the obvious satisfaction of Carla del Ponte, who coincidentally found herself in Washington on the same day as Kostunica, it is easy to conclude that he agreed to this as well. Thus, in only seven months, Kostunica has tasted not only the anticipated sweetness but also the unexpected bitterness of his statesman's calling. In his first appearances following the coup of October 5 of last year, he expressed the expectation that the Western powers would compensate us war damages but that they would do this under the guise of economic assistance in order to preserve their own honor. When asked what he thinks about cooperation with the Hague tribunal, he answered that it was the last thing on his list.
After only a few months he discovered that there would be no significant influx of funds and assistance from abroad and that what has now been proposed can only be achieved by giving in to the blackmail of the key participants in the planned donors conference. Furthermore, his American hosts taught him that the Hague tribunal was really the first thing on his list and they should know since it's their money.
The worst thing of all and the most pathetic weakness of our officials is the lack of any kind of public and reliable guarantee that possible "cooperation" with The Hague and the extradition of Milosevic will be rewarded with an appropriate, previously predetermined sum of financial assistance. If the honor of the nation and the state are for sale at least we should know how much we are getting for them. After last year's elections, key leaders of DOS, especially the gentlemen from G-17, convincingly promised us that as soon as they came to power our country would get four to six billion German marks. And the worst thing is that they were not lying to us; they themselves were deceived but they don't dare tell us by whom.
Now Zoran Djindjic and the same gentlemen from G-17 are saying that we can expect up to one billion dollars in assistance at the upcoming donors conference. What they don't say is who told them this, what guarantees are there that this sum will really be forthcoming and whether it will be in the form of cash which can be used to revive our economy, or in the form of genetically modified soy beans, flour and other products way past their date of expiration, like the food which was recently distributed to hungry Bosnia.
To us it appears that even if our government gives in to blackmail, there still will not be any big money coming in. Because why would the USA and the other powers give us a lot of assistance when they can achieve the same thing without spending anything? It is entirely enough for them to use the technique of manufacturing and managing crises such as the creation of new flashpoints near Bujanovac and Presevo or encouragement of the separatists in Montenegro in order to confront our officials with the following choice - if you want us support the survival of Yugoslavia and put some pressure on Milo Djukanovic, then you must cooperate with The Hague. Or if you want the terrorists to withdraw from Sector B which they entered with our knowledge, then you must abandon the remaining Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija.
To those in our government who are again suggesting that we may receive a billion dollars if we agree to be blackmailed by means of the Hague, we can say - if we are in a position where we must tolerate pressures and periodically yield to them then at least let's not lie to each other.
Even though the aforesaid "Constitutional Framework" has not yet been published in its entirety, it is apparent that it is unacceptable both to our state and to our compatriots in the southern Serbian province. First of all, it severs the last formal ties between Kosovo and Metohija and Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. Instead of clearly stating at least in the preamble that Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of Serbia and Yugoslavia, something which UN Security Council Resolution 1244 also establishes, the head of the interim administration purposely omitted such a provision. Then he went on to establish in no way limited legislative, executive and judicial organs of this province, as if it were a completely sovereign country, without foreseeing any jurisdiction of intermediary institutions in Belgrade, such as the possibility that at least some Serbian and Yugoslav laws be directly applied in the Province and that the Supreme Courts of Serbia and Yugoslavia should be the courts of final appeal for it.
And what is even worse, this "Constitutional Framework" does not condition the holding of the scheduled November elections upon the prior return to their homes of all refugees and expelled persons, among whom are more than 200,000 Serbs, nor does it foresee the establishment of polling stations outside Kosovo and Metohija so that these refugees and expelled persons can vote should they desire. This means that for the interim administration the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija is a done deal which no longer needs to be taken into consideration.
This detrimental situation in our occupied province has presented the new government of the country with great challenges. First of all, it is unable, despite all idiosyncrasy, to explain why the powerful foreign factors who allegedly greeted the victory of Vojislav Kostunica and DOS, and the toppling of Slobodan Milosevic as the chief culprit for the abuse and persecution of the Arbanasi [Albanians] wholeheartedly continue to deepen the rift between Kosovo and Metohija and Serbia for the purpose of transforming it into a completely sovereign state. Because if the aggression against our country was "justified" by Milosevic's "crimes", what serves to justify the prolonged occupation of Kosovo and Metohija and their almost complete secession?
Within this context the adoption of a position on the announced elections will mean the acceptance or non-acceptance of the de facto secession of our southern Province. President Kostunica assessed this correctly and his office advised that this "Constitutional Framework" does not represent a sound basis for the protection of the rights and interests of national communities, while participation in the upcoming elections depends on the safe return of expelled and displaced Serbs, revelation of the fate of the kidnapped and missing and establishment of an actual connection between this "Constitutional Framework" and the state institutions of our country.
Unlike Kostunica, who feels that the issue of the upcoming elections is a decisive state issue, for Zoran Djindjic it is only a matter of concern to our remaining compatriots in Kosovo and Metohija. That is why he says: "We are here to support their decision, not to make the decision instead of them." This is the same Pilate-like washing of hands which Milosevic used at the critical moment in the fate of the Serbs in Western Slavonia, Kninska Krajina and Serb Sarajevo in 1995 when he sent them the message that he would accept whatever decision they made: either to stay in their homes and risk their lives, or to flee and lose everything. Because it was not his job to decide instead of them.
What Zoran Djindjic doesn't know or doesn't want to know is the obvious truth that the state exists, among other reasons, in order to protect its citizens from foreign violence, and not to feign inexperience by saying it is an issue of "free" choice by these unfortunates.
In addition to this accurate statement, Djindjic also added another one (its validity is at best open to debate). He said that the material position of our country will significantly worsen unless we "cooperate" with the Hague tribunal. Without intending to be prophets of doom, our thesis is that unquestioning cooperation with the tribunal and especially the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic will lead to the shifting of responsibility for war damages upon our country for which we and our descendents will then have to pay.
During a recent lecture by Robert Miller, a respected Australian professor and regional expert, Zagorka Golubovic asked him the following question - why are the Americans so persistent in demanding that Slobodan Milosevic be extradited to The Hague? Professor Miller readily replied - a country which agrees to extradite its former head acknowledges its own guilt by doing so. In other words, instead of removing the collective guilt from our nation and our country by the trial of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague, as explained by so-called mondialists and other humanists worldwide, such a trial would only serve to establish our collective guilt and to shift responsibility for payment of enormous war damages upon us. Because if the Atlantic pact was ready to resort to criminal bombing in order to inflict terrible damage upon completely innocent people and even to kill us because of the alleged crimes of Slobodan Milosevic, then what is to stop it from using the same recipe to shift all responsibility for the great costs of waging war on us as well?
The possible destructive results of the eventual extradition of Slobodan Milosevic are suggested by many circumstances. It is no coincidence that the U.S. persistently demands that Millosevic's guilt for the war in Kosmet, as well as in Croatia and Bosnia, not be defined as his individual guilt but rather as the guilt of a head of state - so the state of which he is the former head can be made legally liable for everything of which he will be accused and found guilty for. Therefore, it is also no coincidence that George Robertson, the NATO secretary general, stated unequivocally that the campaign of ethnic cleansing waged by Milosevic was in fact conducted by the very state that he governed. After Milosevic's ureckless and stupid, as well as inaccurate statement that "state monies were not stolen but spent on financing the Serb battles in Croatia and BiH," Croat and Muslim officials are rubbing their hands with contentment. Because now it is much more convincing to claim that they were "victims of aggression" by FRY and that as "victims" they have the right to compensation of enormous war damages which they assess at several tens of billions of dollars.
Additionally, a possible Hague sentencing of Milosevic as head of state would make all of our accusations against the Atlantic pact superfluous and justify all measures taken against us so far: blackmail, brutal sanctions and criminal bombing. Above all, the Americans are trying to use blackmail to accomplish what they have already done in Vietnam and Nicaragua, that is, to use blackmail not only to erase their own debts toward the countries upon which they have inflicted harm but to shift upon those countries at least some of the enormous costs of their "peacekeeping" operations in Bosnia and Kosmet which by 2000 already exceeded 21 billion dollars.
This is the same arrogant policy that is being implemented toward our country at this moment with regard to the eventual extradition of Milosevic to the Hague tribunal, thanks to which victims are transformed into culprits and culprits are transformed into victims.