After the passing of the new Montenegrin referendum law, on the basis of which the possible secession of Montenegro is to be decided, the U.S. ambassador expressed concern because, according to this law, only one quarter of all registered voters need vote for independence in order to approve this fateful decision go through. Because if the referendum is valid if half plus one of the total number of registered voters participate, then half plus one of that half is actually one quarter.
In addition to this, the American ambassador observed that the state status of Montenegro can be changed only by a change in the Montenegrin Constitution and that for this a two-thirds majority of all deputies in the Parliament is necessary. Had he also by chance recalled the most recent American presidential elections, in which American citizens in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo and Metohija also voted, he should also have decisively objected to the fact that this law foresees the denial of voting rights to several hundred thousand Montenegrin citizens who currently live outside Montenegro.
The first reaction of Montenegrin officials to this American friendly critique and advice was mixed up and uncoordinated and ranged from harsh criticism of this American position to sycophantic readiness to consider the friendly advice since, to quote Djukanovic's advisor Miodrag Vukovic, the adopted referendum law is not the Holy Bible. The quickest recovery came from Milo Djukanovic, who announced that "in the very near future" he would travel to Belgrade to continue talks on the future relations of Serbia and Montenegro.
He is especially ready to consider the new proposal of [Serbian Prime Minister] Zoran Djindjic which apparently has not yet been articulated nor formulated. Therein lies Djukanovic's cunning. Because he does not want to hold talks on changes to the Yugoslav Constitution within the framework of Yugoslav institutions since he no longer recognizes this common state; what he wants to do is stick Serbian officials with some sort of new interstate alliance as if FRY no longer existed.
And, what is even more significant, he would most like to talk about this with Zoran Djindjic, knowing full well that Djindjic, because of the position he holds, is far less determined to preserve the existing federal state than, say, [Yugoslav president] Vojislav Kostunica. He is even counting on the fact that Zoran Djindjic, because of his rivalry with Kostunica, might easily succumb to the temptation to cut a deal with the Montenegrin leaders to reestablish some new federation of the two states, and then to tell Kostunica the same thing that Boris Yeltsin once said to Mikhail Gorbachev: "The state (USSR) of which you are the president no longer exists."
Our misfortune, however, lies in the fact that in this dramatic state crisis Milo Djukanovic and Zoran Djindjic and Vojislav Kostunica are being asked for their opinions less and less frequently, while the American government, which has decided to condition its eventual opposition or agreement to the secession of Montenegro on fulfillment of its demands, has an increasingly decisive role. Namely, the American government has conditioned its opposition to the secession of Montenegro on pressure on the Yugoslav state for unconditional "cooperation" with the Hague Tribunal, more effective forcing of the Serbs across the Drina into what amounts to a centralized Bosnia and the abandonment of the remaining, allegedly extremist, Kosovo and Metohija Serbs.
So that both possibilities remain in play, the American government is still giving Djukanovic generous financial support which he uses to support more than 20,000 special forces policemen, 1,700 employees of the state television and other numerous customers, and thus encouraging his policy of secession.
It may well happen that if the Yugoslav government becomes more flexible and "cooperative" that Montenegro will remain in some sort of loose federation of states and that Milo Djukanovic, if he protests too much, will end up in The Hague for putting on a military uniform during the time of the military operation against the district of Dubrovnik. It is also possible, however, that the Americans will be deeply "disappointed" with the new policies of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia and that they will ask Milo Djukanovic for the same thing he himself ardently desires - the secession of Montenegro and the dissolution of the common state. No matter which way it goes, the Americans hold the key to this Montenegrin riddle.
In the very beginning of this new democratic era, the greatest emphasis was placed on the "thrill" of the foreign players with the new government in Belgrade. The quick acceptance of Yugoslavia into the United Nations and OSCE is cited in support of this claim. However, no mention is made of the fact that we were accepted as a completely new country which was created yesterday, even though our membership in the United Nations had been only suspended; consequently, by submitting a request for acceptance as a new country we practically co-validated the violation of the UN Charter carried out by that suspension.
An ugly shadow has been cast on this caring and benevolent approach of the so-called international community toward the new government by the unexpected demand of Milo Djukanovic that Montenegro completely secede as an independent country and the incursion of Albanian terrorists armed to the teeth into the external safety zone, all with the unspoken and perhaps the direct support of the North Atlantic alliance.
For ordinary people who don't care much about dignity or the territorial integrity of the state, the economic progress that was promised and the desire for an improvement in life conditions that have become intolerable are far more significant. On the eve of the elections, these hopes were fueled by the casual statements of DOS leaders such as Vladan Batic, Mladjan Dinkic and others to the effect that four to six billion marks of gifts, assistance and favorable loans would pour into our country after their election victory. It was even public talk that the NATO member countries were prepared to compensate the damage they had caused by their aggression in the form of appropriate assistance.
It quickly became apparent that these were false promises and transparent deceptions. Instead of four to six billion German Marks, barely three hundred million has arrived for the most part in merchandise, electricity and other basic needs, hardly any of it in the cash necessary to revitalize the economy. And so the economy continues to stagnate, while prices, especially of food items and other expenses that are absolute necessities, continue to spiral upward. And what is worst of all, salaries are increasingly losing the race with prices which has an especially adverse effect on the growing ranks of the poor.
This has induced some groups of employed persons - the workers of "Telecom", "Zastava" in Kragujevac and, most recently, education workers - to begin strikes and to demand significant increases in salary. By granting the possibility of an initial twenty percent salary increase with successive incremental increases thereafter the Serbian Government has managed to stave off the first strikes; however, it is highly questionable whether it will be able to continue to do so when health workers and other destitute groups of workers begin their own strikes. In other words, due to the almost complete lack of generous support previously promised from abroad, the new government has not been successful in revitalizing the economy and in securing enough bread and other needs for its citizens.
In addition to a full belly, which is always the highest priority, ordinary people also need some form of comfort and food for the soul: in these modern times, this is equivalent to an entertaining television program. Milosevic's Socialists were not lacking in this respect; like true pirates (lest we say thieves) they broadcast the best and the newest films and television series for which they obviously paid nothing to their creators and producers. Especially memorable were the exceptionally good film marathons run by TV Politika which were broadcast with the intent of discouraging people from going out into the streets. The new government doesn't have the knack for this nor the money to pay copyrights; consequently, it is compensating for the huge lack of good films with an almost repulsive excess of public appearances by its leaders.
During the time of imperial Rome social peace was preserved according to the dictate: bread and circuses! It would appear that our new government is incapable of providing us with either.
by Kosta CAVOSKI
First the European Union asked that an early census be conducted on bilingual official forms. Then all ruling Macedonian political parties were asked to give Albanians representation in all government institutions, proportional to their participation in the population. After this, the Americans got the desire to take over the key Macedonian base of Krivolak and that their allies from the North Atlantic pact be deployed in other Macedonian garrisons as well, while enjoying every possible form of immunity, including the privilege of falling exclusively under the jurisdiction of their national courts even when they are at fault for killing a Macedonian minister in an car accident.
Finally, the Macedonian government agreed to let the North Atlantic pact attack our country from Macedonia.
And how have the powerful foreign players paid Macedonia back when it found itself on the verge of destruction because of the armed rebellion of the Albanians? With a Pilate-like washing of the hands and abandonment to fend for itself if it can. It even seems very probable that the Albanian terrorists are being trained and supported not only by the U.S. and Great Britain but also by numerous "humanitarian" organizations from throughout the world. In other words, even the most intense wooing of the foreign masters will not be helpful to a country if its enemy is a key ally of those masters. And that is a lesson for our pro-American people in the government who think they will save the integrity of the state and help the country by carrying out every order that comes from abroad.
The second lesson is connected with the already tested strategy of the Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija and the Presevo valley. First, they infiltrate, well-armed and trained; then they take over a segment of the territory and begin building up their ranks with local compatriots; and then they demand negotiations on an equal basis with the central state government. During this process they use a two-fold tactic: ethnic cleansing in the region where they represent an overpowering majority and the "advocacy" of a multiethnic civil society in areas where they are still a minority.
The actual beginning of their battle for national sovereignty and secession may look almost innocent and even legitimate: in the beginning they demand only their own university in Tetovo and in the end they start an armed rebellion. In this battle they proceed gradually and transfer armed operations to other areas only after they are sure that they are well-fortified in areas where they have waged war previously. When they became convinced that Kosovo and Metohija was more or less theirs, they opened a new front in the Presevo valley; after the signing of the ceasefire and the fortification of their positions there, they began an armed rebellion in Macedonia. It almost goes without saying that the next area of armed activity for them will be Montenegro if Milo Djukanovic and his supporters, with the help of Albanian votes, secede from FR Yugoslavia.
The third lesson follows from the position of the Western powers towards possible negotiations by the besieged domestic officials with the terrorists. When those forces want to humiliate, blackmail and perhaps break up a country, they demand that its government negotiate with terrorist leaders, as our officials did in Rambouillet and as they are now doing in Bujanovac and Merdare. If, on the other hand, they still support the territorial integrity of the besieged state then they advise, as Javier Solana did in Skopje, that under no circumstances should there be negotiations with terrorists.
Finally, the best lesson of this decisive conflict near Tetovo was summed up by Ljubomir Frckovski, the former Macedonian Army and Police Minister. In his opinion, if the police and army do not defeat the Albanian terrorists in Tetovo and on the northern border within 10 days (starting with March 19, 2001), Macedonia will cease to exist. In other words, one cannot apply the strategy of "go-stop-negotiate" when dealing with terrorists; instead, the rebellion must be wiped out on its inception.
It is not unlikely that Frckovski gleaned this insight from Milosevic's destructive tactics in Kosmet and Covic's similar policies in the Presevo valley.
This may have been the reason why the leading opposition parties that are now in power did not publicly condemn the most damaging of Milosevic's moves, such as his abandonment the Serbs in western Slavonia on May 1, 1995; the abandonment of Knin Krajina to a miserable fate at the beginning of August 1995; the crippling and subsequently, as a result of the betrayal of Brcko, the dismemberment of the Republic of Srpska (RS) into two noncontiguous parts; the surrender of our compatriots in Baranja, Vukovar and western Srem to the Croats after Dayton; and, finally, the surrender of Kosovo and Metohija to NATO.
Because Milosevic did all these things at the request or on the basis on an agreement with the American government, America's customers could not publicly attack the concessions demanded or coerced from their rival by their patrons.
The allegedly confidential memorandum that the American ambassador addressed to Zoran Djindjic eloquently confirms that even after the fall of Milosevic, American policies toward our country have not changed in the slightest. Once again we are being asked to abandon our compatriots across the Drina and in Kosovo and Metohija, to assume a conciliatory position towards those who are destroying our country with weapons and a great national humiliation.
Vojislav Kostunica, for example, is criticized for having "supported Serb separatists in Bosnia for a long time" and for "continuing to support radical elements among the Serbs in Kosovo". What he is being asked to do is "to state that not only does he accept the legality of the Hague Tribunal but to also say that Yugoslavia is obligated to extradite indicted persons".
Let us see what does represent the rule of law and what does not, according to this memorandum; what, in the Americans' opinion, is good for the Serbs and what is bad?
It is bad when Kostunica states with justifiable reason what he actually thinks of the Hague Tribunal; it is good when he says what he is told he should say.
It is bad when the government in Belgrade cooperates with political parties across the Drina that oppose changes to the Dayton Agreement and fight for the protection of RS sovereignty; it is good when forces that advocate the immersion of RS in a more or less centralized Bosnia are supported.
It is bad when the remaining Serbs in Kosovo, who are struggling just to survive and to keep this Serbian land a part of Serbia, receive assistance; it is good when these Serbs, too, are abandoned to their fate.
It is bad when our judicial organs try Milosevic for acts he committed against our interests and can easily be proven; it is good when he is extradited to the Hague Tribunal in order to fabricate an alibi for the aggression that took place even before Milosevic's alleged crimes were committed.
Or, even more drastically: it is bad when several hundred thousand voters elect Nikola Poplasen president of RS; it is good when a single, solitary man - Carlos Westendorp - removes him from that position. And that is, according to the Americans, true democracy.
To make sure readers (we won't even mention politicians) understand what agreement to these and similar American dictates and requests on the part of the European Union can lead to, it is useful to recall what they have already led to in RS and throughout Bosnia.
In RS the high representative can change the electoral will of the voters at any time by decree, regardless of whether the official in question is an elected mayor, a parliamentary deputy or the president of the republic himself. No one can become a minister of the government or the director of a public corporation if the American ambassador vetoes his appointment. For the past three years the high representative has not only been striking down laws but also ratifying them himself; in the near future, he is expected to enact a part of or perhaps the entire constitution of RS, which will then cease to exist as an entity, leaving in its wake some kind of a multiethnic Serb-Bosniak-Croat amalgamate.
In short, under the guise of touching concern for democracy and the rule of law, the new masters of the universe want to transform our country into a state of customers, and to reduce our rulers and politicians to the level of American clientele.