Although the material is still "rough", the first general reports about the humanitarian aspects of the military-political action of the Croatian army and police, its content suggests that the "Storm" besides the liberation of the occupied Croatian territories had for a goal ethnic cleansing of Serbs from that area. The most convincing proof for this thesis comes from the UNCRO documents, actually that of its service for a humanitarian crisis. Although final reports and analysis will be finished, due to the amount of the material according to UNCRO, at best in a month, the existing compilation of the reports about human rights and the chronology of the human right violations in sectors South and North already seem like a continuation of the Bassiouni commission report which mostly records Serb crimes committed during first years of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Immediately after the agreement between Hrvoje Sarinic and Yasushi Akashi on 8/6/95, with which UNCRO was confirmed as a monitor of human rights in the area the "Storm" rolled over, operational teams for human rights (HRAT) were founded; they were composed from the members of the UN Center for human rights and UNCRO-PHA and persons for liaison with civil UN police and military UN observers. The members of the teams started moving through the recently liberated territory recording day after day everything that was happening in the wings of the "Storm". While the chronology of the human rights violations in sectors South and North, concisely, almost like on a contents page, records a date, place and a short description of the human rights violation, the Service for a humanitarian crisis report (subtitle indicates that it is a compilation of the reports about human rights) chronologically, starting with 8/7/95 and ending with 9/12/95 in the form of news reports describes human rights violations recorded by the UN teams, as well as European observers and also informations obtained from other sources.
A TV team from WTN, accredited by the UN tried to film an arson near Drnis; seven Croatian soldiers surrounded them; the team was taken inside a house where they were in a very insulting way told that they have no right to film anything. Their videotapes were confiscated, their documents thoroughly inspected and more than DM1000 was stolen from one of the team members. Later, the team was turned over to the Croatian police who threatened to take their passports away.
On 8/16/95 a HRAT team saw 4 bodies in the village of Zagrovici; they looked as if they had been dead for at least a week. Two bodies, both men, were lying in a ditch next to the main road. Traces on the road indicated that the bodies had been dragged across the road to the place where they were found. Both men had shot wounds through their heads. Both were dressed in underwear and T-shirts and one of them had slippers on. The right hand of the man with slippers was mutilated; several fingers had been cut off. Both men were about 50-years-old. Further away from the road the HRAT team found two more corpses; one was a 50-year-old man, lying next to his house wrapped in a bed sheet and with a shot wound through his head. The fourth corpse, the son of the previously mentioned man, as was later established, was found in a field; the cause of death couldn't be established due to the advanced decomposition of the body. UN civil police reported the discovery of another three corpses: one body was that of a middle-aged man, dressed in a civilian clothes; it was lying in front of a burned (no signs of shelling damage) house in Zvjerinac; the other two were men in uniforms, found in Golubic. UNHCR officials were not allowed to enter the village of Vrlika on 8/16/95 although a HRAT team visited the village the day before without any problems. We received a report that several bulldozers were seen during the day working next to the Orthodox cemetery in Vrlika. On 8/15/95 the HRAT team noticed protective masks and rubber gloves, which seemed brand new, left on the ground in that place as well as the fresh tracks of a bulldozer..."
On 8/28/95 the report says:" A HRAT team found bodies of five recently killed persons in the village of Grubori. On 8/25/95 the team checked on a big cloud of smoke and found a whole hamlet, some 20 houses and other buildings, in flames. According to the HRAT team unconfirmed reports, allegedly a unit of ten Special Forces soldiers had been seen in the area that morning, approaching Grubori; the unit had been wearing camouflage uniforms. When the team arrived in Grubori, they only found elderly women in panic; the other inhabitants had been waiting for the UN workers near the village. It had been reported that the Croatian police had been pressuring the inhabitants to leave the village. The team received assurances from General Cermak that the Croatian authorities would respond adequately to that situation; however, the representatives of the authorities only visited the village the following day.
On the evening of 8/25/95 a HRAT team returned to the village and found bodies of two persons. One, a 70-year-old man was found on the floor of his bedroom with a shot wound on the back of the head. The other man, about 65-years-old, was found in the field with his throat cut. When the team left the village, six elderly women and an elderly man, who remained in the village, declined the team's offer to be taken to the town. The women were crying and were deeply traumatized. The following day, a HRAT team found burned remains of a 90-year-old man among the burned out ruins of the houses. On 8/27/95 corpses of a man and a woman, 41 and 51 years old respectively, were found in the fields. they had been shot in the head. One person had disappeared. The team also found a body of a person who had been killed approximately two weeks earlier near Grubor. Croatian authorities claim that the arson and killings in Grubori were caused by an uncontrolled fire as a part of an anti-terrorist campaign to flush out the remaining 'RSK' [Republic Srpska Krajina] fighters from the area."
HRAT teams frequently informed the Croatian military and civilian authorities about their discoveries, demanding an end to a destructive, thieving and bloody feast. On 8/25/95 HRAT recorded:" Yesterday, at a meeting with general Cermak, the Croatian side was informed about the looting and arson. At first, general Cermak ascribed responsibility for those deeds to the bandits in uniforms of the Croatian army, but later admitted that he was in charge of a large area and that it was hard to control all parts of the territory. He stated that he sincerely regrets these events, which were against the policies of the Croatian government." On 9/1/95 it was however written:"UN continues to protest against the restrictions on the freedom of movement imposed by the Croatian authorities in the area northeast from Knin. In a letter to general Cermak, sent yesterday, the commander of sector South mentioned that HRAT teams had noticed a dark smoke raising above a forest within the forbidden area. He asked the authorities to abolish all restrictions of the freedom of movement and to stop the torching of houses. He wandered why the authorities who were capable of so efficiently controlling all movement in the area, were unable to prevent incessant massive destruction of property..."
Reactions of the other representatives of the authorities, as well as that of good part of the opposition, to the UNCRO report (which in the meantime reached hands of Croatian journalists) and other reports about systematic human rights violations during the "Storm", are similar to that of general Cermak. Satisfied that with the operation "Storm" was "finally solved the serb question in Croatia" they shrug everything off and qualify it as a political pressure on Croatia with a goal of forcing her to accept the latest solutions by the international community for Bosnia-Hercegovina and the occupied part of Croatia.
How quickly it was forgotten that, until recently, Serb politicians, even those from Krajina, shrugged off similar reports and demands by the international community to stop crimes on the territories which they used to, or still, control? When the internal impetus to stop a crime, for the sake of Croatia, is lacking, the concrete warnings are already coming, for now in a form of a question: how can Croatia expect reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem, while at the same time she doesn't stop crime against the Serbs and their property in recently liberated territories? Maybe the answer can already be found in the erdut agreement about the two-year-long international military protectorate over that area?