How come that Croatia as late as three years after the end of the war cannot calm down but still has difficult patriotic cramps in its stomach, although it has not only regained jurisdiction over all of its territory but has even spread outside the borders within which it was recognized after the break up of the former Yugoslavia? This journalist recently put this question to one of the more populist HDZ representatives in the parliament, full of hope that he would get a true answer at that competent address.
But, alas, the answer was an ordinary verbal corpse, i.e. a lifeless phrase which does not mean anything at all: "That is because," pompously emphasized this well known HDZ hawk, "the Croats are not used to their own state, and now want to make up for the lost time". He wasn't moved by an inch from his nirvana by the remark that Croatia is not going through anything that half a dozen of other countries, some of which are our neighbors, haven't gone through recently. True, in those countries there are also political parties and individuals who can never get enough of freshly dug up trenches for the always threatened state and the nation.
Since Dapic broke the ice with his anti Serb exercises, public expression of militant chauvinism has obviously won the right to exist, so that this time HDZ headquarters even failed to issue any, even feeble (Drago [Krpina, HDZ spokesman] where are you?!), condemnation, or at least a statement distancing HDZ from such claims. Moreover, since Mercep had founded that what he calls a political party last winter, and has decided to right now hold its first "reporting congress", it is impossible to avoid a suspicion regarding the coordination with the highest state authorities. Those authorities have, namely, at the same time - which will be understood only later - for a third time in a row cheated the obligations regarding the return of Serb refugees, this time even followed by a clumsy (if something worse is not in question) assistance by the opposition.
Instead of precisely agreed rules for the return of refugees, the Croatian parliament has unanimously voted for the agreed "conclusions", because of which the International Community canceled its participation in the forthcoming Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of Croatia. Thus, Croatia lost millions that donor countries were willing to contribute towards the reconstruction of Croatia, which for a country just out of a war has the effect of worst economic sanctions. However, there is an additional symbolic meaning, which can have even worse consequences: Croatia has consciously decided not to put an end to the war and enter a peaceful period of reconstruction, development and gradual integration with the world.
The fact that all that happened at the same time when new sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia (more precisely Serbia, since Montenegro was spared this time), opens yet another, perhaps the most important question. If Croatia won the war against Serbia - with which the official Zagreb, not without reason, likes to boast - how can it be that the two countries are sharing an almost identical fate? Do we have to believe that Tudman has gotten so close to Milosevic during the past years that he follows and imitates (co-option of other parties and spiteful rejection of international pressures) even in the futile thrashing of a looser?
Croatia has thus realized that which Milosevic hasn't succeeded in doing (or what he has realized as a caricature): that in practice all Croats live in the same state. That ethnic collection has been then firmly shut and protected with suitable locks (double citizenship) and, no matter how angry it may be, the International Community can change very little. However, the major challenges are not directed towards abroad, but have been tragically focused on the domestic matters. Namely, it is clear that in Croatia a "national revolution" from 1990 got transformed in to a nationalist revolution, whose characteristics are significantly different from the former one.
Its goals have lost all semblance of rationality and foresight (even in HDZ, when they get somewhat confused, they admit deliberate pumping of fear because of the return of Serb "grannies"). Moreover, they have lost a connection even with their own legal infrastructure. No constitution, including the Croatian one, is so bad to allow selective application of the right to citizenship based on whether the applicant is of Croatian or Serb nationality. Nevertheless, HDZ has been stubbornly insisting on that fixation, and the only explanation is the survival in power of the team which, once it finished what it had been elected for, doesn't know what to do with itself nor the state it controls. Therefore, it always needs new windmills to tilt at.
In that system the aspirations for ethnically clean Croatia have a very important place, not only because that is the traditional ideal of Croat nationalists (Pavelic's radical formula for de-Serbization in three parts [one third convert, one third expel, one third kill] is well known, but Tudman, to his undoubted pleasure, has already surpassed his predecessor in efficiency). What is even more important is that cleanliness is considered as the most important achievement of the Croatian liberation war and it is believed that if that achievement is reversed everything else will be endangered or lost. The confusion in all that can be no less than impressive.
No one can harm nationalist movements as much as they can harm themselves. Isn't that the show we are watching right now?!
German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel has until recently either delivered his personal messages to Franjo Tudman personally or, in the worst case, sent them via a messenger. This time, he decided to issue a public statement in which he not only called on Croatian leaders in Bosnia-Hercegovina to "use their influence on local Croatian authorities" in order to prevent the repetition of violence, like the one which happened recently in Drvar, but also reproached the Croatian president for "still not making a proposal for the return of Serb refugees to Krajina" and insisted that "he finally must demonstrate true desire for reconciliation and readiness to open a new chapter in Croat-Serb relations".
In addition to that, only a day later, Kinkel sent an open letter to Tudman in which he clams that the Croatian attitude contributed "to the climate of violence and intolerance in Drvar" and that the policy of Zagreb with respect to refugees deserves sharp criticism.
The response of the Croatian government was equally strong and equally non-diplomatic. In its protest note to the German government, among other, it is stated that "the Croatian government and Croatian public received Kinkel's statement with indignation" and that the statement is "one sided and unacceptable", as well as "is unacceptable and in diplomatic practice unusual the way in which one minister of foreign affairs publicly addresses and reproaches a president of a foreign state".
Government's protest note was delivered to the German ambassador in Zagreb, and to make sure that he and Kinkel don't take the note too seriously, the ambassador was told in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Germans shouldn't get too excited because of the note since it is mostly for domestic consumption. Namely, it was explained to the German ambassador that the Croatian protest note had been published in the domestic press, but wouldn't have direct consequences for the German-Croatian relations,. "Briefly, we were told not to worry too much about it," stated for Feral an official in the German embassy in Zagreb.
Equally brief was Walter Linder, spokesperson of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Eastern Europe, Balkans and Turkey. He refused to comment Kinkel's correspondence with Tudman and Croatian government for Feral: "We have said everything we wanted to say; our attitude hasn't changed and we won't daily add to our opinion". Asked whether someone else in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example spokesperson for central Europe, could add to his statement, Linder replied with brutal honesty: "I cover Croatia".["patriotic" Croatian politicians and journalists insist that Croatia is a part of central Europe, not of eastern Europe or the Balkans]
Translated on 7/17/98
Croatian Nationalist Revolution
Recruiters and Soldiers
Feral Tribune, Split, Croatia, May 4 1998
by Marinko CulicFabricated Panic
But, out of all newly founded states (not counting Serbia), only in Croatia there are, and they are multiplying, flushed nationalist bigots who seem to want to restart the already won Patriotic war. In that they as a rule fabricate panic that "the results of the Patriotic war are threatened" (most frequently because of the return of Serb refugees), and Mercep has recently introduced a literally mad casus belli, stating that the showdown with the Serbs, unfortunately, wasn't thorough enough. In vain some papers wondered whether a man who says such things, while his subordinate soldiers are under investigation for the mass murder of civilians, should be allowed by law to found a political party in the middle of Zagreb.Two Countries, Single Destiny
Still, most likely, the full answer shouldn't be sought in such far fetched comparisons but here at home and it has to do with HDZ's vision for Croatian national interests and the method for its political realization. Officially, those interests are what Tudman's served up at the 1990 referendum where it got almost unanimous support by the voters: independent and sovereign Croatian state. Nothing apart from that can be considered the national interest of the Croatian people because HDZ hasn't offered anything else since then. But, it is clear the ruling party hasn't satisfied itself with that but has in the double bottom of its chest smuggled in, and practically legalized, other things.Federation of Asylum Seekers
Vjesnik's editor-in-chief has written a whole article to inform us about his very frequent premonitions that the real goal of the demands for the return of Serb refugees is the re-establishment of Yugoslavia. What an intellectual somersault! Wouldn't it be more reasonable to conclude that the present policy of prevention of the return of refugees is more likely to lead to the re-establishment of Yugoslavia? The International Community could use that policy as an excuse to tie up all the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia which oppose the return of refugees in some sort of asylum seekers federation, with a predetermined duration. The Federation would be dissolved only when all asylum seekers return home.
Croatian-German Diplomatic War, Act 2
Operation Kinkel
by V.K.