At this moment the local authorities and their services function only in few places; in some municipalities the new local authorities haven't even been constituted. Also, the central [Croatian] authorities are not sufficiently present in the region, although both the local leadership and UNTAES have cleared the space for that. Nevertheless, the behavior of the citizens in such conditions it is fascinating. If you go for a walk around Vukovar, you can see that everything seems almost normal. The citizens understand the situation and with dignity face their daily problems.
What is your opinion about Klein's departure? During the ceremony marking the departure of a part of the international peace force, he stated that the next two months were the most critical months for the reintegration. Could Klein's departure make them even more critical?
The UN administration, led by Klein, has done a lot to change the behavior and thinking of the people, and in the sphere of communications and inter-ethnic relations. His assessment that the two forthcoming months are critical was correct. UN mandate is approaching its end. The process which has been going on for almost a year and half is reaching its finale: now we are in the situation to apply theory to practice. We are not happy with the Klein's departure, because he had remarkable knowledge of the situation, problems and methods which can be used to resolve them. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that his successor is the representative of the American administration. Thus, ambassador Walker comes from the same political school.
The return is the most complicated part of the peace process, related to the whole string of preconditions: psychological, political, security, social-economical, moral. A successful solution of these problems implies that the return must be voluntary. There are some indications that this is not the case. The voluntary basis of the return is important because many years have passed since the people left their homes and the forced return could cause new traumas. The establishment and functioning of new authorities is also very important. The return in the conditions where the local authorities are not existent or do not function can only cause new problems.
We must build national reconciliation in which we must be totally honest with each other. No one among the Serbs in this region should hide that he was a Serb soldier; on the other hand, expelled Croats shouldn't hide that they had been Croatian soldiers.
I fear improvisation and simplistic decisions. You have seen yourself that some forced returns, regardless by whom, have given negative results.
You were satisfied with the UN Security Council resolution 1120. Immediately after the resolution had been passed, the Danube valley region was visited by Galbreight and Richardson. Have you received guarantees that the Croatian side will fulfill the demands from the Resolution?
The position of both ambassadors Richardson and Galbreight, and general Klein and the International Community is that the obligations from the Resolution and Erdut Agreement, since the Resolution simply reaffirmed the Agreement, must be fulfilled. We are prepared to contribute to that. However, in practice, the promises are rarely followed by actions. We fear [that the Resolution will not be fully implemented].
Could you give us your estimate of the number of extremists in the Danube valley region, people who are not prepared to accept Croatian authorities and still have illusions that this region will not become a part of Croatia?
A great majority of the citizens have understood the political reality that this region is the part of the Republic of Croatia. Consequently, they have accepted Croatian institutions, which was obvious in the local elections and in our participation in the local authorities. People are aware that as a nation or ethnic community they have certain rights based on the Croatian Constitution and international law. There are hardly any extremists here. Those individuals who openly expressed their feelings and political goals have been marginalized. Otherwise, there would have been many more incidents in the region. Vehicles with Croatian number plates have been driving through the region, busses travel to other parts of Croatia, citizens from other parts of Croatia have been coming to visit, all that without incidents.
There are indications that the people will decide whether to leave or stay here at the start of the new school year. A massive exodus to Serbia has been announced, since the people have allegedly been waiting for their kids to finish school.
The problem of the departure of Serbs [from the region] has been frequently misused. [Croatian] public and some media have been manipulating with the alleged strong desire of Serbs to leave this region. It is absolutely certain that a huge majority of the local population wants to stay in this area. It turned out that the predictions regarding the mass exodus of the Serbs after the end of the school year were not correct. Now, we can hear that the exodus will happen after the start of the new school year. If the problem of education system is not resolved, and we have been working intensively and trying to find a solution although the Croatian authorities have not been cooperative to a certain extent, it could indeed happen that a large number of primary school, high school and university students leave. If the children leave, their parents will follow. As far as the education systems, we are demanding nothing special: only the rights enjoyed in Istria by the Italian minority.
Hadzic had been in the area until recently. He left after Dokmanovic was arrested because he was concerned that he was the next one on the list. I do not have the information about the exact numbers of the people who have left the region, but I believe that there is no mass emigration of Serbs. It is true that the Serb population still doesn't trust the Croatian authorities and that all those who are leaving the region are trying to establish a "back up" position for themselves and their families in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Ultimately, the number of those who will leave depends on the way in which local problems will be solved.
In his speech in Beli Manastir Tudman said that all extremists who are slowing down peaceful reintegration must leave. In your meetings with Tudman and his collaborators, have you specified who these people are?
No, we haven't talked about that, especially not about the extremists on the Croatian side. My impression was that president Tudman was referring to the extremists on the Serb side and that he believes that there are no extremists among the Croats. As a lawyer, I do not understand what it means that extremists must leave. Unless he meant that some people must abandon politics. I agree with that. We have already done that and expect that the Croatian side will do the same. Unfortunately, our experience shows that that is not the case. I don't want to name names, but our people have unpleasant experiences with some people from the Vukovar town council. We can specify the "dark side" of some people from HDZ, we know what they did during May, June and July of 1991 in Vukovar. We can even get them in touch with the families of their victims, so that they can test their conscience. On the other hand, I am certain that there are no such people from SDSS in the Vukovar town council.
As far as Vukovar is concerned, SDSS has established clear principles: electoral results cannot be the only basis for the organization of the local authorities. It is not enough to have simple majority to control all official functions and determine the rules of the game. We said: gentlemen, if we want to succeed, we must negotiate about the division of power. We offered a solution, taking into account election results, ethnic structure and the local interests. Three months had passed until HDZ accepted those principles. Because, the last local elections were not classical civic elections; these elections were a competition of national political parties with national programs. If we want reconciliation and common survival we must agree that the government is in the interest of all citizens and that both sides participate in it according to the ethnic composition of the town. Thus, all leading official functions cannot belong to Croats; not only in politics, but also in state-owned companies. And that is exactly what has been happening.
What are the main obstacles to the reintegration process from the Croatian side?
My complaint regarding the Croatian authorities is that they do not follow through with their promises, or at least not in the previously agreed manner. Another problem is that a part of the authorities still follows a dogmatic approach and doesn't want to understand that two sides took part in this war. The war ended the way it did and we must go on. Nevertheless, Serbs are still treated as if only they used guns, shot and killed in the war. That dogma stands in the way of self criticism and prevents Croat politician from assessing their behavior and mistakes from the early nineties. That dogma and negative attitude with respect to the Serb population result in the attitude that Serbs are responsible for everything bad that has happened. It will be horrifying to one day open the archives of Croatian courts and find out how many Serbs had been tried, based on what and why. Then, someone will be ashamed because of the sentence to Milos Horvat.
How many people [Serbs] from the Danube valley region have returned to their old homes [in other parts of Croatia]? How is that process progressing and to what extent will it allow the return of Croats to the Danube valley region and Vukovar?
The number of expelled Serbs who have returned from this region to other parts of Croatia is very small. Mostly, these are individual cases. There used to be villages with Croatian majority in this region. We have made all conditions for the return of these people to their old homes, but the Croatian media do not mention that. Lipovac, Podgrade, Apsevci, Nijemci, Donje Novo Selo and Deletovci have not been under the control of [Serb] local authorities for more than a year. The return of Croats to those villages is absolutely free and depends only on their will and the interest of Croatian authorities. Now the same also applies to Ceric, Tenjski Antunovac and partly to Ernestinovo. About 20,000 expelled Croats could return to these villages. That hasn't been mentioned anywhere because, obviously this isn't an interesting political topic anymore. Currently, the problem is the return to Vukovar, Ilok...
What can you tell us about the soft border regime with FR Yugoslavia?
Trade with Croatia still hasn't started. There is no resistance on our part. People must get supplies somewhere. Regardless of the war and animosity, I repeat, one shouldn't build walls. We want open borders; the local Serbs would be upset if the strict border crossings were established on the border with FR Yugoslavia. I believe that that won't happen. The citizens of Croatia can cross the borders with Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina with their personal identification cards and I don't see why there should be a different procedure on the border with Yugoslavia.
No, it has nothing to do with spite, and even less with some sort of a political statement. If you take a poll of the people in the street, all of them will tell you that they live in the Republic of Croatia. It's simply carelessness. Although, there's another reason: after all the recent events, no one wants to be the one to take down a plaque of a flag. Let me add something else. It would be in the interest of Croatia, the real democratic Croatia, to resolve the question of the insignia used by ethnic minorities in the right way. Then, the whole issue wouldn't be a problem. The local population, still has a hard time accepting certain symbols used by the republic Croatia. Maybe this is more of a problem for the government in Zagreb than for [the local Serb leadership]. Is it really necessary to emphasize national symbols to that extent, or should that be reduced to the degree acceptable in other states. Signs are irrelevant, the essence is important. UNTAES has also warned us about the plaque. Nevertheless, it is psychologically difficult to take a screwdriver and take that plaque down.
As far as I know, the list hasn't been reduced to 25 names, but by supposedly 20 names. I feel embarrassed talking about that problem: next month we will "celebrate" the first anniversary of the intense negotiations about the problem of amnesty. Unfortunately, those negotiations haven't so far produced a result: the amnesty hasn't been fully implemented. Not a single amnestied person has received an official ruling, either in person or through an official publication. Regarding the infamous list of 146, which is also known as the "list 150", our attitude is that everyone should be prosecuted for the committed crimes, regardless whether he is a Serb, Croat or something else. But, the trials must be based on objective facts and firm evidence, not on insinuations and political manipulations. All our analyses, and you must believe us because we know the local situation, know who did what and do not want to protect the individuals who do not deserve our protection, indicate that the purpose of the list is political persecution.
Could you give us a concrete example?
The village of Branjina in Baranja practically doesn't exist anymore, thanks to the trial against Milos Horvat and another 24 persons from that village. All of them have emigrated. Regardless of Horvat's innocence and the outrage of the international community whose representatives had followed the trial, Milos Horvat is still in jail. The people from Branjina do not trust anyone any more and consequently have left Baranja. Something similar is happening in a village in the former Vukovar municipality. Hence, I openly ask this question: who will bear political responsibility for these cases?