"After that," reveals for Feral Tribune one of the American experts who recently returned from a fact finding mission in Bosnia, "we transferred initial sums to the accounts of the local authorities of several municipalities in central Bosnia and waited for the beginning of reconstruction. Several months later, we sent our people to check why the reconstruction hadn't started yet. They were only able to establish that the funds had disappeared, that none of the houses in predetermined locations had been repaired nor rebuilt, but that the equipment and armament of the local police forces had significantly improved. We are convinced that this was the result of embezzlement, typical of situations where local party and military bosses enjoy absolute power. We decided to write off those funds and to avoid future abuse by directly allocating funds for reconstruction." Still viewing the project from the point of view of bad or good management foreign investors chose reliable local contractors (as their contribution to development of the local economy, another one of classic Bildtean myths), chose to pay in instalments (after each completed phase of reconstruction) and located the pilot program in Gornji Vakuf.
"After a while we realised what was going on," continues Feral's source. "Local authorities on both sides simply do not want to go back to the pre-war population mix; obviously they had instructions from above and chose to let us know about that. It is another problem that we took to long to realize that. Finally, we were left with the choice of waiting that all the houses be again demolished to the ground or to accept the proposals from the local authorities and allow them to put their refugees in already finished houses. The houses are now guarded by both police forces, to make sure that someone doesn't by mistake destroy our house."
The whole case illustrates the current clash of good intentions and hard realism. The Dayton Agreement will continue to be officially treated as holly gospel, while in the field it has long time ago dissolved into a string of half measures, as was confirmed by the latest modification of the implicit decision from Dayton about the rotation of the members of the Bosnian presidency into an arbitrary decision about the extension of Izetbegovic's mandate, made after the elections. The American government will support, until the last day of the [American] election campaign, the idea of integral Bosnia, while American secret services in their latest report do not leave room for doubt when stating that Bosnia is on a way to dissolution into three entities with "porous" international borders.
Franjo Tudman, after a fifteen minute long meeting in the White House dedicated to the abolishment of "Herceg-Bosna", openly said to the journalists that he "[had] no messages for the Croats in Hercegovina," despite Dayton and Clinton (and not only because of his disappointment because of Clinton's refusal to sell US fighter aircraft F-16 to Croatia as "the key ally in the region"). In spite of officially proclaimed policy of military support for the establishment of the joint [Croat-Muslim] Federal forces, only a small amount of obsolete armaments from American stockpiles has arrived so far to Bosnia, and there are rumors about the imminent withdrawal of American military advisers. Even Richard Holbrooke in spite of invested (although somewhat spent) energy and force, in his latest Balkan adventure carries more resemblance to the builders of Vakuf/Uskoplje houses than to the demon from Dayton. (...)