by Ivica DIKIC
It was with these historical words that Tudjman addressed the members of his military establishment on August 23, 1995, after they gathered that morning in the presidential palace at Pantovcak. Tudjman's words were recorded in a transcript that - together with hundreds of other records of the Pantovcak sessions ... - has long been in the possession of the prosecutors of The Hague [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia]. Early this week, [the transcripts] reached the Feral Tribune's editorial office. "We will solve that too" referred, in fact, to the violent state-sponsored Croatization of territory that was, until the beginning of August of that year, part of the so-called Republic of Srpska Krajina [the self proclaimed Croatian Serb entity]. "We will solve that too" was the code for the beginning of a broad campaign to cement the results of ethnic cleansing that the Croatian authorities - with the unselfish assistance of Krajina and Belgrade chiefs - realized through the Operation Storm. After military action, it was necessary to radically change the ethnic picture of the liberated and "depopulated" area.
Consequently, on August 23,1995, at 10 a.m., Tudjman's defense chiefs, represented by Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Chief of Staff General Zvonimir Cervenko, Major-General Vinko Vrbanac, Rear Admiral Davor Domazet Loso, Colonel-General Josip Lucic, Colonel-General Imra Agotic, Colonel-General Petar Stipetic, Admiral Sveto Letica, and Admiral Davorin Kajic, assembled. The central role at the meeting, however, wasn't intended for any of the soldiers, but civilian Jure Radic, former reconstruction and development minister and the supreme commander's main operator in the sensitive ethnic engineering program. The repopulation of the deserted Krajina and definite "consolidation of Croatianhood" in the hitherto "un-Croatian" regions were the main topics of the session in Pantovcak.
We remind our readers that the transcript from the presidential palace discussed here was recorded 18 days after the end of the operation Storm. The atmosphere is no longer particularly euphoric, but noticeably solemn and, above all, worklike. It was necessary to think of a model that would be used to implement Tudjman's instructions, mentioned in a short dialogue with Jure Radic, a dialogue that could function as the motto of the session. "Vojnic," said Radic, "had 76 Croats, and 7,600 Serbs." Tudjman responds: "Ok, now it's going to be different." [Vojnic is a town in central Croatia.]
Supreme commander Tudjman intended to carry out his plan with the help of the new territorial organization of Croatian armed forces. At the very beginning of the meeting he stated the following: "Considering military-administrative command, or what we would consider division to operational zones as we have referred to them until now, as well as the distribution of military units, one needs to consider the geopolitical situation and strategic interests of the country, taking into account foreseen and possible enemies, today and in the future. However, one should also proceed with the consideration that military command could be the most effective means for solving the internal needs of the state. We, however, don't have the need, the pressing need, to further consolidate the existing order as in other countries, but we have it, for example, in the Istria region. But considering the situation we face with the liberation of occupied territories, the demographic situation, it is necessary for military command precisely to become one of the most efficient components of our state policy in solving the current crucial problem, namely the demographic situation of Croatia.
"Therefore, I called the deputy Prime Minister and the reconstruction and development minister, Dr. Radic, to this meeting, so that he can present, for the start of this debate, the current demographic situation, because the distribution of regional command centers, regions, brigades and other, educational facilities, etc., can be a very beneficial and effective way of solving the situation where we need to consolidate Croatianhood as in Istria, and on the other hand to do it as soon as possible - nowadays it is not about changing the ethnic makeup as much as about populating certain towns, certain regions. If you establish towns, regional command centers, educational facilities, etc., it means that tens and hundreds of people will come to establish a family there and immediately we have a different situation, life, etc." Jure Radic then took the stand to share his ideas for "consolidating Croatianhood."
JURE RADIC: Indeed, to be concise, I think it is well known to all of us that after the liberation of Croatia, the main problem in Croatia is the Croat man and woman. Simply, there are fewer and fewer Croats every day for several reasons. One of the reasons is emigration, as many left Croatia in the past because of political and economic reasons. The other reason has to do with the fact that in the past 40 years, fewer and fewer people are returning to Croatia every year. Between 1953 and today, the number of those born in Croatia has declined by half. In 1953, there were 98,000 births, and last year, only 48,000. This is certainly something that we in the army will experience in a little while, when those who can carry a gun will be fewer and fewer. We have black holes on the Croatian soil, where no Croats live. This of course is a consequence of deliberate greater-Serbia policy that intended, preparing the ground for this aggression, to create deserted regions, and when we look at today's picture of Croatia, our expectations regarding the full return to the liberated territory is possibly naïve as many have gotten accustomed to the new environment in exile.(...)
"In order of importance, the critical territory is the area that divides Croatia in half at her narrowest point, the division that was attempted by Belgrade and other centers of the conspiracy. Thus, from our point of view, the most important target for repopulation consists of the former municipalities of Vrginmost, Vojnic, and part of the Karlovac municipality. Thus, the region of Petrova Gora and the surrounding mountains. Before the war, [...] 4,259 Croats and 26,298 Serbs lived in these three counties. Thus, [it is] a completely empty region, and the national priority No.1 is to populate that region with Croats and create as much of a balance as possible. I think that we have to focus on economic development in towns that exist there, and these are Vrginmost, Vojnic, and some larger villages such as Veljun, Krnjak, etc."
TUDJMAN: "We don't have time for that. You present the situation, we'll make decisions later."
RADIC: "That's the critical point. Equally critical is the area to the south, the Slunj area, where Croats have to return. This area is also pretty empty, but fortunately, there weren't any Serbs or there were few. Thus, of equal concern from our point of view is this red-blue area [pointing at a map] at the narrowest part of Croatia, where Croatia was split in two. The next priority, third in importance, depends on whether we consider the regions in Herceg-Bosna, or Bosnia-Hercegovina, or not. It can be placed in order of importance with respect to Croatia. If the liberated areas of Livno, Glamoc, Kupres, Grahovo, and Drvar become populated by Croats, then the region of Knin becomes less important." [Livno, Glamoc, Kupres, Grahovo, and Drvar are Serb-majority areas in western Bosnia taken by the Croatian Army in the aftermath of the Operation Storm; Serbs were over 90 percent of population in Glamoc, Grahovo and Drvar, about 55 percent of population in Kupres, and a majority in the northern, rural part of the Livno municipality].
TUDJMAN: "If it ever happens."
RADIC: "The decision is up to you. If not, then everything in the former municipalities of Donji Lapac and Knin becomes equally important. These two municipalities stretch along the Croatian border, and have almost no Croats. In Knin there were, for example, 1,660 Croats, in Srb 29, in Doljane none, and in Donji Lapac 14."
TUDJMAN: "Do you know how many there were after World War II, approximately?"
RADIC: "In Knin, 60 percent of the population was Croatian after World War II. I have the data but not with me right now."
TUDJMAN: "What, 60 percent?"
RADIC: "Yes, 60 percent of Croats only in the city of Knin. However, Knin was a small town then. Thus, this entire region of Donji Lapac and Knin is a key border region entirely devoid of Croats. I don't know - I think it is interesting that the ethnically purest community in Croatia was the municipality of Donji Lapac, with over 99 percent Serbs [Donji Lapac also had the distinction of being the poorest municipality in prewar Croatia]. There is not one municipality in Croatia that has over 98 percent Croats, according to the prewar census from 1991, not one. There are in Hercegovina, four of them ..."
TUDJMAN: "There aren't any in Zagorje either."
At this point we will take a short break to note Radic's joy that in the county of Slunj, there "weren't any Serbs," then that Tudjman and company were cold-bloodedly handling the distribution of people in another country [Livno, Glamoc, Kupres, Grahovo, and Drvar are in Bosnia-Hercegovina], and to notice that the regions to be populated with Croats precisely overlap with the regions emptied during the Storm. The cleansing entailed hundreds of executions of Serbian civilians, the departure of 200,000 people considered unwanted by the [ruling] HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] for having the wrong names and surnames, looting and burning of 15,000 to 20,000 Serb houses. [...] The goal of the listed activities was clear and clearly stated: Krajina should never again have a Serb majority. Now we give the stage back to Tudjman ...
TUDJMAN: "Regarding military headquarters in the listed regions, operatively and strategically speaking it does not make sense that the fifth division is in Osijek, Djakovo, and Pozega. Thus, primarily operatively, [I would consider] Karlovac and Petrinja. Here, due to political reasons, I would rather go to Pazin than... you understand. Here I think that Knin is indisputable, considering that we have school facilities in Knin, a system more extensive than needed for civilian schools in the next 50 years. Thus, should we make use of that for the headquarters? Should we have a high military school there?"
GOJKO SUSAK: "There is enough space to bring in a guard brigade, headquarters, and a school. We don't have to invest anything, Mr. President, all three will fit there."
TUDJMAN: "I agree that we should make use of it and thus make Knin Croatian fairly quickly. But I want to see what we will do with Gospic. We also have to give Gospic some military institutions ..."
CROATIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL ZVONIMIR CERVENKO: "Here, Mr. President, we have a proposition for the operative distribution of commands, it is item No. 2, so allow the general to present what we think ..."
TUDJMAN: "I'm not sure whether Ploce, Metkovic... Neum would be the best, but we can't [consider that] for now." [Ploce and Metkovic are Croatian towns on the Adriatic coast, while Neum is part of the Federation Bosnia-Hercegovina, also on the coast.]
SUSAK: "No, no, ... the headquarters should be on the other side of Neum, not in Neum."
RADIC: "If so, yes, precisely the other side."
TUDJMAN: "Where?"
SUSAK: "South of Neum."
TUDJMAN: "Maybe Ston."
And it was, naturally, Ston, but the most important is the recognition that Tudjman at the time obviously worked on making Knin "Croatian fairly quickly," and that in August 1995 he still believed that it was "currently" impossible to install military headquarters for southern Croatia in Neum. The headquarters for the military regions (six regions of the Croatian armed forces where units, constituting operational and administrative command) were finally established in Pazin, Knin, Karlovac, Varazdin, Dakovo, and Ston, while Knin, Karlovac, and Pazin were chosen to stabilize Croatianhood in those regions after decades of instability. Knin and Karlovac were also chosen in order to have more Catholic flesh transported from somewhere (most probably Bosnia) to the regions--a guarantee for making Serbs second-class citizens and actively obstructing their return. The following two dialogues from the transcript bear witness to that...
GENERAL MAJOR VINKO VRBANAC: "By liberating, Mr. President, this third part of the occupied area of the Republic of Croatia, the present conditions show, as you said in the introduction, that a change in population needs to occur by military means."
TUDJMAN: "We have the fortunate situation that the liberation demands a distribution of military units that would simultaneously solve the demographic [aspect]."
RADIC: "Vojnic and Vrginmost are the most critical municipalities. In one of those municipalities one should have at least some..."
TUDJMAN: "Not one, but both. If not a whole unit, at least a company should be placed there, no compromise, please. Let‘s move on."
And then the grand finale of the Pantovcak session happens. Near the very end, Tudjman addresses his favorite topic, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and complains to his chief assistants about idiots [leaders] from abroad who didn't recognize the genius of his Bosnian adventures. "Maybe someone watched when in the last election campaign speech in 1990 I somewhat undiplomatically said that the borders of the Croatian ‘pretzel' were untenable," says Tudman, "but this doesn't mean that we created the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna and the HVO by chance, and are now conducting those operations there. It is true that never in Croatian history have Croatian soldiers controlled more territory than now, but it's clear that in a formal administrative sense we can't yet organize differently than we have proposed. You know, after creating such an army and politically succeeding in demoralizing Serbianhood and its army, if there were favorable international circumstances and wisdom, if they had let us, if they had told me, ‘we won't allow the Yugoslav air force, rockets provided by Russians, etc. to engage against Croatia,' we could have said today, after [operations] Summer and Storm, we could have had borders that would fit Croatia, and the rest of the world as well. But considering that there is no such wisdom, we have to discuss things under these circumstances, and ignore what we have accomplished in terms of Croatian interests and the Croatian state."
Thus spoke Tudjman in August of 1995.
This transcript - together with hundreds of others kept at The Hague - testifies to the fact that the former Croatian authorities carefully planned, prepared, and carried out the ethnic cleansing of Krajina Serbs. From the forged leaflets distributed in Krajina before Operation Storm, asking Serbs to flee, to post-Storm days when from Knin to Dvor na Uni mass murders and arson of houses took place, to later weeks and months when the ethnically cleansed regions were at times successfully populated with Croat settlers from all over the world. They were assigned Serb houses spared by the flames and the dynamite, to make sure the unwanted never return. And that wasn't the only method used to stop their return.
Finally, it is unclear why individuals from the current Croatian government, who sent kilograms upon kilograms of Tudjman's transcripts to The Hague, are today fanatically defending Ante Gotovina [suspected war criminal indicted by the ICTY], claiming that no ethnic cleansing took place in Krajina. It would be better if they spoke to Jure Radic, for example, about that issue.