Talking about short memory! When Croatia was in war, the walls of the whole world were covered with the appeal Stop the war in Croatia, and we begged everyone we believed had a bit of humanity not to forget us. Only Stanko Lasic, with his grim "Three essays on Europe", warned us that the world would reply with the same coldness that we show towards more distant countries. Now we can see how right he was. The only thing that Lasic didn't predict was that Croatia will not be indifferent only towards the far away Kurds, Cambodians, and Ethiopians, but also towards the "brothers" from since recently joint country.
We have no time for them any more. We don't know or don't understand their problems any more. If we show some interest in them at all, we do it according to the western stereotypes, made of superficial information and patronizing, but lifeless recipes. They don't like this, and they react angrily. Nacional's journalist Jasna Babic, who visited Macedonia recently, felt it in the suddenly changed behavior of the Macedonian special units soldiers, who held a checkpoint towards the Albanian positions. They were kind to her until they heard she was from Croatia. Then they changed their tone: "Get lost... I'm going to break your camera, I swear!"
These most recent recruits of the ten years long Yugoslav wars shrink from Croatia, because Croatia supported Kosovo Albanians in the last year's Serbian-Albanian war. Mesic's statement that the Albanian terrorism was a consequence of an anti-Albanian policy stirred up additional passions. Macedonians obviously see this as an unacceptable appeasement of the Albanians, who are about to break their country into pieces, before the eyes of the indifferent Americans and uninfluential Europe. Everything, including the until recently existing distrust of Macedonia towards FR Yugoslavia, becomes less important before this cataclysmic picture.
This is the typical warriors' fixation at the direct enemy, strengthened with the intolerance for the Albanians, which existed during the joint country. But, we are interested in Croatia, or more correctly, the question why it is seen as it is at the eastern end of the former federation, from Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH) onwards. When we think of the Croatian "eastern policy" since Tudjman's arrival up to now, we see that Serbia has always been in its center, but in two opposite, and equally limited and narrow-minded versions.
According to the first, Tudjman's version, Croatia saw Serbia as the only regional partner, with which it would divide not only mutual interests, but also arrange the complete relationships in the region. Other countries were to accept this without objections, and if they did object, as in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, then the joint batons of the two regional policemen would force them to obey. This policy failed thanks to the active interference of the international community, although it truly ended only when Tudjman and Milosevic were gone.
The other version of the Croatian eastern policy is more important because it was created by the former opposition, the present government, which advocated, partly openly and partly indirectly, an alliance of all non-Serb peoples against Serbia. This policy also lost its footing after the fall of Milosevic, but it had received such strong impetus from the last year's military intervention against Yugoslavia that it remains the major characteristic of the present unofficial Croatian eastern policy. According to this policy, everything that subverts Serb hegemony, both real and imaginary, is good, and that has been the motto for all actions. Zagreb more or less openly supports the separatism of Montenegro, as well as the separatism of Kosovo Albanians (although they largely cancel each other) and it would probably be the same with the Bosniak separatism, had Bosnia-Hercegovina remained in Yugoslavia.
This regional alliance against Serbia has entailed two troubles. First, it is being forgotten that Serbia is not the same after Milosevic's fall, and that the possible future territorial pretensions of Serbia will not be imposed by weapons. After all, the present conflict on the Macedonian border with Kosovo is the first war in the last ten years without any Serb contribution. This will probably be seen as the beginning of a new phase in the history of this region (Yugoslavia is already treated as a peacemaking factor in the warring area, so that some anti-Serb alliance can no longer count on the support from the World).
The other problem of an anti-Serbian alliance might be even bigger. It is being forgotten that there are tensions among the allies as well, and that the withdrawal of the Serbian threat would be enough for those tensions to erupt. There are points of friction between Bosnia and Montenegro, between Montenegro and the Albanians, and the Albanians and the Macedonians. This last case is the best example of the shortsightedness of the Croatian eastern policy. Both Albanians and Macedonians are Croat "friends", although the capricious geopolitical stars have written significantly different fates for them.
For Tudman Macedonians were the staunchest ally in the lower corner of the former Yugoslavia, but their value fell after they proclaimed independence. The flag was taken over by the Kosovo Albanians, who are until this day, with interruptions, honored for holding the southern stronghold against the Serb Leviathan. The trust towards excessively mythologized Albanian border guards did not fade even when the Kosovo Albanians expressed openly expansionist claims with respect to their neighbors. In the case of Serbia, that was already implied. But now, when that expansionism is turning, still quietly, towards Montenegro, and absolutely openly towards Macedonia, Croatia is silent.
By that she proved that she is a cunning stepmother who used its southern stepchildren only as pawns in the competition against Serbs. Consequently, it is not surprising that in Skopje the government declined Mesic's offer to mediate and may very soon turn towards Belgrade, although Georgijevski and Trajkovski are not exactly known as being pro-Serb. But they know how to add two and two. In the past decade Serbia had very few allies but, partly due to necessity, she loyally supported each one of them. On the contrary, Croatia allied with everything and everyone, but I would like to hear of at least one of them that did not end up betrayed in the end (even the longest alliance, the one with Albanians, was discarded by Tudman as soon as he got closer to Milosevic).
And here we are in the sad conclusion of the Croat policy in the Balkan region. Actually, Croatia does not have such a policy. Instead that so-called policy is a mere reflection of some rusty geopolitical "plans" from the past, although those plans never had a chance of success, and now look like a pile of trash that should be discarded as soon as possible. True, some "strategists" of the international community who during the last ten years insisted on fighting one nationalism with another one and got paid very well for that, should also urgently be discarded. In the end these "strategists" have become a midwife for the Albanian nationalism that, true, appears rather unspectacular in comparison with the Serb and Croatian nationalism, but is so ambitious and warlike that it would be stupid to underestimate it.
But, the aforementioned strategists have it easy. They do not pay for their failures. On the other hand, Croatia will definitely pay for hers!