But, the Government has been doing precisely that, and finally ended up dedicating the whole last session to debating what to do with Tudjman's transcripts, after they become its property (which, according to Mesic's interview in this issue, is still not a done deal). Linic, Crkvenac, Cacic and Vidovic pushed away their thick files, and joined the jury seriously considering the legal status of those papers, and whether it would be good for Croatia to send them to The Hague. The announcement that the members of Greguric's wartime cabinet would meet on the same job proves that the Government has deliberately ceded control.
This small group of waxwork figures has never showed least interest to meet to discuss the horrible economic situation in the country, but they rushed from the museum glass cases as soon as they heard that someone was ransacking their patriotic dividends from 1991 and 1992. This would be more of less acceptable, if they decided to follow the trail of the rumors that The Hague is interested in some of them. But no, they decided to go much deeper and even announced they would make some "conclusions about the temporary situation in Croatia". This smells too much of a backup government, which would serve in the role of some sort of ombudsman or what not, to control unreliable Racan and his Ministers.
Tomac said the wartime government would meet in the Parliament building, allegedly because that was where they used to hold their meetings. It is obvious that the building soaked in history was supposed to play the role of an extra in the jolly reconstruction of some allegedly happier time, when everyone patriotically joined heads, from the HDZ on the right wing, to the SDP on the left wing. The vice president of the Parliament, Tomac, intends to warmly welcome the vice president of the wartime government, Tomac, because he feels more important in the skin of the latter. Moreover, he is willing to help other members of that Government, first of all Budisa, to launch themselves into a more prestigious political orbit.
Racan said recently he did not need Budisa as the fourth vice-president of the Government, but Budisa has found a Government that wants and respects him, and will value him accordingly. We should bear in mind that this took place at the time when an important chain link in the Croatian bilateral policy with The Hague Tribune broke. Fed up with accusations that he has created parallel communication channels with the Tribunal, where he as a repentant witness possibly informed on his colleagues from the former government, Mesic announced his withdrawal from The Hague story. But, the more correct explanation would be that he was forced to leave it, with the assistance of Racan.
When all is added up, it turns out that the proclaimed Croatian policy with respect to The Hague Tribunal is about to fall apart, only there's no one, neither in the government nor in the opposition, to declare that bankruptcy. Even the comparisons with the neighboring ex-Yugoslav countries are not of any use. In each of those countries some moves have been made, except in Croatia, which tends to fall below Tudjman's level of extradition policy.
In such a situation, this government desperately clings to Kostunica's statement that the extradition of Milosevic is the last thing on his mind, believing that this statement provides it with an excuse worth at least several months, maybe even years, of stalling. Therefore it is easy to understand the panic caused by the recent announcement that Milosevic will be tried in Belgrade. Now they all try to prove that it would be a violation of the Hague regulations, although Croatia demanded a revision of those same regulations only several weeks ago. At the same time no one here even thinks of prosecuting even the least important war criminals, with the exception of the trial extorted with Levar's murder, let alone the chief warlords.
This doesn't mean that the situation in Serbia is positive, on the contrary, the objective Serbian analysts warn that the construction of the "October revolution" has weak foundations, and it is not certain whether it will survive. But even more devastating for Croatia is the fact that serious discussions have been held (Dr. Vladeta Filipovic in NIN) about the necessity of denazification in Serbia. Based on the model of Germany, Serbia would prosecute not only war crimes suspects, but also thousands (in case of Germany millions) of people politically responsible for those crimes. (According to Filipovic, some Serbian ministers deserve to be forced to sweep the streets of the cities they "soiled" during the last ten years).
Still, even a year after the elections, the Croatian Television is more or less the way it used to be [under Tudman], because the ruling coalition cannot decide whether detudjmanization is needed or not, which makes the state-controlled TV only a bit less HDZ-oriented than before. On the other hand, there have been no dilemmas whether it is necessary to demilosevicize the Serbian Television, nor are there any inter-party intrigues about it. The best proof for this is the fact that it will soon be taken over by the well-known journalist Mile Isakov, who is also the president of a midget reformist party, which would in Croatia be swallowed by the spirit of the general inertia and passivity.