Interview – Zoran Djindjic

SERBIA IS NOT BARGAINING CHIP

Vecernje Novosti, Belgrade, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro, March 6, 2003

I Do Not Own Serbia

DJINDJIC: Steiner’s offer for talks came as a sort of a reaction to the initiative we proposed. With the agreement of the international community, which decided that, fine, talks may start. For the international community that would be a proof that the Kosmet issue has been tackled seriously. Of course, many abroad are not prepared to tackle this topic seriously, with implications for the intentions of Kosovo Albanians and relationships in the Balkans. Already today, and in two, three, or five years. That is still a taboo topic. That is why they are proposing talks about mundane issues. Apparently, this is also based on calculations that some sort of a solution will come out of it. Without doubt, this is a step forward. A very important step as until now Albanian politicians adamantly rejected any suggestion of dialogue with Belgrade. They kept claiming that their only partner is the international community, while Serbia is a neighboring country with which they do not want to have any relations. What has recently happened, most likely after pressure exerted by Steiner and the international community, is welcome because it also represents, although indirectly, rights of Serbia. Because, this is an invitation, for the first time addressed to the Government of Serbia, instead of the federal authorities. This is really the first time that Belgrade implies Serbia, instead of the federal authorities.

Three Sets Of Issues

It is good that we shall talk in a few days, even though it won’t be immediately at the ministerial level, about issues such as “border” traffic, suppression of smuggling, energy, traffic. Not like two states, but like parts of a common space. Fine, among other, also because, I am convinced, even during discussions about these issues a much more important issue will soon have to be addressed: are we one system or two separate systems? Also: who is going to guarantee for the assumed responsibilities? All in all, even the start of talks is a sort of a satisfaction for Serbia. All of that, however, includes a dose of risk. The danger is – and that is the other side of the coin – that if the talks conclude with the listed issues they may lead to the legalization of the existing situation. There is a realistic danger that those who advocate certain solutions will start saying: traffic, energy and trade are the main issues; let’s normalize these sectors and everything else will be fine. But that is definitely not true. For Serbia the discussion of these issues can in no way be a compensation for her sovereign rights in Kosovo and Metohija. The rights of the state of Serbia in her southern province are more important and wider than the sum of rights of the Electrical Utility Company of Serbia, Post Service or railways company. The issue here is the fate and future of Serbia, the status of Kosovo and Metohija and state and national interests linked with Kosovo. In a sense, it also has to do with the future of the Balkans and our need that the international community take all of this seriously.

The rights of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija are not something that can disappear. No one, neither among Albanians nor abroad, has the right to say: Milosevic used up your rights and you start from zero. Our firm and principled view is that historical, state, and legal aspects must be taken into account while seeking a compromise and a solution. Naturally, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija have their rights. Our approach is not onesided and we are not saying that only Serbia has rights in Kosovo and Metohija. Definitely not. Resolution 1244 also states that a compromise between the rights of Belgrade and Pristina must be found. I am concerned that during the last four years Resolution 1244 has been ignored, together with a possible and needed compromise. We are facing a widely held view that Belgrade has no rights in Kosmet. Thus, the doors opened with Steiner’s initiative are too small to reverse that process.

What is necessary to turn that small door into a gate? Will you demand that something be changed in Steiner’s concept of dialogue with Pristina?

We believe that the talks should focus on three sets of issues. The first set may include daily issues in cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina, energy, traffic, trade, organized crime, problems of various rights, number plates, documents and everything else that bothers ordinary people. The second set of issues should include the return of the expelled and displaced Serbs and other non-Albanians and security. By this I mean everything specified in Resolution 1244 about the right of the Serb people to return to the places from which it has been expelled. The third set of issues must deal, as I’ve already stated, with the final status and institutions. This set cannot be avoided.

What is your view of the framework of the talks that would address that, definitely most important set of issues?

We shall insist that talks focus on the following issues: what will be the relation between Serbia and Kosovo? What will be their relation in five, ten years, and in an indefinite future. The time has come to put these topics on the agenda, at least preliminary, because the third set of issues is the precondition for all discussions about the other two sets. Obviously, the expelled Serbs will not return if there is no security and they do not know what will be the relationship between Belgrade and Pristina. If in Kosovo and regarding Kosovo, not a single Serbian state and national interest is defined. For example, how can we sort out problems with traffic if we do not know the status of the province? How can we regulate energy issues, if we do not know if Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija are two states, three states or one state?

Four Wasted Years

Whether Mr Steiner wants to see and admit that much, the final status issue has been addressed over the last four years. The Albanian local institutions have been handed over attributes of Serbian and Yugoslav sovereignty. State sovereignty, as we all know, has four attributes – legislative authority, judicial authority, executive authority, and security, including border security and military. The first three have already de facto been transferred to the local parliament, government and judiciary. Including oversight of the international community which, naturally, cannot last forever. The transfer of the fourth capacity, security, to the Kosovo Albanians has already started. I reacted to everything that was going on the moment it was announced that in 2004 and 2005 the number of foreign troops in Kosovo and Metohija will be reduced to 5,000 soldiers. That announcement implied that ethnic Albanians, the Kosovo Protection Corps, would take over the responsibility for the security in the province. If this has already happened, we would have to wonder what would be left for discussion by the time “final status” talks start? Especially because it would be unlikely that ethnic Albanians would agree to give up authority and jurisdiction that they have already received from the international community. Of course, that would be the worst possible scenario that we had to prevent and avoid. I can say that I believe that we have avoided that danger. That is that much more important because there was a risk that under the wings of the Iraq crisis and predictable worsening of the Western relations with the Muslim and Arab countries we – as a country and in connection with the “final status” of Kosovo and Metohija – become a bargaining chip. The risk that some become tempted to use Kosovo to show that the West is not against Muslims in general, but only against Saddam Hussein. That is why I have done all I could, with my recent initiatives, to initiate the Kosovo issue in parallel with the Iraq crisis. My intention is to tell the world: we are not anyone’s bargaining chip.

No Delay

It is true that I have, because of Kosmet, spoiled relations with a decent number of my colleagues in international organizations. Some of them have interpreted my initiative as sticking of a thumb in an eye. However, in my opinion, Kosmet is the state priority number one. The status of Kosmet is essentially the status of Serbia. We will not have full sovereignty until the status of Kosovo and Metohija is resolved. I have been elected to defend interests of Serbia. If you intend to defend something, it is essential to know what you are trying to defend. The world must understand that Serbian democrats, and I as the Prime Minister of the Government of Serbia, after two years, still cannot state what our state is. They must understand and accept that for us, just as it would be for any other normal state and nation, it is a big problem. Consequently, Belgrade cannot accept any further postponement of the resolution of the “final status”. The reactions I have been informed of were rather nervous. But I get the impression that I have caught a few of them “red handed”. It seems to me that I am spoiling someone’s concept for the Balkans and Kosovo and Metohija. One has to understand them. They’ve just completed their concept, and then some Djindjic starts causing trouble. And he says, wait a minute, this does not work! Let’s see what has been done so far and what should be done next. As far as I am concerned, these reactions are a proof that essentially there is an unofficial strategy of sorts to prepare for the declaration of independence of Kosovo by 2004 or 2005.

What makes you think that this is a coherent plan, even if an unofficial one?

Although I do not have decisive proof of everything, I am seriously concerned that such a “unofficial plan” already exists. Moreover, that the essential plank of the plan is a concession to Serbia, once Belgrade faces the issue, that the secession of de facto independent Kosovo won’t receive international support. I suspect that at that point we would be told to figure out a way to harmonize relations with the de facto sovereign authorities in Pristina. Unfortunately, it is obvious that in such a situation we would be unable to influence events in Kosovo and that we could spend decades on “harmonization”, while in that process Belgrade would be forced to make concessions. All along we would also be told that Belgrade would have to show understanding for global political relations, while the Albanians would be allowed to do as they pleased, as until now. I’m sure that we would be asked to accept the fact that the international community cannot deal with Albanians. This would be extremely dangerous for the stability of both Serbia and the rest of the region. Since the beginning of January, when I initiated the whole diplomatic offensive, until today, nothing has significantly changed, but we have been able to slow down the speed of transfer of Serbian sovereignty to local Albanian authorities in the security sphere. That is not negligible, but it is also far from enough. For the same reasons, Steiner’s initiative is also insufficient. Things will only start to change significantly once the international community clearly states that the solution is a compromise that is demanded by Resolution 1244. The solution is in true autonomy for Kosmet, return of expelled Serbs and the return of the number of our policemen specified in Resolution 1244 to the province. In other words, in strict implementation of Resolution 1244, to the last letter. Only when such statements start arriving from New York and Brussels, the situation will start to essentially improve.

While you’re saying this, are you referring to answers you’ve received to letters recently sent to leaders of the greatest world powers, from George Bush to Vladimir Putin?

Not directly. Those answers that have partly arrived in closed mail, partly through ambassadors, include admissions that during the last four years a lot that haven’t been envisaged in Resolution 1244 has happened in Kosmet. Answers also include clear support for the respect of Resolution 1244, but that means nothing. That is why, and that will be our official request, we shall demand that on the fourth anniversary of the international mission in Kosovo and Metohija an analysis of the achievements be carried out. We shall demand that experts from the UN Security Council, EU, Belgrade and Pristina participate in that analysis. That a team be formed to prepare a “white book” that would summarize what has not been achieved, how many refugees and expelled persons have returned to the province, why the stipulations about the return of our police and military to the province haven’t been fulfilled, what has happened with “true autonomy”, normalization of relations, with standards that Steiner likes to talk about so much.

White Book of Achievements

We shall demand that everything that was envisaged in Resolution 1244 be assessed on the scale between A to F. My opinion is that the return of police and military deserves grade F, return of Serbs F+, while independence of Kosovo at least B+, standards D-… These are not exaggerations, since ethnic Albanians live normally, run their businesses, move about, work, while Serbs are denied all of that.

When will Belgrade officially request this?

I suspect that we shall have to wait for the resolution of the Iraq crisis. There is an international “technology” for similar things. First we shall have to place the topic on the table and to convince the relevant international factor that it is important and urgent. The second phase would consist of the resolution of the solution. Unfortunately, nothing will be easy. Even if the global powers are convinced in the relevancy of the subject and accept that it is urgent and important. Because, if they were able to resolve our Kosmet knot, they would have done that by now. And we are now still in the first phase that hasn’t been completed. Thus, it is necessary to create a few more concentric circles, so that abroad, when someone says “Kosovo”, no one can respond by saying “that’s been resolved”. Instead, the response should be “ah, that is a problem, some dangerous events are taking place there”. We still haven’t made the necessary number of concentric diplomatic and political circles around Kosovo and Metohija. We still haven’t contacted all those who should support compromise solutions. Our biggest opponent, as in the past, is oblivion, which sweeps problems such as ours under the carpet, so that they reappear after a while as a sort of an illegal building. I am saying all of this because I fear that the international community may say in the foreseeable future that the construction of the illegal building in Kosmet has advanced too far to be demolished and therefore must be legalized.

Therefore, you fear that Kosmet may become a sort of global Kaludjerica [illegally built settlements at the outskirts of Belgrade]?

Yes, I do. The “construction” is pretty much in the final phase. Strictly speaking, all that is happening without an approval of the Security Council.

What will be the reaction of the Government, and your personal reaction, if the international community in the near future asks that we accept that Kosovo is de facto independent?

We shall never accept that. Besides, if the international community, which is stronger than us, really intends to say – “Kosovo should be independent”, I want to hear that first. I want that that be officially stated. There’s nothing worse than double standards – talk about inviolability of borders, sovereignty, Resolution 1244, on the one hand, while on the other hand, in practice all of these principles are being violated and no one protests. Some are silent because they have to be silent, while others pretend to be naïve. And the weaker side is told to shut up and avoid provoking punishment.

Weak Serbia

I repeat: we shall never accept either formal or de facto independence of Kosovo. We shall exploit various mechanisms to alert certain governments and countries and will do everything in our power to make our new position acceptable for the international community. I am fully aware that a long struggle awaits us, but we must try to defend our interests. Similarly, we cannot lose anything in that struggle by starting to defend our interests now. Over the last few years we were convinced that time was on our side, that with renewed and strengthened international credibility we should be able to very quickly turn the tide in our favor. That the world would say: “Now, that you have become a democratic Serbia, you get your earlier authority in Kosovo and Metohija”. That has proven to be wrong. I am afraid that certain things haven’t changed since the moment seven-eight years ago when at one lecture in America I said that at the time the American policy resembled, in my opinion, Tito’s policy – weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia.

Compromise Solution

It is possible that some people are counting on that. Nevertheless, regardless of that, we must define our national interest in Kosmet and should seek allies. We must not define our national interest based on what others believe that to be. As a man who worries about his children and grandchildren, I am concerned about the current demographic situation, imbalance between the population growth among ethnic Albanians and Serbs. I am concerned so much that I seriously contemplate the future of the Serb state with million and a half ethnic Albanians who would have the right to buy real estate in central Belgrade, to buy companies in the forthcoming privatization, with millions of dollars earned through illegal drugs trafficking. I am very concerned about Serbia we are leaving to our children and posterity.

What is the solution, and how quickly can it be accomplished?

A solution can and must be a compromise. I think that it must be sought gradually, but dialog must start immediately. That solution must not be immediately radical. Because of Serbs, international community and ethnic Albanians. It must not be based on unrealistic assumptions. Personally, I have difficulty imagining ethnic Albanians as loyal citizens of Serbia. When I say that, I am not referring to the municipalities in the south of Serbia proper. It is difficult to imagine a normal state with such a large number of disloyal citizens. The creation of such a state would not be favorable for us. But, on the other hand, Serbia has its sovereign rights in Kosovo and Metohija. Regardless of the direction the future search for a compromise solution takes, this or that sort of autonomy or something else. Serbia is not a protectorate and no one can impose on us any solution on any part of our territory. Regardless of my personal views, we shall see through discussion in our political bodies what is the interest of the Serb nation for coexistence with ethnic Albanians, what degree of Serbian sovereignty can be achieved in Kosovo and Metohija. This discussion must flash out our course in the next 20, 30 to 50 years. Regarding Kosmet, we must envisage what sort of Serbia we want to see in year 2050, we must predict future trends and state our national and state interest regarding state borders, sovereignty, international relations, alliances. The condition for this is to be accepted as a partner in the search for solutions. We must under no circumstances allow anyone to tell us: ”Here, take Kosovo. It must not secede, but it is independent”. Or to proclaim its independence irrespective of our views.

If the UN Security Council opts for one of these approaches and Serbia refuses to accept that, what then?

I think that the UN Security Council can under no circumstances make such a decision. We must try hard to alert certain UN Security Council members in time and prevent something like that. Above all Russia and China. Our strongest trump card is that no international body or organization can do either of the two, because they would thereby violate all principles on which they are based. Therefore, I am not afraid that the UN Security Council will proclaim independence of Kosmet and unilaterally change international borders. They will never do something like that. But it can happen that the situation on the ground is unbearable for us. We may be “served” with the de facto independent Kosovo within formally unchanged borders.

It Is Truth, Forget About Motives

There has been plenty of propaganda on that topic. Many lobbies and international non-governmental organizations participate in that. They are trying to prove that my views about Kosovo confirm that the Serbian policy hasn’t changed. Supposedly, I was a “pro-European” politician and now I have become a Serbian nationalist. Essentially that boils down to the claim that in the Balkans everything stays the same, only disguise changes. But, I do not fret because of that. What is important is that the arguments I have offered are extremely strong. Did you notice that over the last days no one has said that I am wrong regarding Kosovo. It is telling that some people from Europe, whom I consider to be close to my political views, have inquired about my motives for raising the issue of Kosovo and Metohija today. My answer to all of them was the same: “just tell me that I am telling the truth, and forget about motives”. After this, their answer was: “Fine we agree. This is an important issue. We support you, we support reform and democracy in Serbia. Talks Pristina-Belgrade should be held and we shall joint them in the future”. This was followed with the obligatory support for Resolution 1244 and Steiner… All of this is too little for Serbia and for me personally. But it is nevertheless more than what would have hoped for without insisting on starting the talks about Kosovo now.

Are you aware of any reactions from Pristina and Kosovo Albanian politicians regarding your proposals?

All the information indicates that they are very angry. Perhaps also because a high international representative from Pristina admitted to me that I am right regarding the quiet push for independence of Kosovo. However, according to him that process was unlikely to change. My impression is also that they were angry because I hit the bull’s-eye. Now, suddenly something that was supposed to take place quietly and away from public scrutiny has been pushed into open. My initiatives have removed the curtains and everything has become a topic for discussion. The representatives of the international community are also facing problems and they keep saying that we are right but that it’s still too early to deal with these issues. My response to that is – just say it publicly and tell us when the time will come to deal with these issues. I ask them – what about six months from now? They say that it’s impossible to say, that we need to “work on common views, because we are in partnership”. However, none of that worries me a lot. Everything I’ve achieved in my life was achieved swimming against the current. I never chose an easy way out. That’s why I am convinced that we do not have the right to choose an easy solution and give in, especially now when the key issue of Serbian statehood is on the agenda. The issue whose solution is crucial for the planning of our future, the issue without whose solution we won’t be able to resolve the danger for the Serb nation. That danger is to a significant extent the consequence of the unclear status of the Serbian state, which is becoming a target for other expansionist movements. I am convinced that we must have a secure state because that is the only way to protect our national interests. We must not be satisfied anymore with external, formal sovereignty, while an “alien” eats us from within. We don’t need a cuckoo’s egg in our nest. I don’t want to participate in something that will in the future be described as my naïve assistance in the creation of somebody else’s state.

Kosovo As Federation

First of all, Serbs in Kosovo need to become a constituent nation, instead of an ethnic minority, in Kosovo and Metohija. I expect that we shall manage to accomplish that once the “white book” I talked about is complete. The temporary constitutional framework has not provided means for self-protection of Serbs and other non-Albanians. This fact is discouraging them from returning to Kosovo and puts them in a subservient position. The real partner for these discussions is the UN Security Council, not the Albanians, because, naturally, they will refuse to talk. We shall demand the “white book” in June. Somewhat later, in the autumn, but in any case before the end of the year, we expect to initiate in the UN Security Council talk about federalization of Kosovo and Metohija and the constituent nation status for Serbs.

If that does not work out, probably the next crossroads would have to be the discussion about some sort of a Cyprus model for Kosmet, with civilized territorial movement of population. Because, if Serbs cannot protect their rights as residents of an entity where ethnic Albanians are a majority, they will on their own move to the territories where they are a majority. This process has been going on for decades already. Besides, Serbs and Albanians never lived together in Kosovo and Metohija. They always lived next to each others. A multiethnic Kosovo society is a big illusion. Something like that never existed. Kosmet has always been a society of ethnic coexistence. Consequently, we are not suggesting a return to the past. I would be happy if Kosmet became a federation and if Serbia established asymmetric relations with that federation – closer relations with the Serb entity and loose links, those that are desired by ethnic Albanians, with the other entity. Serbia can “withstand” that form of relations with Kosmet. But, let me repeat, Serbia must know where it stands.

What if even this second “crossroads” turns out unfeasible?

If even that does not work, then after two-three years we will be forced to draw a new internal border. A solution reached peacefully by Serbia, Serbs from Kosovo, and ethnic Albanians, plus the international community. The final, back up solution is an international conference at which we would seek to answer why none of that is functioning and how to find a lasting solution. We in Belgrade must have a solution if neither of the two mentioned formulas work. We do not want to immediately go to the last option. That would be too blunt and excessively radical for some. But Serbia must at all times know the minimum below which it is not prepared to go and must secure means to protect that minimum. Regarding that, I am surprised that our local analysts mostly oppose my Kosmet initiative, decrying supposed lack of strategy, and condemning it as merely an election campaign ploy. However, I find it encouraging that ordinary people seem to share my ideas.

Negotiations

There is a High Working Group that was formed a year ago and whose task is to cooperate with Pristina. Within that group, we can appoint five or six ministers for talks. Of course, we are still considering whether it would be better to start at the deputy minister level. Initially, negotiations should not be at a very high level, as that would create excessive expectations too early in the process. Out side will insist on the topics proposed by Steiner, the return of expelled Serbs in 2003, a specific target for the return of Serbs in 2003. Last year almost no one returned. We shall demand that locations to which people are supposed to return be defined, and that budget include specific funds for the return. Regarding energy sector and traffic, local institutions in Kosovo and Metohija are our partners. Regarding returns, our partners are UNMiK and the international community. Partners in the discussion about the third set of issues, related to the final status, are to be found in the UN Security Council. Naturally, with the participation of all the interested parties. This initiative cannot harm our chances at this point. No one is working for us, and many are working against us. We can counter their plans only by actively engaging them and offering our own solutions.