by Senad PECANIN
LJAJIC: I did not have any doubts about joining the DOS because my political philosophy is that the Bosniak community is too small and lacking significant political influence to achieve anything crucial on its own and to secure adequate status for Sandzak and the Bosniak community. We are only 2.7 percent of population in Serbia and 3.2 percent in the whole FR Yugoslavia, and all attempts to draw parallels between the Sandzak problem and that of Kosovo and to force that those problems be resolved in the same manner were unsuccessful from the start and inflicted a lot of damage on Sandzak and Bosniaks themselves because, simply, all demands that were made at the time discredited us not only in the eyes of the Serbian and Montenegrin public but also in the eyes of the international community. My strategy was to forge a political alliance with other parties in Serbia and Montenegro. Just like in WWII it was impossible to defeat Chetniks without Partisans, thus it was impossible to defeat Milosevic without, let's say, Serbian opposition parties, and we wanted to give another impetus to that alliance and at the same time to make sure that we are not left on the periphery of the political life. The easiest choice would have been to watch everything from the audience, but that would imply our total exclusion from the political and public life, and we wanted to at all costs participate in that match and, corresponding to our abilities, contribute to the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic's regime, as that regime was an obstacle without whose overthrow there could be no progress for anyone, and especially not for Bosniaks in FR Yugoslavia. During Milosevic's rule we as the nation suffered the worst in Bosnia and Sandzak and his removal was the basic precondition for the cultural, political, and economic development, so that I had no doubts in that sense. The doubts surfaced when the DOS rallies started. I was supposed to participate and speak at those rallies. I am aware that nationalism has taken hold of the public and political life of this country, that at one time it was elevated to the level of the state ideology and I know that I was totally denounced as someone who was destroying the state and trying to annex Sandzak to Bosnia, who was contributing to the linking up of the so-called green transversal; the whole Seselj's and Socialists' election campaign was based on the denouncements of the democratic opposition only because Joszef Kasa and Rasim Ljajic were members of that opposition, and every election rally of those parties began and ended with that criticism. In such conditions it was not easy to act politically, and especially to make radical political decisions, for example, to address in Belgrade 200,000 or 300,000 people, moreover because those rallies were accompanied by certain iconography that is incompatible with some of my political and general beliefs. Then I took upon myself that sort of risk despite other type of criticism - that I sold out to the Chetniks, made an alliance with Serb monarchists, that I betrayed national interests..., but I knew that that was an investment that was bound to sooner or later turn out to be profitable, because the hitherto response from Sandzak to isolation by Belgrade was putting emphasis on self-isolation and did not produce any results, and this was a realistic attempt to produce some results. Later it turned out that all of us who were in the DOS were on Milosevic's black list of individuals earmarked for execution. On the other hand, I was also on some sort of Ugljanin's black list. Allegedly he, in Ankara, at a meeting, proposed that I be killed and, when volunteers started coming forward, he took upon himself to take care of that saying that he would do that with pleasure. Therefore, I was on a liquidation list both with Milosevic and Ugljanin, but I spoke in Belgrade and at other election rallies. My goal was to demonstrate to the public that the picture of Sandzak and Bosniaks in general was totally wrong.
I would like to address the picture of Sandzak and Bosniaks that exists in Serbia. On the one hand it is the result of nationalist ideology that did exist and to a large extent still exists in Serbia. On the other hand it seems that that picture was also influenced by the public presentation of Bosniaks through policies of Sulejman Ugljanin. What are the consequences of that policy for Sandzak and Bosniaks?
More than catastrophic and we shall deal with the consequences for a few more years. Unfortunately, Sandzak is still viewed through the lens of Ugljanin's political logic since that, simply, suits certain political circles here in Belgrade. If you have a chance to pick your political opponent, it makes sense to pick someone who is stupid, politically illiterate, and Milosevic used all available means to force me out of the political game and to portray Ugljanin as a political image of a whole nation and demands that are put forward, because that was the easiest way to totally discredit those demands. In such circumstances this was the only way. An alliance with democratic political forces. Although we had disagreements with many of them regarding some crucial issues, that was a necessary alliance with the aim of overthrowing the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Actually we agreed about only two issues - that Milosevic must be overthrown and that all controversial issues must be resolved in a peaceful and democratic manner. We simply had to swallow that bitter pill, close one and at time both eyes in order to be a part of that opposition and to at the same time, while overthrowing Milosevic, change the picture that exists about us and that was created thanks to some historical baggage, but also thanks to this totally deformed policy that was led by Ugljanin from Sarajevo.
What is your explanation, despite disastrous results of Ugljanin's activities, regarding the blindness of Sarajevo, specifically the SDA and Izetbegovic personally?
The relations between Sarajevo and Sandzak can not easily be explained for one simple reason, the fact that we as a political alternative in Sandzak all the time tried to present a realistic political approach to draw attention to the fact that every radical demand moves us away from the resolution of the basic problems that people face daily in Sandzak and that, unless we stop the process of emigration from Sandzak, the demands for the autonomy of Sandzak hills, forests and pastures will be irrelevant. We had a clear vision to keep low profile during the war and do not make radical demands, but to instead focus on the resolution of the basic daily problems in order to keep the people in Sandzak, and at the same time we wanted Belgrade to know that we were not a danger for the state. However, Sarajevo at first decided to demand that the status of Bosniaks in Sandzak reflect that of Serbs in Croatia; then Serbs were expelled from Croatia and Seselj immediately reacted and wanted to know whether we wanted to get the same as Serbs in Croatia. Then Sarajevo supported Ugljanin's demands for special status for Sandzak which in practice meant demanding that Sandzak get independence in everything but the name. During the war I went several times to Sarajevo - as many as six times - and tried to explain that that demand was precisely what Milosevic was hoping for. That was a way to make sure that we as a community were discredited, as that demand could not be realized. It erases the border between Serbia and Montenegro, which objectively and in practice exists, and that demand ignores the fact that in the Serbian part of Sandzak Bosniaks are a majority in only three out of six municipalities, while Serbs are in majority in the remaining three municipalities, while in the Montenegrin part of Sandzak Bosniaks are in majority in only two municipalities, and those two do not border other municipalities with Bosniak majority, while Montenegrins are a majority in three municipalities. In addition to that Bosniaks in Montenegro are not politically organized and gravitate more towards Podgorica than towards Novi Pazar. Politics is not a wish list - to sit down and draw a map of Sandzak and then present that as a political demand for de-facto independence. That demand was assessed as absolutely unrealistic by the international community, it was not supported by anyone in Serbia or in Montenegro, only Sarajevo supported that. When I tried to explain to what extent that was unrealistic, Izetbegovic agreed with me in all details, and then everything continued as before, with the explanation that they have to support the politician with support in Sandzak. Of course they did not pay attention to the source of that support. Ugljanin's support was based precisely on the perceived support from Sarajevo. Every time Ugljanin spent two minutes with Izetbegovic that would be reported by the Bosnian TV, which was watched a lot during the war via satellite in Sandzak and those politicians who appeared in the BHT TV news immediately had 30 to 40 percent of votes because they were perceived as representatives of the authorities in Sarajevo, as Sarajevo envoys in Sandzak. You can work for years, you can have the best political ideas, but in that balance of power you then become a representative of Belgrade, while a representative of Sarajevo is on the other side. In that choice between Belgrade and Sarajevo people always turned towards Sarajevo - they could make any, even the most radical demands, but would regardless get support in the elections. Moreover, Ugljanin then had a special radio program on Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak torn away from the heart. I've heard, but perhaps that is a speculation, that that program cost about $75,000 a year, that someone was given that money, I do not know who, but that is a unique case that a political party has a radio program on the state-controlled radio station of another state. People listened to that for years because they were convinced that this show reflected the official views of Sarajevo with respect to Sandzak.
We are obviously facing a period in which FR Yugoslavia will be thoroughly changed. In this recomposition a breakup of the country is one of the options. It seems that Bosniaks in Sandzak are even today not united and in agreement about the Bosniak interest in this case. Whether that is the survival of FR Yugoslavia, survival of a joint state of Serbia or Montenegro, or whether it is independence for Serbia and Montenegro. According to you, what is the interest of Bosniaks at this moment? Above all, is it possible to talk about identical interests of Bosniaks in Serbia and Montenegro?
Not only is there a lack of consensus but also even a minimum of common interests is absent. On the contrary, these interests are totally different. While Bosniaks in the Serbian part of Sandzak overwhelmingly agree that the survival of Yugoslavia also benefits the Bosniak community, in Montenegro the overwhelming attitude is that the secession of Montenegro is beneficial for Bosniaks. The basic problem is that during Milosevic's rule in Serbia and Bulatovic's in Montenegro repression against Bosniaks in Sandzak was at its peak. At the time of the split in the Montenegrin authorities, Bosniaks turned towards Djukanovic as someone who could effectively protect them from physical persecution and all other modes of repression. Consequently, from the situation in which they could represent a political factor in Montenegro and be the decisive factor in the political showdown between the those Montenegrins who favor independence and those who favor a union with Serbia, the Bosniaks in Montenegro opted for total political assimilation, without getting anything in return. Instead they became a voting block without a political party that could really articulate Bosniak interests.
Do you think that the only way for the political protection of Bosniak interests, for example, in Montenegro, is through a national Bosniak party? Is it possible to protect interests through some existing or new democratic parties?
Political theory does not exclude that possibility. That is a political showdown, a political market and you can fight for the support of voters with a multiethnic party or a national party. However, in the current conditions, when in the Balkans every, even the most miniscule, community has its own national political party, I think that it does not make sense that that whole community goes and gravitates only towards multiethnic parties. We are the only community that supports the multiethnic principle. I generally support the civic state and multiethnic society, and my ministry actually promotes that as a political ideal, but the distance between that political ideal and our current reality is very large. The situation in the field is totally different from our political ideals. In the Balkans we face a problem of alignment of something that is referred to as state identity and these national identities. That is a problem of all ethnically mixed states and I think that we need a moderate political party that would articulate interest of the Bosniak community in Montenegro and could then enter in coalitions according to its interests. That does not exclude the possibility that Bosniaks be officials of other, relatively speaking, civic parties, but why should we be the only community that would at any price, without setting any preconditions and limits, be only in other, civic parties? I think that we should be a political factor that would actively participate on the political and public scene of Montenegro regardless of whether she is a part of Yugoslavia or an independent state.
The referendum in Montenegro is being discussed regardless of whether it will actually be held. What do you perceive as the national interest of Bosniaks in Montenegro?
I think that the survival of some sort of a joint state [of Serbia and Montenegro] that will be internationally recognized, but in which the member states will be autonomous in most of their functions, is favorable for Bosniaks. That is a compromise between the centralized state and full independence of Montenegro. I think that this would be favorable not only for Bosniaks but also for Montenegro as a state. In current circumstances when Montenegro functions as a totally divided society - with two parallel churches, two national academies, with total dualism in politics, public and cultural life, with political options that are more akin to enemies than political rivals, I think that a declaration of independence could create internal problems. This is neither Canada nor Norway so that citizens would accept the results of that vote or referendum even if the victory is by a one or two percents. The results indicate that the winning margin in any future referendum will be very small, and I think that any conflict would be disastrous for Bosniaks because we are weak and unprotected.
I know of many Bosniaks in Montenegro who disagree with you. Their argument is that only in independent Montenegro it is possible to express political and national interests of Bosniaks, because Bosniaks would be protected, if for no other reason than because of their relative numbers...
That is wrong for two reasons. Based on the current degree of organization, Bosniaks will not be a factor either in the independent Montenegro or in a joint state with Serbia. Therefore, based on the current situation they are not a factor anywhere. Secondly, their relative numbers can be relevant both in independent Montenegro and in a joint state with Serbia. If most of state functions are performed autonomously on the state level, they will not in any way be prevented from deciding about most issues and participating in the decision making process proportionally to their strength. That strength is nonexistent at the moment. Furthermore, they can then project their strength on the institution of the joint state, Yugoslavia, which gives us in Sandzak more political influence than we would have without Montenegro and Bosniaks in Montenegro. With their 14.6 or 15 percent [of population in Montenegro], we are in Montenegro a relevant, and on the federal level respectable political force, so that the factor of population size can be important in either case, but only if we are politically organized.
The first concrete and, if you allow me, historical achievement of your political engagement is the fact that the political structures in Serbia have for the first time in history recognized the national name of the Bosniak community in Serbia, which will be legalized in the forthcoming population census, which has been postponed. You were very firm and threatened to resign...
The forthcoming population census was supposed to be held between April 1 and 15 and immediately before the planned start of the census I received a form which did not include the term Bosniak, but instead the old one, Muslim. It included Finns, Norwegians, Germans and Canadians, ethnic groups that haven't been spotted in large numbers in this area, but there were no Bosniaks. Therefore, all of us who would have registered as Bosniaks would have been lumped together as "others", as Eskimos [every population census in the former Yugoslavia registered some Native Americans and Eskimos, typically individuals who chose this way to protest the pervasive insistence on ethnic classification of the population]. I said that I could not be a member of the government that does not recognize my existence. I told that to president Kostunica and he, indeed, was the first politician who said that we had the right to choose a name for ourselves, that we had the right to our own name as no one had the right to deny us that. He spoke about Bosniaks as a community that lives in FR Yugoslavia in his public appearances. The population census was postponed until next year, and we organized within the ministry last week a round table discussion at which we discussed demands of numerous minorities to be either deleted from the registry or introduced in the registry or renamed. Among other, it was mentioned that Bosniaks should be given the opportunity to declare themselves as Bosniaks on official forms. That will be the beginning of that process that we shall successfully finish and Bosniaks will, nevertheless, be included in that statistical form.
How do you explain the paradox that the biggest opponents of the Bosniak national name for the Bosniak community in Yugoslavia are on the one hand the most extremist nationalist forces in Serbia, such as Seselj and the Radical Party, and on the other hand some Bosniak intellectuals and organizations that want to keep the old imposed name Muslim...
In Serbia there is more-or-less consensus among Bosniaks and some of them will declare themselves as Muslims, but that will be a small minority. In Montenegro the most recent polls indicate that about 40 percent of Bosniaks declare themselves as Muslims, 39 percent as Bosniaks, and there are also those who declare themselves as Montenegrins of Muslim faith. That is the reflection of the maturity of a nation, a nation in Montenegro and at the same time the consequence of the fact that certain groups and individuals in Montenegro are given too much space in the local media to publicize the name Muslim. We must draw attention to that fact, but at the same time that is a warning to us that we must work with those people and explain what that means and what will be the consequences if some of them declare themselves as Bosniaks, some as Muslims and some as Montenegrins. That is not a problem of a state as much our own problem. I think that Sarajevo, the institutions in Sarajevo, should do all they can to draw attention to this problem, especially before the forthcoming population census, and to make sure that as many Bosniaks as possible declare themselves as what they, objectively, are, and to prevent the dissolution of that Bosniak tissue, especially in Montenegro.