by Academician Muhamed FILIPOVIC
The public was intrigued by these negotiations partly due to the fact that I, on behalf of the Bosniak side gave a detailed report to the at the time leader of the HDZ BH, Stjepan Kljuic about the negotiations and thereby indirectly included him in the negotiating process. Stjepan Kljuic is the only one among the current and former significant factors of the Croat policy in BH, and he was a political leader of Croats and the president of the HDZ between 1990 and 1992, when he was by force pushed out from the position of the political leader of Croats by Boban's mafia, based on Tudman's orders, who was a strong representative of the city based culture and tradition of Bosnian Catholicism and Croats. That was the tradition of links with Bosnia as their only homeland. As he could not be broken and won over for Tudman's anti-Bosnian policy, he was brutally expelled from it, even by death threats, which, as we today know, were serious. It is interesting that Alija expelled exactly this Croat, the only significant and needed one, from the Presidency, totally illegally and based on Boban's instructions. At the time Izetbegovic was dealing with Boban regarding the fate of BH and our people.
At the time Kljuic did not take a stand on the agreement. That was not possible, as the agreement hasn't been fixed and everything was still in the stage of intentions and drafts, and presentation of reasons that made the negotiations necessary. He acknowledged the information and warned about some problems regarding the Serbs. TV Sarajevo requested that two members of the negotiating team make an appearance in a very popular show, hosted by at the time very popular anchor of political TV shows, Dubravka Kenic, who was very well paid at the time. The members were supposed to provide information about the flow and possible results of the negotiations. Until today I haven't found out why Adil Zulfikarpasic and Nikola Koljevic were selected for the show.
The show was broadcast at prime time, at 8pm. After the introductory part of the show, in which the host explained the topic, when the two guests, Zulfikarpasic and Koljevic started explaining in front of the cameras in the studio the reasons for the holding of negotiations, there was a surprise. Someone brought a piece of paper in the studio and handed it to the host. She took a look at the paper and turned white in the face. She immediately read the paper on the air. It was a fax from the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) headquarters. In that fax, the SDA, actually its leadership, stated that it did not recognize any negotiations, that it did not support any negotiations, that the SDA not only was against any specific solutions regarding Serb-Muslim relations, but that it actually opposed the very idea of an agreement. The SDA was against the idea that some sort of a Serb-Muslim agreement should be made. The documents also included several phrases about their refusal to make agreements behind the back of their political partners from the HDZ etc.
None of us could guess at the time, and unfortunately that did take place, that the cause of this impolite, illogical, absolutely politically harmful and every condemnation worthy action was the product of the party oligarchy that had from the start and in all matters the decisive influence in the SDA. I personally did realize to a certain extent that the goal of this "coup" was to push Izetbegovic in the position of the man who deceives his partners. I had an unpleasant experience from the time of the formation of the SDA. The party wanted to demonstrate that Muslims had got in the SDA, if they voted for it in the forthcoming elections, a political force that would be able to efficiently protect every future attack and an attempt of massacre of Muslims by organizing a big gathering of Muslims at the spot of their biggest suffering in WWII, in Foca on the Drina river.
A day before the big rally, we were guests in Odzak near Ustikolina, in the house of Halidbeg Cengic, one of most respected men in the region and an heir to the very distinguished bey [Muslim feudal lord] family Cengic. His son Hasan was a defendant in that shameful trial in 1983 together with Izetbegovic. In a new and beautiful house, built in the Bosnian style, Adil Zulfikarpasic, Alija Izetbegovic and I stayed in rooms that were next to each other. As I have always had trouble sleeping when not at home, at least during the first night, I lay that night for a long time, read a book that I had deliberately taken with me on that trip and waited for the morning. My peace was, however, soon disturbed by a loud and heated discussion in the neighboring room, in which Izetbegovic was staying. Based on the voices, and especially from the voice of one of interlocutors, I realized that the discussion was between Hasan Cengic and Alija Izetbegovic. My attempts to ignore the conversation were disturbed by the heated nature of the discussion, as well its content. Young Hasan Cengic was sharply criticizing Izetbegovic for agreeing a day before that Muslims lay wreaths on the grave of Serbs slain by the NDH [pro-Nazi Croat state during WWII] regime, i.e. Ustashe [Croat pro-Nazi movement from WWII]. From the content of the conversation I realized that Hasan Cengic was calling on some authority that is above both him and Alija Izetbegovic, as well as obligations Izetbegovic had, which, in my opinion, were not at all in accordance with the fact that he was now a president of a big political party and was responsible for his work only to our people and people who have elected him to that function, respectively. Every other and possible previous links with some other organizations or some sort of discipline in thinking and actions, after the founding of the SDA and the election of Izetbegovic for its leader, could not be significant at all after that. I realized that Hasan Cengic was following some sort of conspiratorial logic that had no relation with normal and modern political life. He respected some sort of conspiratorial spirit and loyalty to all of us unknown subjects of some to us unknown organization, instead of responsibility towards the party whose senior officials they were and our people.
We had a war as a consequence. Badinter's Commission could not act in that case, so that we paid for that war. The proposal had profound effect. It initiated a big political crisis. We tried to find a way out of that situation by seeking compromise between the demands for the enactment of a Referendum Law and some solution that could be accepted by everyone, in the situation when every more radical view was leading directly towards a conflict that would not have limits and could take the country into a catastrophe.
An ad hoc commission was formed in the Parliament. The task of the commission was to try to find a compromise between two totally opposed views, those of the SDA and the SDS. The commission worked on this problem for two days, all the time being engaged in discussions and trying to align totally opposing views. In this episode, together with the colleague Prof. Dr. Ivo Komsic I had the role of those who were supposed to try to formulate the views so that both sides could be satisfied with them without bringing into question the survival of the Parliament and the legality of its work, and without provoking an outbreak of total chaos in the whole political and state system and war, as its logical consequence. I worked on this issue together with colleague Komsic and with full cooperation of leaders of all parties (at the beginning of the work we demanded that because of the importance of the issues that would be addressed by the commission, all leaders of parties with representation in the parliament take part in its work, which they did). Thus both Nijaz Durakovic and Rasim Kadic and one of the leaders of the Party of Reformists, Sejfudin Tokic, were very helpful in attempts to find a solution for the dispute. After two days of tiring discussions it seemed that we have found a compromise solution. The solution was based on the compromise that a referendum be held everywhere in the country and with the participation of all of its citizens, but that the question in the referendum be formulated as choice between several possible solutions for the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina rather than a simple choice for and against independence. Such a referendum could be accepted in the Parliament, it could be totally legal, as all ethnic groups living in the country would participate in it, but it would not automatically lead to the separation of our country from Yugoslavia. Rather it would provide a snapshot of the opinions of our citizens on that matter. That would make it easier for the parliament to make decisions and do that with more legitimacy. Finally, on the second day of talks, late at night, we reached a solution that was acceptable even to until then totally opposed Alija Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic. It seemed that our efforts were fruitful. Of course, representatives of all other parties, the HDZ, the SDP, the Reformists, the MBO, the Liberals, the Civic Democratic Party, and even the Serb Renewal Movement, supported that agreement. They all welcomed the text with relief, especially as the two main opponents had no objections to it. We proposed that the text of the compromise solution be immediately signed, that a public statement be released, so that at that time very concerned Bosnian public could finally sleep peacefully. Alija Izetbegovic said that he agreed with the reached solution, but he proposed that we do not sign it immediately and wait until the morning when all of us would be rested and fresher. Finally, we found a compromise solution, all of us can be relieved and take a break and sign the document the following morning and publish it. We were all very tired and very few of us were aware of Alija Izetbegovic's habit to leave every decision, especially the important ones, for the next day. The reason for that most likely was in his obligation to discuss every such decision with the circle of his closest friends and get their support for it. Indeed otherwise it is impossible to explain such behavior.
All of us, anyway tired from two days of discussions, accepted his request and calmly went to our homes. The next day at nine in the morning, Alija Izetbegovic calmly, as if nothing had happened during the past two days, said that he withdrew his acceptance of the compromise solution and that the SDA demanded that all of us take a stand for or against its proposal. Nothing else could be done. Karadzic and other Serbs were very angry, protested, and finally left the gathering frustrated, with threats on departure, and the rest of us were pushed against the wall and forced to accept the solution that seemed very risky. However we did not want, in the current situation, to endanger very little agreement that existed regarding some main issues in the Parliament of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the political life of the country. Thus there was a rift regarding the Referendum Law. On the one side all Serbs, the SDS and the SPO, and on the other side everyone else, i.e. the SDA, the HDZ, the SDP, the Reformists, the MBO, the Liberals, and the Civic Party. The ground was set for the infamous session of the Parliament of Bosnia-Hercegovina at which Radovan Karadzic, on behalf of the Serbs, issued his infamous threat: "If you enact this law and take us out of Yugoslavia by force, you risk a war in which Bosnia-Hercegovina will disappear as a state, and Muslims as a nation". The scene was set for the war, and the only unknown was when it would start.
When it became absolutely clear that a war would have to happen, and I kept warning about that, especially after the well known so-called wedding procession incident in the center of Sarajevo, actually a hooligan and senseless murder of a Serb, a very tense situation ensued. That event was interpreted as an attack on Serb sacred symbols, as well as evidence that Muslims are totally intolerant of Serbs, to the extent that they cannot tolerate a Serb wedding procession and the Serb national flag, and that it was impossible to continue living together with them. Therefore, in order to respond to that event, the Serbs conducted a demonstration of their readiness for war and set up a blockade of the city. The city was cut in half and totally blocked. Serb paramilitary forces appeared in the streets, took control of all the strategic spots in the city and blocked all traffic and all the life in the city. A big crisis followed. The government did not dare use police in order to establish the essential order. And it also did not dare take up the Serb challenge and enter the war that the Serbs were hoping for. The way out was found in an intervention of the Yugoslav People's Army, to which Izetbegovic agreed after a staged conversation in front of TV cameras, directed by Goran Milic, with the then commander of the Third Army District General Milutin Kukanjac and the leader of the SDS Radovan Karadzic. It was a TV agreement between Izetbegovic and Karadzic that Kukanjac's forces take control of order in the city and that sentries and barricades be removed so that normal life can be reestablished. With that action, the Serbs actually tested the readiness of government forces to offer resistance.
Nothing in the country was functioning. The government was almost totally paralyzed, the Presidency was also facing total paralysis. The Parliament was not in session, so that the state actually did not function at all. Only Izetbegovic thought that if he was working the state was working too. I contacted the then president of the parliament Momcilo Krajisnik with the request to convene a parliament session. He was working in his cabinet and hadn't left the parliament as most other Serb representatives. I had a conversation with Krajisnik around March 15. Two days after that meeting, Krajisnik invited me to his cabinet in the parliament building. He did not talk at all about convening a parliament session but started very excitedly saying that the extremist forces in the SDS had made the decision to get going, which meant war. He told me that he personally did not support that, although the Serbs have been fully prepared and have the assistance and everything that is needed for a successful and long fight. They had secured assistance from Serbia and from the Yugoslav People's Army, and we would not have any support and assistance apart from possibly verbal support. He demanded from me, as he knew that I was both a Bosnian and Muslim patriot, to try to prevent the war together with him. He wanted from me to immediately go to Izetbegovic and propose to him to meet with Radovan Karadzic. I took his words very seriously. I am convinced that he was neither playing a game nor making some tactical maneuvers. Rather, facing war as an unavoidable consequence of his policies until then, he prevaricated and decided to try to find a way out. That is why I immediately went to the Presidency building and asked to be seen by the president of the Presidency at the time, Alija Izetbegovic. I encountered in his office Ms. Berberovic, president Izetbegovic's daughter, who was at the time the chief of staff for her father. I told her that I had come regarding a very important and urgent business in connection with war and peace and that I needed to immediately talk to the president. She was very polite, but she told me that the president was not in his office. He was at some meeting and she did not know when he would come back. When I said that I would wait for him, regardless of how long that may take, she deflected that proposal by saying that I should leave her my telephone number and that she would call me as soon as the president came back. I could not refuse that proposal. I gave her phone numbers in the part headquarters and at home, where I intended to spend the rest of the day. I awaited a call for the rest of that day, but it never came. The following day I again went to Izetbegovic's office and saw Ms. Berberovic. She was again very polite and told me that she regretted everything but that the president had returned very late. She told me that he was again very busy that day and that I should be patient, as they would call me as soon as he was able to see me. There was no call that day either. The following day I did not want to go back to the office only to be politely refused but, because of the importance of the whole issue I asked the secretary general of the MBO at the time, Ms. Salih Foca, to go on my behalf. The same thing happened. We tried again the following day with identical results. I drew from all of this the conclusion that Izetbegovic did not want to see me and told Krajisnik about it. He expressed regret and parted with me, somehow more finally than before. To my question why such a formal farewell was needed, since we would continue to live in the same city and in the same world, Krajisnik responded by saying that soon there would be two worlds in Bosnia.
I found Izetbegovic's behavior rather mysterious, so that the first time I had a chance, in the middle of the war, in Geneva, I asked him why he had not wanted to see me, although he knew that it had to do with a message from Krajisnik and that it was a very important business. He told me that he had no idea what I was talking about. I told him that if that was true, then his daughter had never told him and consequently had decided in a very important state matter. I told him that now he could see that I was right from the start, when I had claimed that he had made a mistake by placing his daughter between himself and the public.
The war immediately showed its horrible characteristics. It was obvious that the destruction of Muslims as the most numerous group in the country was among the goals of the aggression; the plan was apparently that those Muslims who survive should be transformed into a religious minority without any national and political status and rights. In that situation it was of utmost importance to call a session of the parliament as soon as possible, so that it could take the necessary measures for the continuation of legal work of the state institutions. As the parliament had been paralyzed for a while, I demanded that it convene. I went to the TV Sarajevo studio and asked from the editor-in-chief of the main news program, Senad Hadzifejzovic, to allow me to appear for two minutes so that I could appeal to the representatives to immediately convene in the Parliament building in Sarajevo. That took place on April 4, 1992, just before the outbreak of the war. The parliament could not stay outside of the dramatic events at the time. At the session that was called for April 6, 1992, we did not have a quorum for a legitimate session, above all because some representatives of the SDA failed to show up. The session was attended by all the opposition representatives, most of the HDZ representative and about a half of SDA representatives. It was interesting that several SDS representative also showed up (Ljubo Bosiljcic and a few others). However, despite the efforts of Avdo Campara the secretary of the parliament, who sometimes managed to miraculously find legal basis for certain solutions, it was impossible to find a quorum. We then agreed to make a joint statement in which we pointed out the aggression on the state and proclaimed that the parliament was still in session and adjourned until April 8. In the meantime I visited Alija Izetbegovic in order to point out to him that it was wrong that the parliament was not working and that it was important that exactly then representatives were in Sarajevo and participating in the work of a session that would be legitimate. I found him in the building of an almost empty presidency. He was totally resigned. It seemed to me that he really had not expected that the war would start. I managed to convince him that the parliament had to find a solution for legal and legitimate work and that that was of utmost importance at the time. I encouraged him by telling him that we had constitutional and international law on our side, and that we would somehow create the power to back up that law. I pointed out that we were recognized by the world, while Karadzic and Milosevic were merely aggressors and criminals, and that that would be decisive sooner or later.