by Sacir FILANDRA
Instead of lounging under Hercegovina sun, which is these days scorching soldiers of numerous and ethnically diverse Stabilization forces and officials of the international community, from intelligence officers to financial exerts, the newly elected leaders of the Federation institutions are sliding from one end of an armchair to the other. Of course, in their cozy, big, plush and safe offices. They do not communicate with the rebellious province, which western Hercegovina indubitably is, even in the manner practiced by Roman emperors.
Roman lesson: Emperors first sent envoys to rebellious and unsuitable regions, and then soldiers. Of course initially the citizenry, residents and subjects of the holy empire were informed about their new ruler. In the ancient Rome, it was the custom to inform the public about the appearance of a new ruler after every change on the throne. For that purpose they used specially prepared portraits of the new emperor, which would be produced in as many copies as needed to send the image of the new ruler to all bigger settlements in the empire (just imagine the effort needed to produce so many portraits without a printing press!). The image would then be hung in a visible, highly frequented and central spot, so that the subjects would get a chance to get to know their new ruler and know how to properly behave towards his authority. That means of communications was used to announce the arrival of new authorities.
In all of this, it is interesting that that Roman custom became an organic part of the Byzantine culture. The expression of authority via image was adopted from the Byzantine Empire by the rest of the Eastern Orthodox world, and even communism, which was essentially also based on ancient Eastern Orthodox Christian principles. Consequently, our offices were always adorned by images of the one, only and adored Tito. Of course, the world of western culture and its democratic tradition took the rights of individuals expressed in a constitution for the paramount authority, and consequently ended up with a completely different political iconography.
We do not claim that the new authorities should have sent images of new leaders to the provinces, as these leaders are not exactly new, nor are they really impressive leaders, but we do believe that the behavior of the new authorities in to all of us well-known recent events in Mostar and western Hercegovina is extremely irresponsible, politically harmful for everyone and highly risky. State and Federal institutions are mostly silent, and are communicating with statements, qualifications, and condemnations. It is highly irresponsible and inappropriate for the situation, and also for their obligations.
Local is the best: Bosnia is passing through critical phases of its post-war consolidation, and perhaps these moments are the most critical regarding its future. Let us not fool ourselves that "They", Americans, foreign soldiers, and officials, will solve this. We must be aware that "They" can neither do that nor do they know how to find a long-lasting solution, nor is that their job. This is our, rather than their, home. We are supposed to resolve our problems with our neighbors. A dispute between a husband and a wife can be dealt with with the help of friends, and even temporarily put under control, but spouses live together and must ultimately resolve their issues. Bosnian nations live together, literally in the same bed. No one from outside can resolve their problems. The outsiders can only help.
Numerous solutions offered by the international community are of doubtful utility and are mostly short-term solutions. In most of their work the most important issues are photo-ops, media presentation, pacification of problems, and very frequently true causes of the crisis and factors leading to it are ignored. If the western institutions ever (we hope they do) conduct an analysis of the intervention in crisis situations, that pragmatism and, conditionally speaking, superficial approach, will certainly become obvious. Especially if they conduct comparative analysis, and ask the objects of the intervention (that would be us, without doubt, for many years now) for an opinion. Simply, one needs to be aware of the limits and generally achievable goals of these interventions; they should be approached in a rational and normal manner, instead of in the way that is here repeated again with the new authorities, when the international factor is left to deal with the crisis on its own. We must be realistic and admit that they cannot do that, nor should they. That is the job and task for the local forces.
In that sense, it is necessary to put emphasis on domestic factors. Everyone who feels slighted or criticized by this analysis would say that it is easy to "sell advice" and that he has had enough of that. For starters, it is possible to visit the crisis region, western Hercegovina, establish communication with the "other side", regardless of its arguments, and in a sober manner and with political means manage the crisis, with the goal of eliminating its causes and hot spots with political means. Perhaps the "other side' has arguments that can be defended and must be accepted, if not in full, then at least partially. It is important to prevent the escalation of the crisis and tension, which has definitely already been done by the actions of the foreigners, in order to set up a basis for dialog. The solution of the whole dispute by force, punitive expeditions, and torture, can only produce short-term results. That can perhaps satisfy the international factors but does not bring anything good in the future to us, who live here. Have we not witnessed negative results of such behavior before and during the war?
The other problem regarding the events in Western Hercegovina is the insistence on involvement of only ethnic Croat local officials in the whole event. According to good old communist habits, essentially hypocritical and resulting in catastrophic consequences, Croats are left to deal with "nationalism in their own ranks", securing thereby a career for themselves in a desirable political atmosphere. The whole job with the Croatian component of the HVO, which is the center of the crisis, at least according to the reports and analysis of the media, had been shoved on the back of Minister Mijo Anic. Perhaps others are also working, it is certain that they also work, but based on the old communist habits, Anic is pushed to the foreground. It is obvious, at least according to the media, that that man, even though he has taken responsibility for a historic job for Bosnia, feels rather lonely. It is not his duty to on his own clear roads for a democratic solution of the Croat question.
That Croat question is also Bosniak and Serb, and above all a Bosnian question, and participation of all our forces is necessary in it, as it is obvious that Croats can not resolve it on their own, nor should they do that without the participation of others. If that is a democratic question, and it is certain that it is, then it is a question that touches all of us. Ideally, those disputes should be resolved by Bosniaks, rather than by Croats. Of course Bosniaks who would work based on the law and principles of democratic solution of crises. And if one works according to the law and protocol that applies to the contemporary world around us, then ethnicity does not matter. Consequently the man trying to resolve that does not exclusively have to be a Croat as in this case. Such approach has not so far given long-lasting results.
Hypocricy of the capital: Bureaucratic management of the crisis and general reduction of state business to protocol activities in the capital (which is more or less all that the new authorities are doing) is not much of an improvement with respect to the previous relations between the center and the provinces. We were right to criticize Izetbegovic for never visiting the part of Bosnia referred to as the Republic of Srpska. We interpreted that in his narrow interpretation of Bosniaks and Bosnia in relation to his personality, but we hoped that that type of political irresponsibility has become a matter of the past with his departure from power.
We expected more from the Alliance officials in that respect. At least they portrayed themselves as different and got their right to rule based on that concept. The reduction of the Bosnian idea to the Sarajevo region, which is consciously or unconsciously also actively supported by a part of the international community, and which purported defenders and advocates of the Bosnian idea, steeped in daily pragmatism and their own comfort, are also inheriting and practicing, is leading to unnecessary centralization of the state. This may lead to the syndrome of Sarajevo-centrism, the refusal to recognize deep divisions and conflicts in the Bosnian society and constitutional and ethnic complexities of the Bosnian state. In such a situation, which could become the result of the lack of communication between the center of the state and its parts, the idea of statehood could boil down to the international community and its measures. Until we see state delegations everywhere between Trabinje, Livno and Velika Kladisa, there are reasons to fear such a negative outcome.
It is not enough to enact laws. It is much better to create a political and social climate in which those laws are accepted and implemented. Every law, in order to be self-sustaining and applicable, must secure at least minimal acceptance by all. Otherwise, the force of law would not give any results. In conditions in which in one part of the sate we have all elements of an armed rebellion, disobedience and anti-constitutional behavior, special police forces cannot resolve the problem, although they can quiet the things down. The essence of politics is the skill to present and achieve one's own goals through dialog. A resort to force is an admission of defeat. One should not nurture illusions that the west Hercegovina crisis can be resolved in a few days, but it is necessary to express readiness to resolve it with domestic forces and political means, regardless of how long it takes to find a solution. And it will take a while.