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Interview: Mladen Ivanic

There can be no stable government without SDS

He is a new favorite of the West, perpetual candidate for the Prime Minister of the Republic of Srpska (RS) and president of the second strongest party in the smaller BH entity. He is also one of few Serb politicians who participated in the conference marking the fifth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Can there be a government in the RS without the SDS? Is the name of the Republic of Srpska questionable or does that apply to the decision of the BH Constitutional Court about the constituent character of all three nations everywhere in the country? What does he object to Haris Silajdzic? How did the international community assist the election victory of the party founded by Radovan Karadzic? Why did he advocate independence for the Republic of Srpska?

interview by Senad PECANIN

Dani, Sarajevo, Federation Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 24, 2000

DANI: Mr. Ivanic, will you form a government together with the SDS?

IVANIC: It is not news that the international community, and especially the representatives of the US are very clearly warning that the participation of the SDS in the RS government would implicate a significant isolation of the RS. However, on the other hand it is almost impossible to form a stable government without the SDS, because all other options would have to include too many parties, too many political leaders, including of course also the SDA and Mr. Silajdzic's party, and it would be almost impossible for the PDP to enter in coalition with these parties because their fundamental goal, this is especially true for Mr. Silajdzic's party, is the destruction of the entities. Fortunately, it will be not so easy to form a government, and I can still not state specifically what the final solution will be, if the PDP does end up in the position to offer a Prime Minister. I think that in the given circumstances several key people from the international institutions and political institutions in the RS will have to sit down and very openly and clearly say what possible consequences of different options are. Therefore, I think that the process of the establishment of the new RS government will take longer than is thought at this moment.

Were you surprised by the results of the elections in the RS?

Not too much, although I expected that the SDS would win less votes. Perhaps the biggest surprise is the pretty decent support of the citizens of the RS to smaller parties. As far as the PDP is concerned I expected perhaps two representatives more than we shall actually have, which indicates that our predictions were essentially good. We've achieved what we set out to do. We have become, when everything is taken into account, the second party, both in strength, support and the number of votes.

How do you explain big support of voters for the SDS?

I see two reasons. One is that the present government produced such conditions that it simply affirmed the opposition and its only opposition in the RS was the SDS. There was a lot of arrogance, a lot of talk about big results, there was too much emphasis on the preservation of power, instead of on concrete results. The attacks on the SDS also provided a lot of "assistance". I am referring above all to the Mr. Holbrooke's demand. All of that was empty talk... I did not understand the purpose of that story if immediately it was clear that there would be no ban. I am myself against a ban and think that it does not make any sense to discuss that. Secondly, I think that the publication of the ICG report on war crimes was also a sort of promotion for the SDS as well as Mr. Silajdzic's statement that the time has come to abolish entities, and the lack of international reaction to that statement.

It is interesting that you believe that the International Crisis Group report assisted the SDS. Does that mean that the majority mood in the RS is still such that a publication of names of persons accused of committing war crimes is a plus for a political party?

I would not say that it is a plus, but it is true that it is not known whether those allegations are true or not. Consequently the publication of the names without any reaction simply formed the impression that the purpose of everything was simply to attack the SDS. In such conditions the object of the attack tends to garner sympathies and always gets some support.

How serious are the warnings, even open threats, above all of the American administration, as well as others, that the RS would pay dearly if the SDS participated in the government?

These views are well known and have dominated the international institutions for more than three years already. I take them very seriously and do not intend to underestimate them. It is obvious that the international community is at a sorts of the crossroads after big expectations regarding these elections. It is also obvious that the international community has not obtained the results it expected and interpreted in the context of the whole region. I think that we shall have to conduct serious discussions with the representatives of the international institutions regarding the goal in Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH). There can hardly be a stable government in the RS without the participation of the SDS, but it is obvious that the principled implementation of the election results, which would be normal anywhere else in the world, is literally impossible in our conditions, because it would imply a strong reaction against the RS and I do not think that that is in the interest of the RS.

Would you care to comment on the election results in the Federation?

I think that everyone expected that both the HDZ and SDA would fare worse, that Mr. Silajdzic's party would not do as well as it did, and that the SDP, NHI and a few other parties would do much better. For me the results were not that surprising, because if one carefully examines the degree of homogenization around national parties, it is reflected in the results. The homogenization of Croats, around the HDZ, is the strongest. Then, if you consider the SDA and Mr. Silajdzic's party, that were until recently coalition partners, that block has also received more than 50 percent of Bosniak votes. Finally, there is, of course, the SDA. Therefore, there are no big differences in the degree of homogenization. I made a correct prediction of the results. Therefore, I am not surprised, but I think that the international institutions are in shock because they expected significant changes, at least in the Federation.

I do not understand how you, as an intellectual who is not tied by most of the public in BH and the international representatives to the nationalist option, can be against the decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constituent character of all three nations everywhere in BH?

I am not against the decision. I am against euphoria that followed in the wake of that decision and expectations that BH can now be totally refashioned with total disregard of the Dayton Peace Agreement. I always advocated that members of different ethnic groups, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, should have equal rights and live normally. I also believe that the RS must secure equal rights for Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Of course, all that implies certain adjustment of the overall political system in the RS and in BH, but I am against the tendency to abuse that decision and claim that the RS should be abolished, that there should be no entities, that the principle "one parson- one vote" should be affirmed, as I believe that in our circumstances that principle is not realistic. Therefore, here we must find a way to make sure that each nation feels secure, and that is a matter of agreement, rather than euphoria.

It seems to me that this is something new. I haven't heard you say something like this before. Also, I haven't heard any of the prominent politicians in the RS say something similar. Are you aware of the consequences of such attitude? A change of the Constitution that is necessary after the decision of the Constitutional Court brings into question even the very name of the Republic of Srpska, and it seems that this is the most painful for the citizens and political parties in the RS?

I do not agree with that interpretation and do not see why the name of the RS would be brought into question...

If Croats and Bosniaks have the same rights in that entity, how can the name of the RS remain?

The Republic of Srpska is a product of an agreement or a guarantee for the Serb people that it would have its own institutions within the framework of BH. My opinion is that the fact that the RS would treat Bosniaks and Croats as equal within the RS does not imply that its name is questionable. I think that that particular view is another example of the approach that is harmful for the overall relations and that such approach will make it impossible to implement the equality of all nations to the end in the RS. I honestly think that if the name is seen as problematic then it follows that the terms Serb, Serbian and all related terms are offensive to others, and that won't go...

That interpretation surprises me. I do not think that it is offensive, but that simply at that moment it would not be an expression of the constitutional definition of the RS.

I think that in that case the only solution is to call a referendum, and let the citizens decide about the name. I believe that the name of the RS can stay and do not understand why it would have to disappear, because the purpose of the establishment of an entity named the Republic of Srpska was to provide a framework within which the Serb people in BH would have guarantees and security. Now, after that it turned out that the other two peoples did not have guarantees and I think that we should take one step further and the RS should provide those guarantees.

Is the acceptance of that fact also the acceptance of the view that the Dayton Constitution was above all the expression of the moment and the fact that it was necessary to stop the war and that it is necessary to modify the Constitution so that it can on the one hand guarantee equality of all citizens and on the other the functioning of BH as a normal state and a candidate for Euro-Atlantic integrations?

In my opinion, the Dayton agreement above all stopped the war and provided conditions to begin the development of a construction that would allow normal functioning of BH and its entities. I think that the Dayton Agreement was a pretty good solution and that it is not very complicated and that the demands for its modification are simply a way out for numerous incompetent politicians who did not want to use the possibilities provided by the Dayton Agreement and construct a functional and efficient society. After the Dayton Agreement BH politicians continued to wage war using different means and all of them tried to use the possibilities offered by the Dayton Agreement. However, they did not use these possibilities to forge an agreement, but instead to prevent it. One side used its obstruction as evidence that the political system in BH is too complex and that more centralization is needed, while the others strove to turn BH into some sort of a paper roof whose only purpose would be to provide for ever stronger definition of the jurisdiction on the level of entities. In my opinion, the Dayton Agreement provides a decent framework and that there is no reason for any essential changes, because that is likely to open numerous serious dilemmas, especially in the present conditions in the whole region where it is still unclear what will happen with Kosovo, what is the position of Macedonia, and all that can be reflected on the RS. I think that the opening of that topic on the one hand will produce centralization and on the other hand separatism. I believe that there are no conditions for any serious change of the Dayton Agreement because of the environs. The Agreement will be modified in the future but with approval of all three nations. It does not solve anything in BH to impose something on a nation. Moreover, changes in the Dayton Agreement, which was accepted after a bloody war, imply politicians who will agree among themselves to promote interests of all three sides. It is too early for that, there is still too much ethnic tension, and I think that essential changes can not take place unless they are truly accepted by the people, which means that they have to be gradual and come from below. I advocate these principles regarding the Dayton Agreement, because we are now again opening a topic that forces us to fight among ourselves, and we will all end up with bruises after such a fight. We'll lose the decent atmosphere of cooperation that exists in the common institutions and between certain parties in the RS and the Federation. I think that all that can set us back.

You frequently accentuate the need for a decrease of the influence of the international community in the agreements regarding the internal order of BH. I see that at this moment as unrealistic, as I do not see even a minimal consensus for any more serious decisions among the strongest political factors in BH.

That was not present until now among other because on certain sides key political personalities were symbols of the war, I do not want to say whether positive of negative. Because of that, it was theoretically impossible to forge an agreement. Can you imagine someone from the Federation making an agreement with a wartime leader from the RS? Even if this leader were ideal, it would be problematic. Or the other way round, can you imagine a Serb coming to an agreement with a man who is a symbol of the war. Even the best agreement would fail. The recent events in Croatia and Yugoslavia, the creation of the situation in which there are no more enemies in the region, the arrival of a new generation of politicians in BH, are all creating conditions to take into account both interests of entities and individual nations, and the need for BH to function as a state, because that is the interest of all of us, the Serb people and the RS as an entity. If that does not give results, then I am a pessimist. Then we will get either total centralization, which will objectively imply the end of influence of Serbs and Croats in BH, or a break up, and I think that neither of these two solutions is good for BH.

Are you abusing the term centralization for political purposes, having in mind that you are an economist, by applying it to the need to provide BH with a minimum of competencies that appear to be crucial for the establishment of a more competitive BH?

Some can see my use of the term centralization as manipulative, but I truly believe in that. I believe that the principle "one person - one vote" cannot be applied to the political relations in BH.

I agree with you in that, but we are talking about giving greater authority to the central government, such as those that more-or-less exist in every country in the world.

I am fully aware that the central authorities in BH will have to have influence as well as that in the future some decisions will have to be made by common institutions, but I also think that many of these problems can be simply resolved by harmonization of regulations. It is my opinion that, exactly because of economic reasons, prime ministers and the president of the Minister's Council will have to every two weeks regularly meet and to discuss practical problems. I am convinced that such approach could produce much more progress than the continuous battle regarding where certain decisions are to be made, by the entities or the common institutions. At some point we need to make an effort and try to together implement solutions instead of continuously turning towards the representatives of international institutions. Two prime ministers should together with the president of the Minister's Council identify open problems and what each one of these institutions needs to do to have them resolved.

In addition to all the low level dirty campaigning that we witnessed in the recent election campaign, I think that two statements resounded like a bombshell and produced a lot of negative influence on the voters. One was Silajdzic's demand for the abolishment of entities and the other your statement about a possible referendum of the RS citizens regarding the secession and annexation to Yugoslavia...

"It is time for independent RS."

Such a statement could have been expected from someone from the SDS, but not from you, and that was a big surprise.

My statement followed Mr. Silajdzic's statement after about ten days. I publicly demanded from the representatives of the international community to react to that statement and they failed to do so. In those conditions, in fact, there was only one alternative. Either go against or accept that demand as it were, negative and against the Dayton Agreement, at least based on my interpretation of that demand. I totally understand why the SDS did not react - they were afraid of a ban. Mr. Dodik did not react because he was afraid of losing the support of international institutions that allowed him to stay in power, and it was natural that I reacted. My reaction, which, it seems to me, was never correctly reported in the Federation was: to the demand that it is time for BH without entities, we in the PDP respond by saying that it is time for BH without Mr. Silajdzic. That was our first reaction and we said that that decision is not up to us but up to Bosniaks. If the Bosniak people supports such a politician, and if he continues to act and the international institutions continue to ignore that, then one can expect that in the RS someone would demand an independent RS. Therefore, there is a whole series of ifs, and before that there was one sentence that said "It is time for BH without Mr. Silajdzic", i.e. without such ideas. Therefore, my demand was more of a response, a way to politically fight against such an understanding of things and I said myself that I knew that that was not good, but I warned that extremist approaches are not good for BH. A natural reaction to one extremist approach would be an extremist approach from the other side. Even today I truly believe that if someone else's will is imposed on any of our three nations that will only open painful questions.

Do you and your party have ambitions not only in the RS but on the Bosnian level and among non-Serb voters?

You'll see soon that we do have such ambitions. The difference is that the orientation of the PDP will be somewhat different from other parties from the RS until now. We shall target large cities, above all Tuzla and Sarajevo, and will try to develop strong municipal organizations. We have already taken first steps.

I asked you this because the mentioned statement will continue to follow you and will be frequently used and abused as an argument in your political career.

It is very possible that in a large part of the Federation it will be remembered. I do not regret that statement at all. I repeat, I would say the same today. I think that that was a very measured statement. It was a warning and did not call for a referendum at this point, but after a whole series of ifs. Everything else would mean that there is no real answer from the RS apart from statements that Mr. Silajdzic is right, and I do not agree with that. I do not think that his demand is good, and have for a while opposed the view that everything coming from entities is by definition against BH. In my opinion, BH will have a true perspective to survive as a state if it is generous to its citizens. I especially believe that BH cannot promote the classical approach to the state, but I think that the opening of BH towards its neighbors will contribute to its strengthening and create normal conditions, especially among Serbs and Croats.

Do you believe that the question of territorial integrity and sovereignty of BH has been resolved? Do you in any option connect that question with the future status of Kosovo?

I hope that the solution of the status of Kosovo will go in the direction that will not endanger the position of BH. However, if someone opted for independent Kosovo, if Yugoslavia were broken up, I think that that will influence the situation in BH and can open a whole series of painful questions, especially the very essence of BH if the process in Kosovo leads in the direction that is in opposition to elementary principles of functioning in international relations. That is why I think that independent Kosovo opens many dilemmas and I would prefer if that did not happen.

If that does happen, and one can glean from the reaction of the most influential part of the American administration that such an outcome is far from unlikely, what would in that case be your attitude with respect to the territorial integrity of BH?

If that happened, that would really open serious questions about BH. I would again like to say that I hope that that will not happen as it would bring BH before new and big challenges.

It would also bring you before new challenges.

I think that 75-80 percent of inhabitants of the RS would demand in such circumstances to join Yugoslavia. That would objectively create an irrational political atmosphere. I think that Yugoslavia herself and dominant political parties there would in case of a secession of Kosovo demand that the citizens of the RS have the same rights as Albanians in Kosovo and be given the right to self-determination. I think that in such circumstances it would be impossible to stop a referendum on self-determination. In such circumstances we would face a possibility of a new conflict and because of that I would like to warn representatives of international institutions that they have to be very careful with Kosovo.

We frequently meet at gatherings in transition states and I have to admit that that I am frustrated by the degree to which BH is lagging behind even the most backward countries form that list. What are your view on this topic?

I fully agree with you as far as the economy is concerned. At most conferences not a single word is dedicated to the economy. We keep dealing with all sorts of questions of symbolic nature that are very sensitive. A common army, whether entities are to be or not to be, can a republic have its name or not... The key issues are set aside, and BH has left the era in which it could rely on getting significant financial aid. It will not get this assistance in the future and will become dependent on credits, and the fact whether it can return these credits. And our prospects are weak. Most politicians in BH are totally incompetent in that area. If you check the political scene you'll see how many economists are there. If we want economic development, several serious world class investors must come here in the next six months; the key objects, which are everywhere interesting, must be given to the largest and most important world companies; the atmosphere must be totally different. I would like to work on that and spend hours and hours on reaching agreements, rather than on marginal symbolic matters. When BH finds a generation of politicians prepared to turn in that direction, then political tensions will be significantly reduced and we will have the possibility to function normally and adapt both the Dayton Agreement and the BH Constitution to our needs. That is a completely different environment and I believe in such an environment. I want to say that both in the Federation and the RS there are already politicians who are prepared to work in that direction. I am a pronounced opponent of people who keep raising issues that won't feed anyone.


Translated on December 22, 2000
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