Owners of the People

Dani, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 31 1998

On September 12 and 13 1998, the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina will take part in the second general election since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Representatives of the International Community (Robert Berry) expect that the constellation of forces on the Bosnian political scene will significantly change this fall and that a new political realignment will follow. This realignment is supposed to significantly reduce the power of national and nationalist parties. These expectations are exaggerated.

They are the result of a superficial analysis of the events in Bosnia-Hercegovina and a classic example of wrong conclusions based on true premises. Namely, although corruption, failed promises and lies, threatened ownership and personal security, economic collapse and the obstruction of the return of the expelled persons to their homes are the necessary and sufficient reasons to, according to the criteria of the Western political practice, remove the ruling political team by withholding the electoral support, in Bosnia these same reasons are necessary and sufficient to again vote for the parties in power! Although it is difficult to understand that paradoxical masochism, it is there, present as a devilish echo of Communism, as a throwback to the time when it was only allowed, regardless of the desperate reality, to vote for the "reds". A little has changed in that sense.

Today, an average Bosnian citizen is overcome with joy when he reads in the papers scathing criticism of the ruling political oligarchies. His squeezed little heart simply jumps with joy because there are journalists who dare "destroy" Alija Izetbegovic, Haris Silajdzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Jadranko Prlic etc... But even the revelation of highly disgusting facts about the mentioned individuals will not significantly influence his decision to again vote for them. That is the result of non-existent public opinion with the consequence that in practice the writing of journalists has almost no social effect.

Flight From Freedom

Let us recall that the current member of the three-member Bosnian Presidency from the Republic of Srpska, Momcilo Krajisnik, just before the start of the war received a prison sentence because of embezzlement committed together with his political apprentice (that is correct, political apprentice, not a mentor) Radovan Karadzic! Irresponsible biographers of the chauvinist duo from Pale have turned that thieving dimension of their wicked characters into a national myth. In spoken and written tradition of the Serb chauvinist right, Momcilo and Radovan were then sentenced because of their struggle for the Serb cause, and not because of the theft of anational money! At the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, periodical Slobodna Bosna uncovered a huge theft of oil by Krajisnik, Karadzic, Mandic and others, but was condemned in the Serb political, cultural and public circles as an anti-Serb magazine, although the mentioned individuals since a year ago have become official and potential thieves even for a significant part of the Serb public. What else is there to say except that political masochism of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks defies reason?

That servile mentality of the people is an advantage for conservative and anachronistic groups while it is a disadvantage for progressive and anti nationalist parties in their attempt to win power in this country where the exercise of that vice does not compare with that of any other, including gambling, alcoholism and sex! Power is an elixir that succeeds in Bosnia without an exception. Because of its sweet call, even president of the Republic of Srpska Biljana Plavsic turned from a hard-line supporter of new Chetniks into a post Dayton democrat. With the most recent run for a member of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic confirmed that power is more important to him than Bosnia, God, and Bakir. In spite of publicly proclaimed unity of SDA members regarding Izetbegovic's candidacy in September, the number of SDA cadre who are (true, for now only anonymously) prepared to criticize their party president is increasing. These critics believe that another executive political mandate at the age of 73 irresponsibly underestimates the nation and aggravates his closest collaborators.

Silajdzic's Umbilical Cord

Bicakcic's on the whole preserved moral integrity is a solid foundation for a potentially successful future political career. However, since as the Prime Minister of the Federation Bosnia-Hercegovina he is forced to favor the development of that entity on the account of the state as a whole, he does not have a good standing in the refugee population. Bosnian Krajina, namely refugees from Prijedor and its surroundings, can serve as evidence for that. In Prijedor, during the war Serb fascist forces systematically murdered and persecuted non Serb population and many Bosniaks and Croats lost their lives in the concentration camps Keraterm and Omarska. Disappointed with their several-years-long agony (most of them currently live in Sanski Most, about thirty kilometers from Prijedor) they have lost confidence in SDA (although that does not mean that they will not vote for it!?) and on the individual basis they mostly blame Izetbegovic and Bicakcic for their misfortune.

Several refugees from Prijedor confirmed to this journalist that in the last election they voted for the Coalition for the United and Democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina (SDA, SBiH, GDS, and LS) only because of Silajdzic and that they will do the same in the forthcoming election. Thus, Silajdzic has the image of someone who is fighting for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their houses, as one of the rare state officials who understands the essence of Bosnia. That exaggerated confidence in Silajdzic is only a new alibi for Izetbegovic. Silajdzic, although Izetbegovic has again skillfully taken advantage of him by telling him only two days before the public announcement that he (Izetbegovic) remains a Bosniak candidate for the Presidency, demonstrated the worst possible political cowardice by deciding not to break his umbilical cord with SDA, the party whose activists during the previous election campaign [almost] stuck a stake into his head.

Parties in Waiting

This idea, highly unacceptable for the majority of Serbs and Croats in whom their nationalist and chauvinist policies have all but killed the idea of Bosnia, is the corner stone of Izetbegovic's vision for the Bosnian state. Therefore, he sees in the left-wing parties the greatest danger for the Bosniak nation and the health of the nation: "The so-called leftist forces are again trying to dilute this [national] consciousness. They offer salvation in some ill-defined sort of mixing and forgetting. No one has forgotten who he is and what he is. Only we are supposed to do so... They, the leftists and foreigners together, charge: nationalist parties are to blame. Some certainly are, but when the opposition states that in Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, it exclusively has in mind SDA, since neither Lagumdzija nor Tokic expect nor are trying to win Serb and Croat votes, but Bosniak votes that normally go to SDA. That is why they are trying to discredit SDA in all possible ways."

Unintentionally, Izetbegovic has taken a stand on the Bosniak national question, asserting that SDA equals Bosniak nation. With this totalitarian and nationalist rhetoric he has essentially implied that there can be no leftists among Bosniaks, and thus reduced the nation to the theocentric position promoted by SDA. That is nothing but Islamic Communism. However, Izetbegovic, as a president of a political party, has the right to arm his followers with "healthy and progressive ideas" but he has no right to charge that the opposition, if it wins the election, will do all in its power to destroy Muslim authorities. He says: "Fighting for power, the opposition will sacrifice the interests of the Bosniak people." The president of SDA only forgot to mention that everything had already been sacrificed and that his envoy Muhamed Sacirbegovic had signed a legal recognition of the Republic of Srpska ushering Bosnia-Hercegovina, as the most important interest of the people on whose behalf he talks, into an extra-historic phase. Thus, today, the only choice is to build a stable and modern country on the foundation of anti-history.

That is why Izetbegovic's demand for a revision of the Dayton Agreement is a belated geriatric application of personal responsibility. The new Dayton will not happen. Only when those parties that want the state to work in practice and are aware of the essence of the Bosnian state win majority in the Bosnian Parliament, they will enact laws necessary for functioning of the state. Only through such parliamentary procedure, the Dayton Agreement will be truly improved and the ubiquitous term post-Dayton Bosnia will become obsolete since political debate will take part in a normal state, free of myths and any sort of ideological background. But, such parties are still waiting for their turn.