I am State
Dani, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 3 1998
by Esad HecimovicDuring the election campaign for the 1996 elections, Izetbegovic indirectly argued with and raged against Western media and diplomats who criticized the use of military, police and religion for political ends. During the Spring and Summer of this year, Izetbegovic has for the first time publicly argued with the representatives of International Organizations. SDA and Momcilo Krajisnik share understanding for his anger. The election campaign in 1998 is based on the resistance to "the foreigners who appoint their own authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, dislike Izetbegovic because he is a Muslim and SDA because it is a Muslim party" and may temporarily strengthen Izetbegovic's position, but will in the long term isolate the country and people whom Izetbegovic represents in that position.
Momcilo Krajisnik, Serb member of the Presidency, was the first one to express understanding for Izetbegovic's anger and sharp words regarding the "International Community" and NATO provoked by the imposition of sanction against Sarajevo canton and support for opposition parties. On July 20, at a press conference in Doboj, Momcilo Krajisnik expressed apprehension "that the International Community plans to remove national[ist] parties from the political scene in Bosnia-Hercegovina in an attempt to introduce different political forces that would return Bosnia-Hercegovina to the state it was in 1991." "Certain forces have first split Serbs, then Croats, and are now trying to cause divisions among Muslims," said Krajisnik, adding that "the International Community is trying to achieve a utopia in the November elections."
On July 17, at a press conference called by the Coalition for the United and Democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina, Izetbegovic said that it is "very unpopular that a certain political option wins power, or seeks assistance, or metaphorically said, 'air support from NATO' in order to win power. Our people is not xenophobic, but it doesn't like foreigners who appoint authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and doesn't like those parties which seek assistance from foreigners." In later explanations, Izetbegovic tried to dilute the meaning of these statements, explaining that he spoke conditionally, not knowing whether NATO secretary general had supported the opposition parties' Brussels protocol or not. However, Izetbegovic's anger with "foreigners who appoint authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina" was not provoked by the Brussels protocol.
Whom Does People Love?
Previously, on May 8, Izetbegovic told Jacques Klein, deputy high representative for Bosnia-Hercegovina, that "our people loves foreigners as friends; it doesn't like them as mentors; thus, foreigners should not try to behave like mentors. You do not have the right to do that because the Dayton Agreement didn't establish a protectorate over Bosnia, and you are not a protector [sic]." That Izetbegovic's reaction to Klein's interview in Oslobodenje was mostly interpreted as a revolt because of Klein's posthumous praise of Gojko Susak as a politician "who had the power to keep his promises". Klein added that the same "cannot be said for the politicians in this region," claiming that neither in Bosnia nor among the Bosniaks "there are politicians with comparable authority and power". The polemics between Izetbegovic and the Office of High Representative (OHR) quieted down in May with an explanation that Klein's statement reflected his personal relationship with Gojko Susak. That was the time of sensitive negotiations between OHR and Izetbegovic's cabinet regarding the restructuring of the state-controlled media and return of refugees. Both sides needed mutual cooperation, and the clash was quickly forgotten. Sharp words were again said after the dispute regarding the restructuring of BHT [Bosnian state-controlled television] and the appointment of its Governing Board. Izetbegovic's public appearance on July 17 represents the pinnacle of two and a half years of fear in the Party of Democratic Acton (SDA) that the western officials in OHR and SFOR are preparing "the elimination of Alija Izetbegovic and weakening of SDA".Although he didn't specifically name the OHR for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Izetbegovic's anger with the International Community is personified in OHR as the center of all civilian and military efforts for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The institution of the High Representative for Bosnia-Hercegovina was established on December 15 1995 with the UN Security Council Resolution number 1031; the task of the High Representative is to oversee civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. As early as January 1996, the leadership of SDA was alarmed that "the West will spend as much as is needed for SDA to loose the forthcoming elections". "Intelligence data indicate that Karl Bildt hates us and that he will do everything in his power to undermine us," Bakir Alispahic warned the members of the Chief SDA Council on January 27 and 28 1996. Bakir Alispahic, who at the time was the director of AID [SDA controlled "Bosniak" secret service] and a member of the SDA Executive Council, alarmed the Party because of the "intentions of the West in Bosnia-Hercegovina": "The West is not united in its criteria and attitude with respect to Bosnia-Hercegovina. Some believe that the crisis can be resolved through Izetbegovic, as the only person who can control the situation in Bosnia. On the other hand, there are those (and it seems that they are fairly determined in their intentions) who see the solution of all problems in the elimination of president Izetbegovic and weakening of SDA," said Alispahic. For the then leading politician in SDA, "the deployment of IFOR forces is also a part of politics, a part of strategy" whose goal is "the destabilization of, above all, Muslim, Bosniak population, in other words SDA, specifically through actions of various institutions and official bodies".
"I claim that there are tens of thousands of spies in Bosnia: roughly 20 percent of all forces in Bosnia are people who work for various intelligence services. They have very concrete tasks and are trying to fulfill them. A high officer with IFOR has asked recently one of our men: 'Is there a person, regardless of how money needs to be invested in that, who would be willing to found a party that would compete with SDA?' That should be a sufficient signal that the West will spend as much as needed to make sure SDA looses in the forthcoming elections," warned Alispahic. "I ask you: can they come to the building where I work and tell me to move elsewhere! They claim to have the right to do so," said Alispahic. A few weeks later, Alispahic was fired from the position of the director of AID, due to an American request.
110 Dictatorships
Alispahic's warning to the leadership of the party was actually baseless. During 1996 there was no specific strategy for military support to the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. More intensive work on such a strategy within Western diplomatic and military structures, such as NAA - North Atlantic Assembly, began in 1997. In these discussions a strategy for more efficient and synchronized actions of military and civilian organizations was sought. Willem van Ekelen, in his report about the accomplishments of the international intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina, submitted to the sub-committee of the NAA in the Spring of 1997, expressed "concern that both civilian and military efforts in Bosnia cannot reach the root of the problem; as was analyzed by the General Rapporteur for the whole Balkans, the 'unreformed old guard' still controls political and economic rains and all significant information outlets. This 'old guard' remains communist and nationalist. That means that it has a tendency to interpret all problems as 'all or nothing' game or, in other words, that it is incapable to comprehend that compromise can be mutually beneficial. Thus, it cannot accept anything less than the total control and can only interpret democracy as a conspiracy for the benefit of an enemy, no matter who that may be. Unfortunately, the ranks of the 'old guard' are the most significant characteristic of Bosnian political, economic, and social structures, on all levels, among all ethnic groups, entities and communities, among Serbs, Croats and Muslims".Carl Bildt said in these discussions: "Today we have in Bosnia 110 local mono-ethnic dictatorships; they need to be transformed into 110 local multiethnic democracies". Carl Bildt, as the first High Representative for Bosnia-Hercegovina, arrived to Sarajevo without an office, equipment, even a car. The office of the High Representative was slowly developed as the headquarters for coordination of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement implementation, with the full support of SFOR. With the appointment of Carlos Westendorp to the office of the High Representative and Wesley Clark as the top allied commander in Europe, a new strategy for the military support to the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement implementation was established. This strategy took final shape last winter, between the Bonn conference (December 10 1997) and March 1998. The key issue in the Bosnian peace process is how to enable the existence of self-sustaining structures in state authorities and society. The Bonn Conference of the Council for the Implementation of Peace was dedicated precisely to this issue. The list of answers to this problem provided by the Bonn Conference has caused panic reactions among the local authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The hard to swallow answers are open support and assistance to multiethnic parties and increased authority of the High Representative to fire elected officials and even strike down enacted laws. Carlos Westendorp has so far used this authority to prod the local authorities to accept responsibility and initiative and avoid the development of the "dependence syndrome".
"With continuation of progress, I begin to see a point at which the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement will be possible without military support. In order for that to happen, three instruments of totalitarian control - military, police and the media - must be put under control of a legitimate democratic leadership, taken out of party political control and sustained without contributions from illegal funds," Wesley Clark explained to the American Senators. To such loss of control, the "old guard" responded with new "conspiracy theory". In earlier situations, even during the war, Izetbegovic rarely supported various "conspiracy theories". After the sanctions against Sarajevo and the visit of the opposition parties to Brussels, Izetbegovic outlined a "conspiracy theory" according to which "Europe and America do not want us, only because we are Muslims"."They do not want a Muslim party here. That is my conclusion. But even if it were true that Europe and America do not want SDA, it wouldn't be because of our program and actions, but simply because SDA is a Muslim party and they consider it to be a Muslim party," said Izetbegovic.
Public Argument
In the circles of Young Muslims and the founding core of SDA one frequently hears a statement that Europe does not want the integration of Muslim nations and countries: the best example is Turkey. The most recent Izetbegovic's appearance is his first public confirmation that he shares this conviction. The question of religious and ethnic identity is the basis for political homogenization around SDA. Thus, the emphasis on European rejection of SDA just because it is a Muslim party" is at the same time an announcement of the homogenization of potential voters around the issue of religious and ethnic identity, and the expressions of fundamental ideas on which this party is based. Foreign diplomats and analysis do not criticize SDA because it is "a Muslim party". Just the opposite: during the last few years, they have stated many times both in the Western and Islamic circles that SDA is not a Muslim party and that they do not consider it to be such. From the Western point of view, the main objection against SDA is that it "uses religion for national and political ends".From the point of view of Islamic revolutionaries, SDA is not an Islamic, but Bosniak, national party which "subordinates faith to national and state interests". From the point of view of Islamic volunteers and missionaries "SDA is more dangerous for the faith than the Communists, because it only represents itself as a religious party, while it does not develop an Islamic state nor Sharia law". For Western analysts with long experience in Bosnia-Hercegovina, problems of the West with SDA do not originate in "Middle East" but in "Eastern Europe". Thus, it is understandable why Izetbegovic publicly clashed with the "International Community", symbolized in Bosnia-Hercegovina by OHR as the center of all civilian and military efforts for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, only two years after Alispahic's warning about the intentions of the West.
In the last 18 months the mechanisms of control - military, police and the media - were placed under the control of the West. The High Representative completed the establishment of oversight over military, police and the media with the formation of the OHR Commission for the Media and the appointment of the BHT Governing Board. That was an important difference between the elections in 1996 and 1998. During the election campaign in 1996, Izetbegovic also indirectly argued with and raged against the western media and diplomats who criticized the use of military, police, media and religion for political goals. The elections campaign in 1998, based on the resistance to "foreigners who appoint authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, dislike Izetbegovic only because he is a Muslim and SDA because it is a Muslim party", may temporarily strengthen Izetbegovic's position. However, in the long term it will isolate the country and people whom Izetbegovic wants to represent at that position. With such a campaign, in light of the changed relations between main Western and Islamic countries, Izetbegovic would confirm the views of the analysts who explained that his goal is neither a Muslim nor multiethnic Bosnia-Hercegovina but simply to remain in power!
Translated on 11/25/1998
