Requiem for Bosnia
Dani, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 28 1999
by Senad Pecanin, Vildana Selimbegovic and Jasmin DurakovicThe leading Bosniak political party has recently celebrated the ninth anniversary of its founding. Since the health of its leader will decide whether SDA will still be in power next year in time for the tenth anniversary celebrations, an attempt to summarize its rule carries the challenge of an analysis of the eventful and tragic period through which Bosnia-Hercegovina went during the last ten years. The end of Communism, promotion of political organization based on ethnicity, break-up of Yugoslavia, international recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina, aggression and genocide committed against the Bosnian people, defense of the country, attempts to strike a balance between the division and unity of the country, East and West, Serbia and Croatia, totalitarianism and democracy... offer numerous reasons and a lot of material for an assessment of the role of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA)
Problem of Bosnia
"For united and democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina" - that is the name of the coalition centered on SDA and that is this party's publicly declared attitude towards Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, in practice, there are hundreds of reasons and tendencies which bring that goal and program into doubt.All these reasons and tendencies are stemming from one fundamental paradox, which has plagued SDA from its founding and which, perhaps, can be connected with the personal profile of its leader Alija Izetbegovic, who has in the meantime surpassed the framework of a political leader and became an ethnic magus, thereby entering picturesque typology of the Balkan leaders.
Namely, SDA has always, consistently and deliberately tried to avoid clear political definition of its program, trying to reconcile irreconcilable opposites: SDA tried to be partly nationalist, partly religious, and at times even partly a civic political party... However, neither SDA nor its leader ever approached all the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina with equal intentions, convincing clarity and serious determination to lead them towards the establishment of a common state and a commonwealth acceptable to all. That, of course, is not possible if from the start one accepts ethnically organized political life and ethnically based division of power. On the other hand, in our conditions with confused and politically amorphous voting body, that is definitely good for the winning of elections and staying in power, but absolutely discredits the proclaimed goal of united and democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina. It also strengthens the argumentation of those who believe that the "original sin" of SDA is exactly its lack of vision of united Bosnia-Hercegovina and faith in possibility and purposefulness of fighting for that goal.
Evidence
Because of Serb and Croatian nationalist forces within the Communist movement, Bosniaks were decentralized and transformed into an ethnic community between a religion and a nation, which in the early seventies received its official legalization through the proclamation of the Muslim nation with a capital "M". Nevertheless, even is such conditions a part of pro-Bosnian communist movement, which is today posthumously identified with tragically perished (murdered!) Hamdija Pozderac, was successful, unlike SDA, and in certain periods very successful in protection of Bosniak national interests. This claim does not imply that the Communists should be posthumously decorated by "Gold Lilies" for achievements in the struggle for Bosnia, but does emphasize that the past was not, as in already established and official history, black and white, as is unscrupulously and without any critical distance asserted by newfangled interpreters of Bosnia's truths. During Communist times one could discern outlines of pro-Bosnian political and state-making program which, unfortunately, their successors in power did not know, want nor could continue. On the contrary, exactly the rule of declared anti-Communist and national parties speeded up the process of the break up and destruction of Bosnia.The Party for Democratic Action (SDA) was founded on May 26 1990 in Sarajevo hotel "Holiday Inn". Its most prominent founding members were people from the group of the so-called Islamic fundamentalists, sentenced by the Communist authorities in 1993 on long prison terms for "religious and political activities against the regime", and Adil Zulfikarpasic, an experienced political emigrant and the person who promoted Bosniakism abroad as an expression of the national identification of the people to whom he belonged. SDA quickly won the trust of the majority of the Bosniak (then Muslim) people and in the elections held in November 1990 won a decisive victory, while its leader Alija Izetbegovic assumed the authority of its unquestionable leader that he has kept until today. However, then SDA formed a coalition with the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). These three parties together introduced the rule of the so-called constituent nations. It was an unprincipled coalition which prepared the ground for the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina. All of them cared only for their own nation and Bosnia was left to its own devices.
In its political program SDA opted for the preservation and protection of the interests of "the Muslim cultural and historical circle" obviously counting at the time on all the Yugoslav Muslims (in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Sandzak, Kosovo, and Macedonia). From the strategic point of view, SDA and Bosniak intellectual elite opted then for the continuity of the idea of Islam as the foundation of ethnic identification. For some that was a transitional, for others a permanent solution. Opposing them was a minority faction led by Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic, which believed that time was precious and that the Bosniak issue was the most important issue facing the Bosnian Muslims at the time. As politicians with undeniable political experience, obtained by Zulfikarpasic among political dissidents abroad and by Filipovic within the Communist League, they were aware what the question of the Bosniak national identity may mean for Bosnia. These differences in strategy led to a huge conflict within the party at the start of September 1990. Consequently, Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic founded their own political party that took the struggle for the Bosniak national identity as its main goal. This conflict pushed SDA even further from Bosnia and led to the strengthening of the group which preferred in its political activity the idea of political Islam to that of struggle for Bosnia as some sort of a realistic political soil. The seed of quasi-Muslim political and religious ideology that truly developed during the war was as early as then inserted into the political life under the guise of struggle for a spiritual cleansing of the people. The damage caused by such policy is immeasurable. First, Bosniaks greeted the war in a political and ideological confusion which, naturally, stems from the time of Communism, but the policy of the ruling party towards the national identity did increase that confusion. Realizing its error, and spurred by the pressure of the intellectuals, SDA as late as in September 1993 during a session of the Bosniak Assembly reformulated its policy and opted for Bosniakism. However, traces of negative consequences of pressuring of Bosniaks with Islam as the only element of their cultural and historic identification can still be felt and will be felt long time in the future, which leaves space for the doubt that that was a deliberate political project rather than a consequence of the chaotic situation during the war.
Care for the Future of Bosnia-Hercegovina
At the time when it only dealt with itself and learned the ropes of power, SDA made another important strategic mistake: it did not predict the inevitability of the break up of the former Yugoslavia. While Radovan Karadzic at the rostrum in the Parliament threatened that "one people will disappear", Izetbegovic claimed that there would be no war. Neither domestic nor imported. Persistently meeting with the presidents of other Yugoslav republics, he rejected the possibility "of siding with one or the other side in the conflict". When a Serb wedding guest was murdered in the center of Sarajevo Izetbegovic did not hesitate to say "this is a shot at Bosnia-Hercegovina", still deeply convinced that "two are needed for a war". He will be remembered as the last Mohican in the struggle for the preservation of the former Yugoslavia: together with Kiro Gligorov, the president of Macedonia, during one of the last sessions about the solution of the Yugoslav crisis he proposed the idea of a loose confederation. Although during the aggression against Croatia he stated that "that is not our war", in February 1992 when Croats from western Hercegovina blocked the road to tanks of the Yugoslav People's Army in Listica he asked the gathered people: "Who are you going to trust if not me and Tudman?". However, at that time Lisbon maps were already in the making. These maps actually sealed the fate of Bosnia-Hercegovina: all later negotiations only dealt with percentages. Bosnia-Hercegovina was divided in Lisbon.
Preparations for Defense
Although most recent Bosnian history is already showing signs of senility, modern historians agree in one thing: SDA prepared the defense of Bosnia-Hercegovina. True, as late as autumn of 1993, Izetbegovic spoke about self-organized popular defense, but all the doubts were dispelled in the Spring of 1994: SDA appeared as the exclusive founder of all the resistance movements. Actually, both the Green Berets and the Patriotic League have roots in SDA. However, with time, they grew apart. Both from each other and from the party itself.As far as the Berets are concerned, Emin Svrakic, the founder of this organization, likes to say that the organization was established at a meeting in the Police Hall and that first members were recruited among the bodyguards of the president of SDA, Alija Izetbegovic. The Green Berets recruited most of their members in Sarajevo but also had branches in Jajce, Travnik, and in Hercegovina... As far as the Patriotic League is concerned, Sefer Halilovic claims: "On February 7 and 8, 1992, there was a meeting on military strategy in the village of Mehurici near Travnik. This meeting was later labeled as historic. The participants at the meeting included commanders of regional headquarters and the Chiefs of Staff of the Patriotic League of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The goal of the meeting was to coordinate regional plans and issue assignments for the next period. The preparations for this meeting started in 1991 when I sent instructions to all field headquarters: RVS Tasks [?]. That document, among others, set the foundation for the domestic weapons industry. When we met, I spoke about the current military and political situation and assessments and predictions regarding the future strategy. My basic ideas were accepted at the meeting and summarized in the first two articles of the most important document of the Patriotic League: Directives for the Defense of the Sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. My speech and reports of commanders, direct exchange of opinions and intelligence were also included in this document that was completed on February 25 in Sarajevo. I was assisted in the preparation of the document, as well as in the organization of the meeting in Mehurici by advisors Rifat Bilajac and Zicro Suljevic. However, I am the sole author of the Directive: it was distributed as manuscript and was only later typed out and sent to the commanders of regional headquarters".
Both the Berets and the Patriotic League were plagued by two identical problems. One problem was that their weapons were supplied via SDA and were thereby used for the control of these two movements for the defense of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The other problem has to do with their place in history, which was later brought into doubt. However, while the Berets excluded officers of the former Yugoslav People's Army from their ranks and instead recruited, as some liked to emphasize at the start of the aggression, people from different walks of life but without an exception loyal to Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Patriotic League was treated as a military wing of SDA and the first military commanders were recruited there. In Sarajevo the difference between the Berets and the Patriotic League was for a long time described just like that: the first were heroes of the defense, while the others were their commanders. As the war went on, the number of heroes decreased and a similar fate also befell the commanders.
Bosnian Army
Officially, it was founded on April 15 1992. Its first members came from the Green Berets, the Patriotic League, Police, Bosnian patriots... It is easiest and most honorable to recall everything the Army showed during the war. From immeasurable patriotism, over striking courage, to impressive readiness to fight, even though its fighters lacked food, weapons and ammunition. In such circumstances the Army managed to resist double aggression, defend and preserve a decent chunk of the Bosnian land and win victories even in the bloodiest battles. However, it lost perhaps its most important battle: it failed to preserve itself. There are those who even today claim that that is the reason that the victory was not far more convincing. When the aggression started, Sarajevo sang Raise the Flag, Dragan Vikic, and the headquarters of the special Police unit at the Police Hall was swarming with young men who wanted to fight. In that first wave of aggression, the Police absorbed the first attacks and was a link between all other armed movements and groups. Then the Army united all apart from the Police and recruited even today frequently criticized Jusuf Prazina Juka and took on itself also the burden of politics. Maybe because of that the fate of policeman-hero Vikic can be used to illustrate the Army of this country. Roughly at the time when Vikic was dismissed from the Special Police unit, the ideological, SDA halo of the Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina was being completed.Too large an appetite in the directing of the strategy and making of key military decisions, lack of trust in professional soldiers and too large reliance on Izetbegovic's comrades from prison, abuse of SDA and Izetbegovic's authority by military commanders who were later fought by the state as masterminds of organized crime... these were all examples from the fate of the Bosnian Army. Only for a moment it seemed that there was a deep understanding between the president and the Army, but also the realization of the former that the Army of the defenders of Bosnia-Hercegovina was not able to significantly change the military situation. However, then the mass offensive with the goal to break the siege of Sarajevo came. This operation was characterized as the greatest defeat of the Bosnian Army and was followed, as a counteroffensive, by the attack on the Srebrenica demilitarized zone. True, the Bosnian Army is blameless in all of that. The blame should be laid at the feet of the creators of Army's ideological consciousness and conscience who, by building parallel command structures, actually weakened the Bosnian Army. Consider the following example: special and Muslim units had their own supply chain, separate from all the other Bosnian Army units. In practice that meant that they had the best uniforms, accommodation, food, weapons and ammunition. Some claim that they were even better paid than other soldiers. Led by this example, commanders began to compete in building religious schools finding mentors in "proven Muslim circles". "Selam" was made into an official military greeting etc. When the Third Corps marked its anniversary with the Seventh Muslim Brigade in the first row, that was the public promotion of the Bosniak Army. Everything that happened after that is only a consequence of that action.
Human Resources
Both the most ardent supporters and worst enemies agree that Izetbegovic has demonstrated exceptional skill in eliminating possible political competitors: hence all significant individualists were seen off from SDA: Adil Zulfikarpasic, Muhamed Filipovic, Fikret Abdic, Rusmir Mahmucehajic, Haris Silajdzic. Consistently bad choice of people for the important positions and vacillation were actually among the most pronounced characteristics of SDA. A clear principle - between capable and loyal choose the latter - has returned to haunt SDA in the recent years.Actually, the problem arose the moment this principle became universal and began to be applied to all positions. From a receptionist in the Presidency to a writer of a movie script. Political criteria became decisive and of paramount importance, and from that attitude to permanent struggle for the position of "Alija's most trusted assistant" there is only a small step that has been taken by many. This process actually maintains permanent tensions within the party itself, breeds healthy competition and realizes Izetbegovic's purges. At the time when the USA issued an ultimatum demanding the dismissal of Hasan Cengic, he was one of the most influential, most loyal and most trusted Izetbegovic's collaborators. Nevertheless, Izetbegovic's gave him up with noticeable ease. Bakir Alispahic also influential and close to Izetbegovic, was seen off in a similar manner. However, those better acquainted with the circumstances within SDA explain that the difference between Alispahic and Cengic in SDA and the state of Bosnia-Hercegovina is equal to the difference between the American $100 million in weapons and Cengic's $2 billion. That is exactly the epilogue of this affair: Alispahic has dissapeared from SDA, while Cengic remains "right next to Alija" ready for some future clashes. Who else could confront Silajdzic? Since, in spite of everything, Silajdzic is still considered to be the most serious candidate for Izetbegovic's heir on the throne: the number of those who see him as the next leader of all Bosniaks is not small. And he is sufficiently distant from the SDA human resources policy.
Clumsy in Government
Partly by necessity and partly by design, the reliance on the officials who because of the rigidity of the former Communist regime were better acquainted with the functioning of prisons than the state administration meant that the mastering of the art of government has been and remains to be an insurmountable problem for SDA. The state was an unsolved puzzle for the largest Bosniak party even at the time when the world gave it legitimacy to represent the whole Bosnian state, and it is even more so today, when it shares power with Serb and Croat coalition partners, who are still doing all in their power to reduce the jurisdiction of the government in which they participate. The clearest case of the lack of understanding of the importance of preservation of the state and state institutions demonstrated by SDA was the holding of the Bosniak Assembly in 1993, when by the skin of its teeth the Assembly failed to transform itself into a parliament of some new "mini-Bosnia", an ethnic Bosniak state set in the part of the present Bosnia-Hercegovina controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Thanks primarily to Academician Muhamed Filipovic, whose forceful opposition prevented the realization of the already prepared scenario, a potentially biggest trap for the Bosniak people was avoided. This trap had been prepared in the common workshop of the participants in the Greater Serb and Greater Croat state projects, and a part of influential circles in the International Community that saw the solution of the Bosnian problem in the division of the country.The solitude in which Haris Silajdzic and the Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina have been struggling since the signing of the Dayton Agreement for the establishment and functioning of central state institutions, as well as the strengthening of the jurisdiction of these institutions and adoption of state laws, testifies that between the strengthening of the state of Bosnia-Hercegovina and strengthening of its power in its half of the Federation, SDA gives priority to the latter. The best illustration of such orientation is its acceptance of the plan for the establishment of ethnic channels within TV Bosnia-Hercegovina which, unlike open support of HDZ for the same proposal, is not transparent only thanks to the fear of negative reactions by the public.
Ideology
SDA has no ideology. However, here the similarity with modern European political parties, which have substituted former classical ideology by modern political programs, ends. Since its founding until today the leading Bosniak political party has not had a precise and developed political program that would, besides generalized phrases, offer answers to challenges facing the Bosniak people and Bosnia-Hercegovina. SDA's pre-war wondering in the definition of the attitude towards Yugoslavia, inheritance of the Communist period, Tito, Yugoslav People's Army, Serbia, Croatia etc. was substituted by present disorientation in search for a strategy for the reintegration of the country, renewal of its multiethnic character, international relations, return of refugees, intra-Bosniak plurality of interests, desirable type of Islam and the role of the Islamic Community in society, doubts about the demands for secular society, attitude towards the Bosniak anti-fascist movement during WWII, place of Bosnia-Hercegovina in current European and world integrations, privatization, looming social catastrophe... Perhaps some comfort for the party can be found in the fact that the opposition does not differ much from SDA in these respects.
SDA and the Islamic Community
The party has from its founding taken the simplest and shortest path: it identified Muslims as a religious group, and addressed them in that language, symbols of identity, green flags, green head-bands. It insisted on religious address in daily meetings and in general communication. The desire was to represent SDA as the party that guarantees liberation in, according to SDA, previously the most constrained sphere of life: religious freedom. Therefore, the party neglected various aspects of true political freedom, economic freedom, civic liberties and rights, which was later reflected in its political activity. By using religious and ethnic symbolism, SDA managed to gather, identify and homogenize Muslim masses and win [the first free] elections. However, as early as then, it fell into its own trap and tied the Islamic Community to itself and its policy which, to say the least, is atypical for the Islamic tradition in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the party itself a theory has been developed according to which the Muslim society should be constituted as unity of believers, organization of SDA and social-political community, which is actually a totalitarian concept that implies unity of religion, state and politics.
Culture
SDA imposed the concept of newly composed culture. From the very beginning it preferred deformed folklore (Hasanaginica in hundred different versions etc.), fabrication of better past (for example the case Muradbegovic) and populist shows (Hadzihafizbegovic, political-literary-singing gatherings of diaspora). Ajvatovica, the largest political-religious-cultural show is the best example of the imposition of that newly composed culture whose norms are kitsch and superficiality. Being a party of upstarts, SDA suffers from megalomania, so that Ajvatovica, Bulajic's movie and superhuman activities of the Philharmonics are all occasions to enjoy its own, in no way confirmed, cultural "greatness". In such politics, the culture is defined as what is ours, therefore national, therefore religious. Everything else, if permitted, is only there because we are generous and multicultural, but it is not and cannot be ours.The basic goal of this concept is political promotion and achievement of a monopoly in culture. All non-party and insufficiently SDA-affiliated cultural activities are routinely stifled. The only cultural criteria are national criteria.
Foreign Relations
The party for Democratic Action profiled its foreign policy through various phases of relations of the state with the Islamic world and the West. It is true that in spite of everything Alija Izetbegovic managed to ensure more or less continuous support from the United States in addition to precious assistance from Iran in weapons at the critical time when the Western governments refused to provide military assistance and efficient military protection of the state and victims of the aggression. This achievement is in itself a significant success. A possible gain for Bosnia in the West if it was led by a leader unburdened by the weight of (un)founded accusations for pan-Islamism and fundamentalism is offset by the losses in the Islamic world, since the assistance from the Islamic countries depended on their recognition of Izetbegovic as a leader whose policy fits in the flow of the worldwide emancipation of Islam and Muslims. Izetbegovic has persistently been trying to present the successful war time balancing on a tight rope stretching over the abyss between the Islamic world and the West as the doctrine for Bosniak relations with the rest of the world. Political credits given by both sides because of the war in Bosnia and suffering of the Bosniak people are now due for payment. Izetbegovic's attempt to continue with the old strategy of striking a balance between the two sides are doomed to fail. The future profile of the Bosniak national policy (at least while SDA is still a major force on the Bosniak political scene) depends on the decision that the Party for Democratic Action should make soon, while its founder is still alive: which creditor should be abandoned?
Future Chances
SDA owes its power and rule to the unique and undeniable charisma of Alija Izetbegovic in the Bosniak people. Thanks to his lack of readiness to decrease his political involvement before his biological demise, Izetbegovic has turned SDA into a hostage of an ambition to rule until death, characteristic of all Balkan leaders. Thanks to him, the idea, but only an idea, of the survival of united, multiethnic Bosnia-Hercegovina has survived the aggression and genocide against the Bosniak people. Expectations that Izetbegovic could realize that the most he can do for the future of Bosnia is to withdraw from active politics, turned out to be unfounded. Because of that, the sad conclusion that the Izetbegovic's biological demise would give an impetus to the reintegration of Bosnia-Hercegovina equal to that provided by Karadzic's departure to the Hague and Tudman's death is simply true.
Dr. Halid Genjac, President of the Chief Board of SDA
As Alija Says
Dani, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 28, 1999
DANI: Does the Party for Democratic Action share the burden of historic responsibility for the promotion of the concept of political organization based on ethnicity in multiethnic Bosnia-Hercegovina?GENJAC: The events in Yugoslavia, starting with Slovenia in 1991 all the way till Kosovo in 1999, demonstrate that the national question in Yugoslavia was not resolved. Only Serbs were satisfied, since they had established an open or hidden hegemony over other nations. In defense of their dominant position they were prepared to use all means, as the recent events in Kosovo confirm in a clear but tragic manner. Bosniaks (at the time Muslims) were one of these subjugated nations. Because of that, every action, including the action of SDA in 1990, with the goal of correcting that injustice was justified. The Bosniak people, its leadership and SDA do not share the blame for the bloody outcome of the crisis. If you recall, the Bosniak leadership insisted on finding a solution within Yugoslavia, through its transformation that would take into account equality of all nations, including the Bosniak nation. Just read the Political Program of SDA from 1990 and you shall see that our demands were reasonable and moderate. Unfortunately, ethnic selfishness won on the Serb side. They could not find strength to give up their hegemony. The consequences were catastrophic. But, for example, let us suppose that in 1990 SDA did not offer its concept. What would have been the result? There answer is obvious: we would have been a part of the rump Yugoslavia. Karadzic, Maksimovic and Ostojic would have ruled Bosnia-Hercegovina, and I leave it to you to figure out the likely consequences of that. I am not happy with the ethnic division of Bosnia-Hercegovina but, if one considers the recent events in Kosovo, it is obvious that it could have been much worse. It is important that we survived. As long as we are here, while we exist, we shall put Bosnia together.
Wouldn't you agree that your party has from its founding until today been using religious feelings of Bosniaks in the manner unsuitable for modern democratic structures?
You are confusing the issues. We do not use religious feelings of Bosnia. Rather, Bosniaks use their religious feelings in order to know who and what they are and avoid getting lost in space and time.
What, in your opinion, are the greatest achievements of SDA so far?
There are many of them, but for this occasion I would only like to mention one huge "detail": the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
What parts of the program of SDA and its most important political goals have remained unrealized until today? In what fields have you achieved less than initially planned?
That is our ideal of united and democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina. Bosnia is neither united nor democratic, or not yet. With every new day I am increasingly convinced that it will be so in the future. Every event that takes place in this region takes us a step closer to that goal. The most recent events, I am sure you know what I am referring to [the NATO intervention against FR Yugoslavia], are a huge step in that direction.
Do you consider the process of the transformation from an ethnic and religious movement into a modern political party completed?
Of course, that process has not been completed, nor does it have a well-defined ending. The party continuously evolves, together with very dynamic events in this region. SDA has demonstrated capability to successfully adapt to these changes, while holding on to its identity. We do not have a reason not to be satisfied.
Is a multiethnic integration of Bosnia-Hercegovina possible if most of the citizens vote for political parties that represent only one ethnic group?
President Izetbegovic has recently responded to that, or a similar question. He pointed out a realistic chance that Bosnia could live with moderate nationalist parties. That is the reality in Bosnia and we must get accustomed to that reality. An alternative would be some Bosnian nationality. That might be good, if it were realistic. But it isn't. We must talk about realistic options. Therefore, let me be clear: a multiethnic reintegration of Bosnia-Hercegovina is possible even if most of citizens vote for nationalist parties, under the condition that they do not have the destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina in their programs. And such parties already exist (SDA, NHI [New Croatian Initiative], HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], HKDU [Croatian Christian Democratic Party], etc.). Their number will increase in the future. Radical options are obviously loosing support, because they clash with the general flow of things.
Adnan Jahic, writer of programs
Virtuous Spokesperson and Immoral Political Party
Dani, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 28, 1999
Dr. Ismet Grbo, with all limitations inherent in his hyper cautious public appearances, was a better choice than the current SDA spokesperson Adnan Jahic. If this statement is correct, when generalized it can lead to only one conclusion: former officials of the former Socialist Alliance are a better choice for nationalist parties than self-important, archaic and conservative inheritors of the Muslim movement in Bosnia.Adnan Jahic, SDA's official voice should have, at least, stayed in Tuzla. Although, based on objective esthetic criteria, he could be treated as a handsome man, which is an important condition for the function of a political spokesperson, his spirituality is a serious obstacle to the realization of the goals which SDA has at least declared as a part of its program.
What is the problem here?
SDA keeps repeating that it fights for united Bosnia-Hercegovina and with that in mind has even cobbled a coalition together. Of course SDA is lying. Serious political parties never place on forward positions people who contradict fundamental party policies. Applied to SDA, that would mean that a person who is against united and multiethnic state for which SDA is, as like parrots repeat it officials, fighting with all its might, should not be a SDA spokesperson. During the war, Adnan Jahic explicitly advocated a division of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the Tuzla paper Zmaj od Bosne Jahic published an article, and not any article, but a program in which he in a pseudo-philosophical manner explained the need for the establishment for a virtuous Muslim state. This ideal Muslim state would be ruled by educated believers, while the heathen would be somewhere lower on a scale of social values, serfs so to speak. Who knows, Jahic may even introduce the category of atheist serfs who would do the most difficult and dirty jobs for agas and beys [Ottoman feudal lords]. That is implied by his suffering piece.
Well now: we would not bring up that episode of SDA Family had not Mr. Jahic been appointed a SDA spokesperson. Since he assumed that important function he has never, in no way and to no one apologized for that textual application of slavery in Bosnian way. He never found it appropriate to publicly reject his attempt to establish a virtuous Muslim state on the territory that could be ruled in prosperity by Muslims. When he assumed a high function within the ruling party, he had to do that. Since he did not, and it is well-known that a spokesperson is nothing but "a personification of a party", we can only draw one conclusion: SDA supports the views of its spokesperson in hope that in the future these views may be realized. If it were not so then someone else would have been chosen for a spokesperson instead of an archaic and virtuous individual from the city of salt [Tuzla]. Adnan, tell us please... do you reject your article?
Translated on 10/29/1999
