It is equally bad that the reduction of the political dynamic to the bi-national relation did not bring about moderation, but on the contrary an increase in tension, intransigence and insistence on incompatible political positions on the eve of the unavoidable start of the most important job facing Bosnia-Hercegovina today - constitutional reform. These days we have obtained the full clarification of those views. Here they are, quoted literally.
Milorad Dodik: "The ideal model for Bosnia-Hercegovina is the one in which no group can impose its will on others through majority voting. We believe that Bosnia-Hercegovina should be a federation. All three constituent nations would have their own federal units. Bosniaks are repeating mistakes of Serbs from the former Yugoslavia. I want Bosnia-Hercegovina in which Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks will be satisfied with the lower level of state organization, while Bosnia-Hercegovina as an internationally recognized country would deal with European integration and all issues of joint importance about which we agree".
Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina (Haris Silajdzic): "Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina (SBiH) decisively rejects any mode of state organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina that would imply the existence of federal units. Increasingly frequent calls by Milorad Dodik to reorganize Bosnia-Hercegovina as a federation are merely a tactical modification of his calls for a direct referendum [on independence of the Republic of Srpska]. Any calls for reorganization of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a federation will immediately be rejected".
It is to be noticed that SBiH resorts to the discourse of unconditional negation and rejection, basing that rejection on their conviction regarding Dodik's "true" but "hidden" intentions. On the other hand, it is noticeable that Dodik, after all, is talking about Bosnia-Hercegovina as an internationally recognized country, about issues of joint importance that require agreement of all parties... Whether we like Dodik or not, it is not exactly rational to a priori reject that sort of discourse, unless it is motivated by some sort of different "hidden" motives or, simply, total lack of any positive proposals...
As far as the Croat "side" is concerned, it can frequently be heard that it has no clear view, that it is keeping quiet, which prompted Dodik to stick his tongue out and explain his vision of the solution of the Croat issue (multiethnic federal unit with Croat majority) and earn the unpleasant label of self-declared protector of Croat interests. He was immediately told to stay out, among other by brother Luka Markesic, president of the Croat National Council (HNV): "Croats are intelligent enough to take care of their own interests". (Oh, it sounds so dignified, honorable brother Luka; only a skeptic could wonder what that intellect has been doing until now!) Being more specific, the assertion about "Croat silence" is not exactly true, since all more relevant politicians have taken stands regarding the new state organization (Covic, Ljubic, Jurisic, and many politicians of "smaller stature"), and more or less all of them agree that Croat interests can effectively be protected at the so-called middle level, and politically at the state level, through institutional forms of equality (parity, veto by minority etc.). Finally, the [Catholic] Church has also stated its view through their already somewhat forgotten proposal about multi-ethnic regions without possibility of majority voting based on ethnicity. Therefore, it is not true that Croats have been silent. The issue is that Croat views have no political weight. And that is a much more serious, above all Croat, but not only Croat, problem.
It could be said that one more "side" has been silent, that its role in the "warm up period" before the new phase of the difficult search for new constitutional solutions has - evaporated. That is, generally speaking, the social-democratic option, not necessarily only the Social-Democratic party (SDP), although the SDP is its dominant representative. In the long-term it could be said that that is most damaging for the interests of the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina: political (self)marginalization of the SDP and, related to that, lack of opportunity to authentically, forcefully, and compellingly articulate and place on the public political scene a vision of Bosnia-Hercegovina that would differ from the ethno-national paradigm, while it would be able to subsume that paradigm and remove its conflict potential. It seems this SDP will never be up to that important role, and creation or some new or renewed structure that would successfully replace it in that job is more than uncertain.