interview by Igor LASIC
GRANIC: It would be dangerous to consider things outside their context, so allow me first a short introduction. Alija Izetbegovic was for me a largely positive personality and everything I wrote is based on facts and firm evidence. My goal is to contribute to better understanding of all processes in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in which I participated. The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is a consequence of the criminal aggression planned by Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, which included premeditated war crimes. It is wrong to share the blame equally among the parties to the conflict, because that is not true. As for the context, in 1991-92 the international community, lacking the will or the ability to stop the war, was of the opinion that Bosnia-Hercegovina could and should be divided. This is shown by many statements and formal proposals coming from David Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Cyrus Vance, Jose Cutilheiro, etc. Milosevic wanted to take all of Bosnia - he was not much interested in Hercegovina - yet the international community treated him as an equal partner in all negotiations.
What about President Tudman?
Up to 1992 Tudman the Historian dreamed about Banovina Croatia. Tudman the Politician initially helped the Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina, supported the Bosnian referendum, sent an ambassador to Sarajevo, and agreed to all international proposals favoring Bosnia-Hercegovina. But at the same time Tudman the Historian dreamed about Banovina Croatia, and also about "Turkish Croatia"...
And Milosevic knew this, of course?
Let me say that President Tudman did not hide his dream from the international community. He was rather open about it, since he did not believe that Bosnia would survive as a single entity. Few at the time did believe that. The British, especially David Owen, a man with a lot of experience in international relations, by and large supported such views. There is no written document saying explicitly that Britain and France wished Bosnia's partition, but that is nevertheless true. Milosevic knew Tudman's thoughts and used them for his own purposes, just as he counted on everyone's weaknesses and inclinations. And we know that Tudman was no diplomat.
Let us return to Izetbegovic's attitude to Bosnia's division.
Up to January 1994 Izetbegovic was in the situation of having almost 700f Bosnia-Hercegovina under occupation, with crimes being committed against Croats and Bosniaks, especially the Bosniaks. I have never mentioned this before, but on the eve of the signing of the [Washington] agreement creating the Federation of B-H, Haris Silajdzic told me in Washington that the SDA, at a secret meeting, had divided between 55% who favored the Federation and 45% who preferred a tripartite division. In August 1993 Silajdzic and I conducted negotiations aimed at ending the war between Bosniaks and Croats, and the establishment of peace throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina - which assumed a military victory over Radovan Karadzic. Our meetings ended with the Geneva Declaration of September 14, which was a big move for both Tudman and Izetbegovic. Two or three days later, however, Owen craftily brought Momcilo Krajisnik from Podgorica, with the idea that the Bosniaks and the Serbs would jointly block any agreement between the Croats and the Bosniaks. But by this time the Americans had engaged, bringing about a complete change. On the eve of the meeting in Washington, Tudman and Izetbegovic met in Vienna on January 9 to define the relationship between the Bosniaks and the Croats, given that Silajdzic and I had already reached a high level of agreement. Izetbegovic took a hard stance, hoping to gain all of central Bosnia for the Bosniaks. When Tudman asked him if he would be able to halt the Bosnian army's operations, Izetbegovic replied that this would be difficult, since his generals had already made their decisions. But during the night of January 10 we reconvened at the suggestion of the Bosniak side. On that occasion Izetbegovic offered Tudman for the first time that everything south and west of Prozor should go to the Croats, while central Bosnia would go to the Bosniaks. Tudman refused this, saying that he could not accept the removal of the Croats from central Bosnia.
Why did Tudman refuse this, given that the HDZ up to that time had encouraged the departure of Croats from central Bosnia?
The primary reason was that it would have meant the arrival of another 100,000 refugees in Croatia. Then there was the problem of the opposition, the problem of Croatia's poor international standing, and so on. Also, he knew that I would have resisted it to the point of resigning my post. At that time we had a good chance to create the Federation, peace negotiations with the Bosniaks were quite advanced, and this was undoubtedly the best solution for all of us.
If Izetbegovic had offered more, would you have accepted?
Look, until 1994 Tudman really did believe that a three-way partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina was the best solution. At the moment that we are discussing, however, even he came to realize that there were better options. I myself was strongly against the division of Bosnia among other because the British, and much of the international community, held that in the event of any partition the Serbs and the Bosniaks should each be given access to the sea. This meant ceding parts of Croatia. Notwithstanding that, it seemed to me most unlikely that the Croats and the Bosniaks would agree on borders in Bosnia-Hercegovina, particularly in central Bosnia.
Obviously, in practice the division turned out to be more complicated than the idea itself. How keen was Tudman on the Federation?
All I can say is that he gave me full freedom to negotiate in Washington, with the goal of facilitating an agreement with the Bosniaks as much as possible. So I then asked him about Milosevic: "Karadordevo, Tikves - any obligations incurred there?" He replied: "None". I had to know that before leaving for Washington. While I was in Washington, he asked me once again whether it would be possible for the Bosniaks and the Croats to have their own entities within the Federation. I said no, after which he repeated that I had his full confidence. The subject was never mentioned again after the Washington agreement.
Prior to the agreement, Izetbegovic proposed to Tudman once again that they should divide Bosnia. What happened?
The second offer came a week after the first one. We met on January 15 or 16 in Geneva, and at one point Izetbegovic, Tudman, Silajdzic, Miomir Zuzul and I found ourselves in a small room. Izetbegovic repeated then: "How about that south of Prozor idea?" A corollary to this was that Mostar would then be divided into eastern and western parts along the Neretva. Tudman simply answered "No", and that was the end of the conversation on this subject. I heard later that the Bosniaks were allegedly testing out Tudman, but I cannot say if that is true. Silajdzic never mentioned it to me. I wish to add here that the only people who up to then had been for a unified Bosnia-Hercegovina were Silajdzic, Kresimir Zubak and myself.
Zubak's opposition to the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina is questionable, but you say you did not favor division. What about the entities?
The division of Bosnia into three entities was an idea that had been suggested also by the international community. That is the context I was referring to earlier. When I became foreign minister in June 1993, however, there was no longer any talk of Bosnia's partition. Silajdzic and I, acting on behalf of Izetbegovic and Tudman respectively, were working towards an agreement based on the principle of establishing peace and an association of Croats and Bosniaks as the right solution.
Milosevic said in The Hague that you knew about the offer of alliance made by Izetbegovic and Zulfikarpasic to the Serbs.
I learnt about it indirectly, from Tudman. It would be wrong of me to judge Izetbegovic's role in that, since I do not know the details. But I witnessed several major moves made by Izetbegovic, such as the Split Declaration of 1995: I used all my diplomatic skills to persuade Izetbegovic and Tudman to meet in Split. But first allow me to digress. On July 10 that year I met Yasushi Akashi, the special envoy of the UN general secretary, on the occasion of the opening of the Dubrovnik summer festival. While we were on the plane he had kept asking me why Croatian soldiers were on the Mount Velebit [in Croatia], until I stopped him by asking whether they should perhaps be in Serbia. On the terrace of Hotel Argentina his mobile rang: he was told about the difficult situation in Srebrenica. He quickly got Milosevic on the line and talked to him for about fifteen minutes. After their conversation ended, he told me with a beaming face that the attack was coming from one direction only and that Srebrenica would survive. But given that Akashi, as a representative of the international community, had already proved incompetent, Srebrenica soon fell and the greatest crime of the war followed. In any case, Izetbegovic came to Split at our invitation, and the Split Declaration - making possible joint action by the Bosnian and Croatian armies - was signed on July 22. The only people who knew about the text of the declaration in advance were Hido Biscevic and myself; the others, including minister of defense Gojko Susak, were given the text only after we got together. Izetbegovic on this occasion showed great wisdom and good will, since together we managed to push the Serbs all the way to Banja Luka, and halted only under threat. Izetbegovic told me that NATO had threatened to bomb him if we did not stop. Warren Christopher told me that they would allow 100,000 Serbs into eastern Slavonia and then protect them with NATO bombs.
What else do you remember about Izetbegovic's moves? What happened at Dayton?
Two days before the end of the Dayton conference, I remember Silajdzic's brilliant negotiations with Milosevic. It was settled then that Sarajevo would remain in the Federation, with the Serbs getting only one suburb. The ratio of 51:49, though, had already been decided in 1995, at talks between the Americans, British, Russians and French. I was woken up that night at 4 a.m. and asked to join the others quickly. I saw a map according to which the Serbs were to be compensated for the loss of Sarajevo at the expense of the Croats. I came out in a sweat. Two hours later Izetbegovic too arrived, and said immediately that he did not agree, because it was not fair towards the Croats. I had a very good relationship with Izetbegovic.
What do you think of him as a person?
He was rather indecisive. He had little experience of international politics, and when the war came he at first did not know what to do. As a result he sometimes made a wrong assessment or decision. He was also a very devout person. I mention this since not only did he not hide his religious principles, he even presented them as absolute values. He did eventually accept the mujahedeen, but only because he had little choice, not because he was a militant fundamentalist. I recall several details that told me lot about him. For example, at one lunch in Bonn Tudman talked about the likely great number of victims if the war was not ended speedily; Izetbegovic replied that the most important thing was that Bosnia should remain whole. He was committed to his ideals, but he was indecisive. It took them six hours to persuade him to accept the Washington agreement, while Tudman needed only twenty minutes of discussion with me. There was no chemistry between the two of them, but they respected each other as national leaders. They were quite different personalities and there was not much warmth between them - they tended to keep their distance from one another. After the Split Declaration, though, they relaxed and became more open with each other. Izetbegovic trusted me more than Tudman, and Tudman was aware of that and accepted it.
You say you do not wish to comment on whether Izetbegovic was sincere in offering partition of Bosnia to Tudman. Given that you knew him, do you think it was only a trial balloon?
It is difficult to say. Izetbegovic was then in a very difficult situation, and perhaps he judged things wrongly. Tudman was getting information, some of it false, regarding British and French determination that Bosnia should be divided, and it is possible that the same was true for Izetbegovic. But the fact that he did not try hard to persuade Tudman indicates that the whole thing may have been a trial balloon. I was glad, since the negotiations regarding the creation of the Federation, prompted by the Americans, were going well. I would certainly have resigned if Tudman had suddenly accepted partition.
You say that even earlier you had never taken part in plans for the partition of B-H. Yet the minutes of a meeting with Bosnian Croat leaders held at Pantovcak [Zagreb] on November 19, 1993 record you saying about Mostar: "It might be a good idea, Mr President, to take a firm position that we want a united city as the capital of Croat Herceg Bosna", and so on.
Before that meeting we had visited Brussels, where we had talked about Mostar. {Mate] Boban favored its division, I opposed it. At that time the possibility of dividing Bosnia-Hercegovina into three parts was still being considered - it was the Americans who later rejected it. At that time a three-way division of Bosnia was the official plan of Owen and Stoltenberg. I held that Mostar should remain whole and become the centre of Herceg Bosna, in place of Boban's stronghold at Grude.
In that case the capital of Herceg Bosna would have included also the Bosniaks who formed a majority in its eastern part?
I wanted Mostar, and not just Mostar, to stay together. I wished to prevent Boban's idea of a border along the Neretva, since the division would not have ended with Mostar. My position was that Croatia should neither take nor give up anything, whereas Owen favored border changes. But at the start of 1994 there was a turn of events, after which the terms of the discussion were different.
If you felt so strongly about it, what did you feel during 1993 when the Croatian government, in which you occupied such a prominent position, was seeking to organize precisely the partition of Bosnia?
I became minister on June 1, 1993. I devoted myself primarily to humanitarian issues. When I heard about the Croat camps for Bosniak civilians, I did what I could to have them closed down, which is what finally happened. I started negotiating with Silajdzic in August of that year, and within a few months we ended the conflict and agreed on the Federation. I can say, therefore, that my aims were achieved. Mainly thanks to the Americans, of course. I considered Boban to be incompetent and unreasonable, and I disliked him also because he lied. He led the Croats of Bosnia-Hercegovina into an extremely difficult and uncertain situation, and he was against peace with the Bosniaks. The Bosniaks were advancing and would have taken all of central Bosnia had it not been for the Washington agreement.
What is your view on the Croatian parliament's "Declaration on the Homeland War" [2000], according to which Croatia was not an aggressor in Bosnia-Hercegovina?
I say again that the policy of partitioning Bosnia-Hercegovina was never my policy. But the situation was very complex. Few countries - in fact none but America - helped Bosnia as much as Croatia did. Croatia took in one million refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina. It must also not be forgotten that both at the start and at the end of the war the two countries won together several major liberation battles.
Yes, but what about the period in between, the awkward 1993?
Yes, the HDZ had some bad policies too, supporting at that time Mate Boban. What he was doing should not have been supported. He should not have been accepted...
But he was not exactly a spontaneous phenomenon, and it seems entirely logical that a person like Tudman would find "on the ground" a person like Boban.
I agree that he was not a spontaneous phenomenon. But I do not want to talk about things in which I did not actively or officially take part, i.e. prior to June 1993. I want to talk only about what I personally did or witnessed. After becoming foreign minister, I did things that in my view do me credit. I could not have done more.
You have not replied to my question about whether Croatia was an aggressor in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
I would not say that Croatia was an aggressor in Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is known, of course, that the Croatian army was in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The only true external aggressor, however, was Slobodan Milosevic. The responsibility for the conflict between Croats and Bosniaks lies to a considerable extent on the Croat side, but some of it also belongs to the Bosniaks. Apart from that, Croatia cannot be called an aggressor because before and after the Croat-Bosniak conflict the Croatian army worked together with the Bosnian army.
A friend of mine from Dubrovnik, who fought in the Croatian army, was sent in the middle of 1993 to man Croat positions on Popovo Polje [eastern Hercegovina], where Bosnian POWs were brought in to help dig the trenches. Who in that case was the aggressor?
The context was very complicated. We had a written agreement for cooperation between the two armies and the two states, and then came the Croat-Bosniak conflict. I do not wish to defend anyone, and especially not the radical wing of the HDZ which committed certain mistakes in 1992 and 1993. But it was not all black and white. If I had become foreign minister earlier than I did, I would personally have done all in my power to prevent that conflict at any cost.
There is a striking difference between Tudman before and after his sickness, which started in 1996. However, I had his support for everything I mentioned in our conversation. At the time I had problems with the intelligence services and the extremist wing of the HDZ, which simply had a different view of all of those issues. As Tudman's sickness advanced he became increasingly difficult to work with and more rigid in his views. The HDZ had to initiate reforms and modernization of the party as early as 1996, including opening towards Europe, economic and judicial reform, return of Serb refugees, etc.
Abdic is today a convicted war criminal, and that speaks volumes. He was used by all and he in turn used those he could. Initially the conflict between Abdic and Izetbegovic had to be avoided, and later all sorts of stuff happened. When I became a minister, Abdic was not that important any more. I hope I am clear enough. As far as I was concerned, Abdic did not exist.
Not because of the heart. That problem has been sorted out. I have three stents and for now everything is going well. Now I have back problems.
You had an operation on your backbone?
Yes, I did. I am recovering well after the operation. I am finishing my book and working on the advancement of the Croatian Party of Rights, where I am a special advisor to the presidency. My goal is turn them into a modern European political party. I think that the HSP has been in the process of serious reforms for some 5-6 years already, as can be seen from numerous changes in their program as well as from their election results. For me personally this task is a great challenge. However, I do not see myself as a political leader anymore. I enjoy the new job and work great with HSP president Anto Djapic.
Mate Granic was a physician before becoming Croatia's foreign minister from 1993 until 2000. A member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and a close associate of Franjo Tudman, Granic was considered a moderate within the party. In January 2000, following Tudman's death and the HDZ's defeat in parliamentary elections, Granic was the party's losing presidential candidate, before leaving it to form the Democratic Centre (DC). However, the latter barely survived the next elections in 2003, whereupon Granic retired from active public life, although in 2005 he became foreign-policy advisor to the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights (HSP).