The Army and Police of Yugoslavia, during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, participated in the resolution of the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija. The modes of participation and the policies that formulated those modes disqualified Yugoslavia, excluded her, and made it impossible for her institutions to continue to take care of the conditions in the Province.
Recently there has been a lot of talk about the return of Kosovo and Metohija to Serbia. However, I shall discuss the return of Serbia to Kosovo and Metohija. I have already described how that could be done.
Then, the Army and Police, after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, participated in the resolution of the crisis in the south of Serbia. They have directly, I stress directly, already learned about the "views and thinking of the members of the executive authorities". Generals Ninoslav Krstic and Goran Radosavljevic were brilliant collaborators and excellent executors of political ideas. Those ideas were published, the whole peace plan was published, in three languages - Serb, English and Albanian.
Therefore, if I were to talk about methods, forces and dynamic of the implementation of the plan for the resolution of the crisis in the south of Serbia, I would have to assume that you don't know what you do know, and consequently I originally decided to decline the invitation. Hoping for a good dialogue I nevertheless decided to speak here in order to be able to discuss differences between the premises on which the two policies, the old one and the new one, are based.
Then I wanted to shorten the long headline of the talk, to take out "objective chances", to skip well-known facts about the several-months-long developments in the south of Serbia and to only discuss the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the future resolution of the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija. However, I decided to keep the original title of the talk, as otherwise I would give up the chance to debate.
No one in the world, including the super powers, can resolve problems without continuously paying attention to the world public opinion, to the opinion in the neighboring states, to geostrategic goals, to financial power, and so on. Therefore it is implied that the abilities are always constrained in some way. However, when in the discussion of the chances for Yugoslav participation in the resolution of problems in our own territory the expression "objective chances" is used, that can mean one of the following three things:
And so on.
I do not think that crises, if there are any, should be resolved without paying attention to the rest of the world, without the understanding of the rest of the world and without assistance of the world community.
Also, I do not think that Yugoslavia has small chances to participate in the resolution of crises on her own territory. Our chances depend on ourselves, on how resourceful we are.
What must be taken into account regarding the creation of these chances?
Above all, it must be remembered that military means are the last possible measure taken by a wise state policy. Slobodan Milosevic hastily, in Kosovo and Metohija, first resorted to military force. Surrounded by people who, apparently, did not read anything and discussed and judged everything, and himself unprepared to listen to good advice, Milosevic was obviously not aware that a bad policy would result in bad conduct of military action.
I suppose that soldiers will recognize these last words. Long ago, in 1907, Zivojin Misic [WWI Serbian officer] published his seminal "Strategy" in which you can find the following sentence: "Bad policies without doubt adversely affect waging of a war."
That great Serb warrior, also wrote literally the following:
"Having in mind the current conditions, we must fight on two fronts - against the enemy army and population. Consequently it is necessary to as soon as possible finish with the army and then give the population a chance and sufficient incentive that it, under burden of war, desires peace."
Someone may recall that Misic was talking about a war between states, rather than about a civil war within the borders of a state. That is correct. But, isn't it true that Slobodan Milosevic, with his bad policies, caused the creation of an Albanian parastate in the southern Serbian province, and then fought a war against that parastate and its army named the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)? Weren't his police and military actions, against Misic's advice, way too long? Were they not excessively cruel? Was there no looting, killing of civilians and some rapes? Were crimes against humanity committed in some Albanian settlements? Could an ethnic Albanian citizen of this country hope to have a peaceful life in the state whose uniformed guardians were prepared to commit such crimes? Could such a citizen wish for peace?
Gentlemen, let me refer to two more lessons from the past, to ideas of Ivo Andric and Milovan Milovanovic.
Andric, a former ambassador of the Yugoslav Kingdom in Berlin, later a literature Nobel prize laureate, was immediately after the end of WWII asked by the communist authorities of Tito's state to talk to the Yugoslav diplomats about the way they should behave towards foreigners.
Andric condemned as the worst possible approach the attitude, which claims that there can be no middle way between force and subjugation to force. He claimed that the road to success and dignity is precisely between those two extremes.
"In relations with the rest of the world," Andric emphasized, "we must above all correctly determine and limit our needs, since the lower the needs, the smaller number of our demands and the greater likelihood of our success. To be forced to ask for a lot is in itself a sign of weakness."
The great writer emphasized that in formulation of demands and in offering counter services, we should be "clear and positive" and never make promise we cannot fulfill. Never, even verbally, cross the limits of your strength, as those limits may be clearer to the foreigners than to us.
Furthermore, I quote Andric:
"One should always keep in mind that every success, fulfillment of a demand, consists of one or more concessions by one or more interested parties. And concessions are in mutual relations made only if one expects a concession in return. Therefore those who do not want or do not know how to make concessions, must know that pretty soon they will be unable to count on concessions by anyone. These debts do not have deadline nor are they precisely measured, but there is an invisible bookkeeping in those relations and those who are branded as bad or dishonest debtors, cannot count on success."
I would say that in that invisible bookkeeping Milosevic had too many minuses and that he was labeled as the worst debtor. He was spiteful in his relations with the powerful western world, he lied to his interlocutors, he behaved as the savior and last defender of the defeated communist idea, relied exclusively on brute force.
Seeking friends and allies in impotent East, Milosevic made another mistake, as he made political concessions in return for economic benefits. That is a well-known mistake, already made in our past. Dr. Milovan Milovanovic, a great Serbian politician educated in Paris commenting on the relations between the Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary said, I am paraphrasing, roughly the following - there is a conviction in Serbia that we must keep making both political and national concessions to the dual monarchy in return to preferential economic treatment. That is a mistake! The right way is to in the future use economic concessions to win Austria over to support our political and national goals. Therefore, instead of being passive, we shall be active, "instead of buying demands, we shall make demands". These were the words of one of two most significant Serbian politicians of the twentieth century, who claimed that the small Serbian boat must be tied to the European ship.
After so many decades we are again facing the need to fundamentally change our views. We have returned to good ideas, which the former, violent president of the state, probably convinced that history started with him, did not even seek in our past.
We have made essential changes in our policies, and then applied that new, changed policy in the south of Serbia, in the crisis that broke out in the land buffer zone and because of the land buffer zone.
I was most exposed in the resolution of that crisis, I was responsible for strategy, but the success belongs to all the participants on both sides, both the Serb and the Albanian side.
Let me now list the premises of that new, changed policy. What did we, whom the state entrusted with stopping the Albanian rebellion and silencing the guns in the Pcinja district, say?
We said:
Never scorn or underestimate your opponent. That is always a reflection of stupid vanity or hidden weakness.
Never strive to defeat and humiliate the enemy, because every time you win, that is only a temporary victory.
In inter-ethnic conflicts best solutions are those without a winner.
Respect your enemy so that you can turn him into a friend.
If you are forced to resort to military action, instead of diplomacy, do not act dishonorably. An old, wise proverb says that a dishonorable victory can only defeat one half of the enemy.
Always take into account that the world is watching you and never do anything that would worsen the negative image this country earned under Milosevic.
Keep in mind that the inertia of deformed and extremely critical attitude towards Yugoslavia exists in the world and will exist in the foreseeable future. An influential foreigner who during Milosevic's rule developed a negative view of Serbs cannot be convinced by words to change his attitude. Only deeds can make him change his mind.
Do not fear the international community. Try to become a good assistant to each and every one of its representatives.
Make a reasonable number of demands and only demand those things that can belong to you based on earthly justice and human solidarity.
Support your neighbors so that they may support you.
Do not treat the future historical reconciliation of Serbs and Albanians as an empty phrase but as an essential need.
Keep in mind that successful diplomacy finds its path between the extremes and never in the extremes.
Think clearly and positively.
It is not enough to show good intentions. One must be truly good intentioned.
In order to build trust in the space rife with traditional ethnic mistrust it is necessary to incessantly, with a series of positive steps, deflect somebody else's doubts.
Never lie, someone will find out if you do.
Do not make promises you cannot fulfill.
Give up secrecy and conspiratorial style. Secrecy is today practically impossible, and conspiratorial style leads to isolation. Openly state your goals and act only when you get clear agreement of all relevant factors.
Finally, make sure that success in national and state affairs, if any, does not make you vain. Vanity is another word for the lack of dignity.
Gentlemen, these are the chief premises of the new policy in the state and national affairs, the way I see that policy and its goals.
I ask you to consider everything I said as a debate with dangerous views that still haven't been abandoned. There are still politicians, especially in the opposition parties, who believe that only force and violence are needed for the control of secessionist rebellions and uprisings, for the solution of inter-ethnic problems. There are still many self-declared guardians of national and state interests who, convinced in our self-reliance, on behalf of the Serb nation want to xenophobically and persistently turn away from the West. There are still way too many futile logicians and political quasi-sages who are convinced that devil lives in the West.
Let me now temporarily leave the polemical discourse to present a few points about the biggest and still unresolved crisis in Kosovo and Metohija.
As I've already said, Yugoslavia, thanks to Slobodan Milosevic and his arrogant henchmen, has lost the ability to participate in the resolution of the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija. I am convinced that this loss is only temporary and that our state, through a series of intelligent political and diplomatic actions, will again create and earn that ability.
Let us name things are they truly are. The situation in Kosovo and Metohija is bad. The Kosovo Liberation Army has only changed its name, uniforms and insignia, while everything else is the same. Everything has been solidified - hate against Serbs, secessionist program and violent behavior.
The idea represented by us in Belgrade, about the need for historical reconciliation of Serbs and Albanians, has been denounced by some Albanian circles as dangerous! The Hague Tribunal still hasn't issued indictments of the leaders of the KLA for numerous and undeniable crimes, for genocide, for ethnic cleansing of the Province and expulsion of Serbs and Roma. KFOR and UNMiK are lenient in their treatment of militant Albanians and we should identify in that the inertia about which I spoke, created during Milosevic's backward rule.
UNMIK and KFOR for the sake of their own safety, are trying not to aggravate ethnic Albanians. That is why expelled Serbs and Roma cannot return to their homes in Kosovo and Metohija. That is why there is more and more uncertainty in Kosovo and Metohija. That is why both here and elsewhere in the world we are hastily searching for a formula for the so called final solution of the troubles in Kosovo and Metohija.
Gentlemen, I have already stated my opposition to the division of Kosovo and Metohija because every division of the province would leave way too many dissatisfied ethnic Albanians outside the Albanian part and way too many dissatisfied Serbs outside the Serb part of the province. Instead of reducing tensions, we would increase them by a division.
I proposed that for the sake of law and order, security, return of the expelled persons, protection of the historical rights of the Serbian state and ethnic rights of Albanians, similarly to the recipe used in Bosnia-Hercegovina, two entities are formed in the province, one Serb and another one Albanian, and that Kosovo and Metohija remain legally and in practice a single territorial unit, under the auspices of the United Nations.
The Albanian entity would be protected by international forces and the Kosovo Protection Corps. The Serb entity would be protected by the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Police, which would in no way violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Of course, we can adopt the cantonal principle for the internal organization of Kosovo and Metohija, if the political factors prefer the term canton to the term entity, but the collection of ethnic Albanian cantons and ethnic Serb cantons would still represent two different entities.
You are probably aware of my dedication to efficiency, and I assure you that the formation of entities is a very efficient transitional solution, the best possible given the current situation. That wise interim move should be taken in order to gain ten years of peace - needed for the recovery of the economy and consolidation of the state - before great integration and entry of the south-eastern Europe to the European Union.
If all Albanians, Albanians from Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Macedonia, were all in the big European home, if all Serbs, also split in four different states, lived in that home, both of them would lose the unpleasant feeling of being broken up that they have today, they would lose reasons for keeping apart, for national self-isolation and ghettoisation. And, whether they liked it or not, they would have to pay attention to the house rules. Unfortunately, only well organized and wealthy states can join European Union, and the road to wealth and good organization is neither easy nor short.
Let us now consider those infamous "objective chances" of Yugoslavia to participate in the resolution of the Kosovo-Metohijan drama, to win the implementation of any formula? Let us remove that issue from the agenda once and for all by noting the obvious - no one can resolve Yugoslav problems without the participation of the democratic Yugoslavia.
Everything could be done or not done with the undemocratic state. It could be isolated, it could be dismembered, it could be bombed! The present day Yugoslavia is not isolated anymore, she is not under a protectorate, she is not accused of lack of good will, she is not accused of wanting something that does not belong to her. The present day Yugoslavia respects the rules of the game. I would say that those circumstances most definitely qualify her to crucially influence her fate.
Naturally, I do not mean to imply that the problems in Kosovo can be resolved without taking into account the will of the majority Albanian people and without its approval and agreement. Although at this moment there are no direct talks between the Serb and ethnic Albanian representatives, Yugoslav politicians can talk to the international mediators, who in the resolution of the crisis in the south of Serbia turned out to be precious assistants. The international mediators should be, openly and without flinching, informed about all the details of the complex inter-ethnic relations; in front of them we need to defend ideas that, as a state policy and political consensus of all the participants in the political scene of Serbia, both the government and the opposition, are becoming a sort of a national project.
I see three stages, or three phases in the future regulation of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija:
And while these three periods go on, it is necessary through a series of carefully planned actions and measures to work on the establishment and nurturing of inter-ethnic trust in the province. To those who tell me that that is a naïve dream, and that there can be no inter-ethnic trust in the territory known for several centuries of mistrust and bloody conflicts, I respond by saying that there are no eternal enmities. Consider the words of eminent historian Prof. Dr. Vladimir Stojancevic in his voluminous study "Serbs and Albanians 1804-1912":
"Serb-Albanian relations in the nineteenth century were historically unavoidable and also contradictory in their reality. The scale of those relations is wide-ranging and rather diverse. It included examples of both serious conflicts and utter enmity as well as spontaneous détente, establishment of friendly links, or direct cooperation against the Ottoman authorities".
It makes sense to assume that the fate will never again offer to Serbs and Albanians a common enemy, as during national uprisings against the Ottoman empire. But, don't Serbs and Albanians even today have a common enemy? Isn't poverty something that both of our nations will have to destroy? I am convinced that that attitude, with assistance of international factors, will be adopted by the leaders of both nations.
As you can see, I very frequently mention the international community, convinced that without its support there can be no solution, especially a final solution.
I repeat, we should not hide anything from the international community and the Albanians, neither goals nor means.
I stress this because of those fans of secrecy among us, Serbs. People who still think that Serbs must have some sort of secret national program, written in the total silence, something like Garasanin's "Nacertanije", a document about which only a handful of state officials will be informed. The times of secrecy and "Nacertanije" are over!
In the new policy of Serbia and Yugoslavia there is nothing that cannot be publicly stated and that will not win the support of the just world. We have abandoned old and questionable goals - the unification of all Serbs in one state and life in some new Balkan federation will never again be our obsessions. Actually, we have abandoned all those ideas that can be accomplished only be war.
Now we need to formulate new goals, to publicly state our interests and to wisely and convincingly defend them - until realization. Entry into the EU, for example, should be our goal. Reduction of tension in Kosovo and Metohija should also be our goal. Historical reconciliation with Albanians is also our goal.
I am convinced that none of these goals will threaten our neighbors, and that no one in the world will have a problem with any of our goals. Except, of course, for those militant Albanians who dream about an enthically clean state, Kosovo without Serbs and Roma, Kosovo with a padlock on its door. However, that separatist goal, besides paid support, cannot win any other or different support. That is why I think about the future hopefully and with confidence in progress. I do not accept the claim that nations that in the last few decades consciously chose to live in the past, will forever remain unprepared to improve their present situation.