interview by J. TASIC
"What is immediately obvious in this document is that Belgrade and Serbia in this text are mentioned only in the context of negotiations initiated in Vienna, without any institutional ties with their southern province, currently under temporary UN administration.
"Despite many positive elements, the implementation of which should ensure a less difficult life for the non-Albanian population, the proposed draft document is not really based on the essential principles of UN SC Resolution 1244 but is actually leaning more toward the secession of Kosovo and Metohija. Of especial concern is that the draft plan represents a type of revision of Resolution 1244, even though certain factions in the West that support the independence of Kosovo and Metohija cannot ultimately change Resolution 1244 without the agreement of Moscow and Beijing.
"Resolution 1244, the main document regulating the work of the UN Mission in Kosovo and Metohija, clearly states that it '[a]uthorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo'.
"In the Constitutional Framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo, this point of the Resolution is omitted, although it is mentioned and repeated in its second Annex. In both places in Resolution 1244 there is mention of the establishment of substantial autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia and Montenegro, as the basic and main precondition for the resolution of the Kosovo crisis, and the final status of the Province. This presumes the existence of basic institutional ties between the mother state and its constituent part, which is presently under the temporary administration of the UN Mission.
"Autonomy can exist only in relation to a broader entity, not as an independent whole or an artificial para-state, which is in fact what UNMIK has created in Kosovo and Metohija in the past five years. Accepting the draft plan for the implementation of standards without this essential provision of Resolution 1244, as a result of which Slobodan Milosevic agreed to an end of the conflict with NATO, prejudices the final status of the Province, which is contrary to the UN Security Council document. Through the gradual transfer of competencies from UNMIK to provisional Kosovo institutions (PISG), without any ties with appropriate Serbian institutions, the survival of Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia and Montenegro is becoming an abstraction, and with time a practical impossibility."
In what way could Kosovo and Metohija establish institutional ties with Belgrade and, keeping in mind the present institutional vacuum within Serbia herself, to what degree does this government have the authority to negotiate regarding the further fate of the Province?
At the beginning of the UN Mission, while the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was still in power in Belgrade, the provision regarding substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was considered by Western diplomatic circles to be impossible to implement. Upon the departure of Milosevic UNMIK by inertia continued to address the issue in the same way and, to be quite honest, no one in Belgrade forcefully insisted on it, either. Nevertheless, I think that it is possible to find modalities for the integration of substantial autonomy in Kosovo and Metohija within the institutional framework of the Republic of Serbia. First and foremost, the Serbian Parliament should have places for representatives of her southern province; otherwise, every argument that Kosovo is a part of Serbia would be and remain a rhetorical figure for internal political use. Unfortunately, certain government officials in Belgrade frequently give irresponsible statements claiming that Kosovo is already lost and thus create a false perception that Serbia is prepared to renounce a part of her territory. It is necessary to keep in mind that agreeing to the secession of Kosovo and Metohija would automatically initiate the process of the disintegration of Serbia. The Serbian Orthodox Church has expressed firm support for the principles of the Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro, and Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija on the basis of which the Declaration and Resolution in the Serbian, and Serbia-Montenegro Parliaments were passed reaffirming that Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the state's territory. The negotiating team that will take part in negotiations, regardless of its composition, is bound to act in accordance with the principles affirmed in these documents.
What is your view of the fact that, with the exception of the standard regarding dialogue with Belgrade and 'the need for cooperation with all neighboring countries', there is no mention made of economic, cultural, communication, transportation or any other ties between Kosovo and Metohija, without which the so-called technical and life issues cannot after all be resolved, while Kosovo is being referred to the European Union, the Council of Europe and the United Nations?
Kosovo and Metohija in Grossman's document is already treated as a separate entity. It is simply inconceivable that economic, cultural and other issues can be resolved without, first of all, institutional ties. Kosovo and Metohija must first function as a substantial autonomy within Serbia in order to be able to resolve other issues. UNMIK should be the facilitator in this process, not the means of support for creating a para-state.
Most Kosovo Serb political representatives consider the provision regarding the Kosovo Protection Corps to be especially controversial. They would like to change it in some way within the Constitutional Framework. How realistic is the demand for the disbanding of the KPC, which this draft program also refers to as "a peace and security component in Kosovo and in the region", even with a reduced number of members and defined rules of conduct?
UNMIK chief Harri Holkeri has just suspended 12 top members of that organization. If we look at the history of the KPC since its establishment in September 1999 to today, almost the entire leadership has been suspended, blacklisted by U.S. President Bush and the EU or imprisoned. The organization has been compromised and represents nothing but a smokescreen for the former Kosovo Liberation Army, which de facto is continuing its destructive activities. Ties between the KPC and the so-called Albanian National Army have also been established. It is absolutely absurd to expect arsonists to act as firefighters. The KPC, in the opinion of Kosovo Serbs, should be immediately disbanded and the process of demilitarization of the Province continued. The existence of an organization such as the KPC is not mentioned anywhere in Resolution 1244 but it surprisingly does figure in Grossman's plan.
On the other hand, the proposed draft plan for the implementation of standards in Kosovo does not mention the presence of "Yugoslav and Serbian personnel" clearly mentioned in Annex 2 of Resolution 1244, where it is noted that "[a]fter withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions: Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; Marking/clearing minefields; Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; Maintaining a presence at key border crossings." This provision also has been completely ignored because it has been arbitrarily interpreted that "personnel" refers exclusively to military units. It is unrealistic to expect KFOR to permit the deployment of Serbia and Montenegro Army tank brigades and artillery around monasteries and border crossings, which would represent a danger not only to cultural monuments, which would become direct targets for terrorists, but also for the soldiers themselves. However, according to the provisions of Resolution 1244, it is completely legitimate to ask for the official opening of a provincial representative body of the Serbian Government in Pristina, which would be in constant coordination with appropriate structures of the UN Mission, OSCE... Some thought could also be given to appointing Serbia and Montenegro Army liaison officers to the KFOR Main headquarters in Pristina, as well as to the command headquarters of the multinational brigades and local KFOR contingents protecting Serb enclaves and patrimonial sites. Instead of holding "anonymous" meetings at administrative crossings, meetings would take place regularly in Kosovo and Metohija, and through these representatives problems directly relating to the Serb community, its safety and the protection of cultural monuments of the Serb people would be resolved. In this manner the activities already being implemented by the Coordinating Center would only expand on the ground and official representatives of our Government and the Serbia and Montenegro Army would be officially deployed in Kosovo and Metohija, a part of their sovereign territory.
How does this draft guarantee conditions for the protection of the religious and cultural heritage of the Kosovo Serbs?
One of the problems is that this document speaks very little about the protection of our cultural heritage, which is in practise placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture in the provisional Kosovo Government. For the Church, as the biggest owner of cultural property, this is unacceptable. We believe that thought should be given to the forming of protective zones at least around priority objects, as well as to more precise regulation of issues of protection and jurisdiction over our monuments. The Kosovo minister of culture Mr. Brajshori has never entered any of our churches. Placing our cultural heritage under the guardianship of UNMIK for a year or two means that it will end up under the jurisdiction of the Kosovo Ministry of Culture where there is not a single Serb and which lacks the credibility and professional expertise to deal with the issue of Serb cultural heritage. A new Kosovo law on cultural property is currently being prepared without consultations with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is unacceptable. Two versions of a draft of that law have been prepared and written exclusively by the Kosovo Albanians. Representatives of the Council of Europe who are overseeing the process have rejected both drafts and proposed a European concept that is now being debated. In any case, regardless of the final solution of the status of the Province, the Serbian cultural heritage must remain exclusively under the jurisdiction of appropriate Serbian institutions, first and foremost, of the Serbian Orthodox Church as the largest owner of cultural property and the Serbian Ministry of Culture. Otherwise, within a short period an Albanization of the Serbian cultural heritage will be carried out and our most important monasteries, most beautiful frescoes and icons will be presented to the world as some sort of "Kosovar" heritage that has nothing to do with Serbia and the Serbian people, who managed to preserve this heritage with great sacrifice during the course of five hundred years of Ottoman rule.
How do the Kosovo Albanians reacts to the proposed document?
Reactions have been primarily negative because Albanian leaders want to impose the opposite principle of "status before standards", explaining that without full power and control in Kosovo and Metohija as an independent country they are unable to achieve the stated requests. This idea looks like an attempt to build a house from the roof down without walls and firm foundations and for now the international community is not accepting it. A second danger is that of a series of propaganda-symbolic activities creating the impression that standards are being met. Recently Mr. Rexhepi distributed keys to Serb returnees to the Istok region before RTK cameras, while at the same time pressure continues on the remaining Serbs and refugees are being prevented from returning to other parts of the Province, as we saw recently in Musutiste village near Suva Reka (when a bus with Serb returnees was stoned). This is more political marketing than an honest intent because the essential goal of Kosovo Albanian leaders remains an independent Albanian Kosovo that would serve as a unifying nucleus for all the so-called Albanian territories in the Balkans.
What do you think of UNMIK chief Harri Holkeri's call on Serbian officials to publicly apologize for what happened in Kosovo and Metohija in order to reduce tensions on the ground?
No one can deny that a sincere apology represents a universal moral act. However, the broader context of the situation in Serbia and her southern province poses the completely legitimate question whether the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians and the UNMIK leadership owe an apology to the Kosovo Serbs, Roma, Gorani, Bosniaks and others who have been suffering for more than four years under the administration of the UN Mission. Words must be supported by concrete acts. Atonement (metanoia) in Greek means a change in the manner of thinking and acting, not a histrionic display of insincere sorrow for a mistake that has been made. The current representatives of the Belgrade government, especially the highest representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, have on numerous occasions expressed their sincere regret for the suffering of innocent civilians in Kosovo and Metohija regardless of their nationality, and the monks and priests assisted the victims of all nationalities. The opposition confirmed its disagreement with the policies of Slobodan Milosevic through action that brought about a change in the government and started the process of building a new democracy in Serbia, which is today the most multiethnic state in the Balkans.
While the war chiefs of the KLA, now the leading politicians in Pristina, organized or tolerated the murder and kidnapping of hundreds of Serbs, the destruction of churches and cemeteries, representatives of the opposition in Serbia, who are now in power, frantically fought to change the undemocratic regime and redirect the course of Serbia toward a brighter future. Some of them have been assassinated, imprisoned and beaten in the streets of Belgrade and other Serbian cities by Milosevic's police. No one can demand that they accept the political and moral responsibility for what they themselves did not do and to initiate a one-sides process of reconciliation with the former leaders of the KLA, who are still conducting an anti-Serb campaign in Kosovo and Metohija and are not prepared to admit any of their mistakes. Such a one-sided act would not only jeopardize the political position of the Belgrade government but would justify the continuation of ethnic terror in Kosovo and Metohija. Despite her problems, Serbia has entered the 21st century as a changed country, while in Kosovo and Metohija the clock stopped in June 1999 or perhaps even earlier, somewhere in the 19th century.