interview by Milorad IVANOVIC
BLIC: the book has been published at the same time in Croatia and Serbia. What sort of reactions do you expect?
JOVIC: This is the first academic book to be jointly published after the break up of Yugoslavia. I deliberately wanted to initiate serious academic discussion about the break up of the former Yugoslavia here. I think that it is entirely unnatural that there are about a hundred books in English about the break up of Yugoslavia, many of them excellent books, while, on the other hand, in Serbia and Croatia only a few books deal with this topic. Most of them are of political nature, or books of memoirs. There are very few discussions that attempt to take even a small step away from politics and politically correct approaches and very few attempts to avoid politically colored conclusions, rather than doing what historians should do - describe what happened and refrain from judging events. All political judgments, whether some politician was good or bad, belong to every citizen, but the job of a historian or political scientist is to provide assistance by explaining what and why actually happened. That is the sole purpose of my book.
Recently, tens of books about the former Yugoslavia have been published. How is your book different?
Most of other books insist on the importance of inter-ethnic problems, nationalism, identity and the so-called ancient ethnic hatred between Yugoslav nations. I do not deny importance of the national identity, nationalism and problems of creation and destruction of nation states, but I am convinced that the break up of Yugoslavia cannot be explained without a detailed analysis of the ideology that was the very heart of the Socialist Yugoslavia. That ideology was based on Marxism, and the idea of "the withering away" of the state, that is its gradual disappearance, is central to Marxism. Yugoslav Marxists took that idea seriously. They believed that the state was supposed to "wither away". They found it impossible to establish a strong state, because Marxism was an anti-state concept. An additional problem was that Yugoslav Marxism was developed in opposition to the Soviet ideology. They wanted to create a state totally different from the Soviet Union, and especially emphasized the aspect of the weakness of central state institutions. For Yugoslav Marxists Socialism meant decentralization and a weak state, therefore a process of strengthening of the society and weakening of the state.
You actually claim that our state was weak, and society strong, while most other analysts claim just the opposite?
Correct. I am not the first person to write about that. For example, Zoran Djindjic wrote about the unfinished state. For example, consider the collection of taxes. In western democracies there were never problems with collection of taxes, as was the case in Socialist and post-Socialist countries. Secondly, the fundamental role of the state is to prevent a civil war and to prevent armament of the population, creation of private armies. State makes sense only if it is capable of protecting its citizens from the danger coming from outside, or from other citizens. The Yugoslav state consistently failed to do so, especially in its terminal phase, which resembled chaos and anarchy. I frequently mention the example of the Yugoslav [People's] Army shooting a film about illegal smuggling of weapons, instead of doing something to stop it. It's as if the YPA assumed a role of a teacher who shows a film on TV and expects that the people would say "don't do that, that's bad". A state must prevent violence, it's not enough to preach about peaceful resolution of crises.
Most analysts believe that the break up of Yugoslavia was speeded up after Tito's death, while you argue that the death of Kardelj was a much more significant event?
My approach differs to the extent that I believe that Kardelj was a much more important influence on the so-called fourth Yugoslavia, which started in 1966-67, and was then legally codified with the 1974 constitution. In my opinion, Tito became a tolerated outlier in that phase. Since the early seventies, Tito was a political icon. He did not have much real political influence. There are anecdotes indicating that politicians were meddling in Tito's marriage and deciding whether he should get a divorce, that they organized spectacular public functions honoring Tito, while in politics, in reality, Tito had less and less influence, while other people made decisions on his behalf. For example, from conversations with people who were close to him I learned that Tito was not allowed to give interviews to the media without an approval from the political leadership. Thus, I demystify Tito's role and demonstrate that he was not that powerful. Also, we learn that Tito was not exactly an advocate of decentralization, and that he accepted the 1974 constitution with a lot of reluctance. On the other hand, all elites, including the Serbian elite, supported decentralization, above all because all of them wanted to prevent the appearance of a new Tito after Tito's death.
In that case, was the motto "Tito, even after Tito" untrue?
That was simply an empty phrase that had no basis in the constitution that made sure no new Tito could come after Tito's death. By introducing the presidency, instead of a president, and the presidency of the Communist Party Central Committee, the elites demonstrated the intention to prevent the coming of a new Tito. They made sure that Tito would be an exception, and in practice everything was done to make sure that no one similar appeared on the political scene. That did not only apply to the institutions, but also to politics. For example, if in 1978 or 1979 you were to repeat one of Tito's statements about brotherhood and unity in Yugoslavia, you would risk being denounced as a centralizer and nationalist. Tito was the only person permitted to say things that no one else was allowed to say. But, states paid less and less attention to his warnings, because they were aware that they had to be patient for only a few years more and after that they could do whatever they wanted.
Why did Communists in Serbia elect Milosevic [as their leader]?
Milosevic, Kucan and Tudman were law and order candidates. They were a strong response to the situation of chaos and semi-anarchy, produced by workers' self management. In Yugoslavia, we have a reaction that is totally different from the developments in other Eastern European countries at the time. In other Eastern European countries 1989 marked a rejection of the strong state and a victory for the civil society. The best example is Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic. In the former Yugoslavia, where the society was stronger than the state, people did not want less, but more state control, they wanted more order and a new strong leader. Milosevic, and later Tudman, won because they managed to present themselves as strong leaders who were capable of establishing unified and strong states. Milosevic, in the one hand, exploited Tito's myth. Songs celebrating Tito were modified to celebrate Milosevic, his portraits could be seen everywhere, and his political style imitated Tito's style. Milosevic wanted to place politicians at lower levels in a sandwich between himself and the people. That was the idea behind his anti-bureaucratic revolution. His success has a lot to do with Tito's standing and the fact that population sought a new Tito, who would bring order and prevent anarchy.
Are there other explanations for Milosevic's success?
He combined the idea of strengthening of Serbia and of Yugoslavia, and thereby satisfied both wings of the Serb political tradition: Serb and Yugoslav. I am convinced that he would have failed, if he chose only one side. Besides, he received many votes from convinced supporters of Yugoslavia until the very end. His last election campaign used the motto "For Yugoslavia". Even when everyone else realized that Yugoslavia was not popular as a concept, he still stuck to that idea.
At the time we are doing this interview, during your visit to Belgrade, you came to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and are leaving the Commonwealth of Serbia and Montenegro. If the Socialist Yugoslavia was based on ideology, what is the new state based on, and how far is it likely to go?
If someone researches the seventies and reads Kardelj's theoretical wiriting and criticism of his ideas, it becomes clear that his critics claimed that his concept was condeferal, unrealistic, that it failed to create the sense of belonging to a community. The critics included people like Zoran Djindjic, Vojislav Kostunica and Dragoljub Micunovic. Now, I see that they are in one way or another participating in the creation of a new state that is even more decentralized and even more unfinished and unique than the Socialist Yugoslavia at Kardelj's time. This new state union is based on the lack of desire among Serbs and Montenegrins to live in their own nation states, in separate states of Serbia and Montenegro, and the lack of enthusiasm for life in a joint state. The problem is not whether someone wants to live together or separately, a bigger problem is if someone cannot define whether they want to live together or separately.
Does the new state have an equivalent?
It seems to me that it is a unique concept, which most closely resembles Bosnia-Hercegovina. From the public relations point of view, I do not understand the desire to replace the name Yugoslavia by Serbia and Montenegro. I've been living for nine years in Great Britain and I know that the name Serbia is very unpopular there. It is not pleasant to be a Serb after everything that has happened. In some countries, such as Italy, the image of Montenegro is also very bad. On the contrary, Yugoslavia is still seen as a victim, a country that was destroyed by ethnic nationalism and brutal violence. Now, you change the name Yugoslavia into a name that will end up not as Serbia and Montenegro, but as Serbia. My guess is that, just like everyone refers to Bosnia-Hercegovina as Bosnia, thus most people will refer to the new state as Serbia, rather than Serbia-Montenegro. I do not know whether Montenegrins wanted to end up being known as Serbia. Similarly, it is questionable whether the rest of the world will view citizens of such Serbia more favorably than citizens of Yugoslavia.
What keeps Serbia and Montenegro in the new commonwealth?
From the Serbian side, it is the still strong support for the Yugoslav idea. Recent public opinion polls indicate that over 70 percent of population regrets the disappearance of the name Yugoslavia. Serbia cannot discard the Yugoslav idea, which is a paradox, because people abroad are convinced that Serbia is the most nationalist state in the region. That is simply not true. If Serbia were the most nationalist state in the region, she would want to have its own nation state. On the other side, in Montenegro, we have a situation typical for a small state bordering a larger state, while the differences between the two states are so miniscule that the issue of identity is always open.
What is the attitude of the EU with respect to the founding of the new state? Is it realistic to expect that the new state may become an EU member one day?
I think that the EU will play a very important role in the region. The EU, if you like, has the role of a new Tito. We have Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia, where he plays the role of new Tito, from Tito's post-WWII phase. He can annul any decision. Javier Solana has a very significant role in the establishment of the new commonwealth, which is already referred to as Solania. They have the role of impartial judges and witnesses. I do not believe that Serbia and Montenegro will join the EU as an equal partner in a foreseeable future, but the EU will be very much present here. Although in politics many forecasts turn out to be wrong.
Regarding the guilt and responsibility for everything that happened in the former Yugoslavia, do you agree with those who advocate individual or collective responsibility?
In any case, it is unlikely that any community was in all cases a victim or a criminal. The idea that on the one side there are only criminals, while on the other side there are only victims is a black-and-white picture. Just consider WWII. Germans committed horrendous crimes, but they were also victims when the British bombed them at the end of the war. British were victims, but they also committed crimes and bombed others. Americans were not really victims. We know very well about their treatment of Japanese Americans, let alone about the atom bomb.
What do you advocate?
The Hague Court has adopted the model of the court in Nuremberg, with clearly defined victims and criminals. There is no doubt that Croatia was a war victim, but she also carried out an aggression against Bosnia and aggression against the Serb population in Croatia. The Serb population [in Croatia] was a victim, but it also expelled Croats from their homes. I do not agree with that black-and-white picture. My other disagreement is with the attitude towards the Hague Tribunal. Croat President Mesic, by the way I am one of his admirers, says about this issue the following: "We should extradite 10 or 15 generals to the Hague tribunal so that we can close that issue and individualize responsibility for crimes". That may be politically useful, and even most appropriate from the legal point of view, because otherwise some of these men would never be responsible for their actions. But, it is another issues to establish what really happened. From that point of view, it is unacceptable to blame everything that happened over the last 10-15 years on 20 or 40 individuals who should be sent to the Hague. It is a mistake to believe that Milosevic and Tudman were dictators. They were elected in free elections, and their actions enjoyed support of a significant part of the electorate. If we now boil down everything to one or two men, portraying them as some sort of monsters, rather than looking at ourselves in the mirror and asking how it was possible that we elected those men, then there will be no justice. How is it possible that even today some people recall those times with nostalgia and would again vote in the same way? Legally speaking, guilt cannot be collective, but historically and politically, it must be collective.
How much do your students know about Yugoslavia, and what specifically draws their attention?
I prefer if they know very little about the subject before signing up for my class. It is a bigger problem to correct their misconceptions, learned through the media. The first few weeks are spent debunking their previous knowledge and misconceptions, and then we starting building from the bottom. Here, that process would take somewhat longer, so that I find it easier to teach there, rather than here. The semester lasts three months. We start with the Yugoslav idea and its origin in the nineteenth century, and then gradually continue to the end of Yugoslavia. Some of the last few lectures are dedicated to the wars after the break up of Yugoslavia.
Do your students envy our youth?
Everywhere in the world, people have the need to imagine a world different from the one they live in. Many people in the West, while Socialism existed, were Marxists of the sort we never saw in our society. The popularity of Yugoslav self management in the West was significant in the eighties. Why? Because, people have a natural need to seek an alternative, to live somewhere else. No one is satisfied with the country he lives in, with his current situation. That is not only our characteristic. After 1989, with the fall of the Berlin wall, Europe lost its alternative, and people find that very frustrating. That is a paradox, because after 1989 it was expected that we would have more freedom. But, to have freedom, you need at least two options. By definition, freedom is a possibility of choice between two or more options. That does not exist anymore in the world. There is the liberal democracy and that's it. When I tell my students about the past, about self management and a different world, they necessarily wonder whether that was perhaps really better than the system they live in.
Many are convinced that we have idealized the rest of the world and that we view the West through rosy glasses. What do you think?
The less opportunity for travel people had, the more idealized their picture of the West was. I had an opportunity to see the data for Romania, where only 12 percent of population had a chance to travel abroad. And, naturally, when recently George Bush visited Romania, we had a total euphoria. When I came to England in 1994, I was shocked to see people living in the street, their whole life. They have no right to vote, they have no address. Secondly, our people, who are used to Socialism, have a hard time getting used to the idea that they must pay for health services, pay taxes, or that they have to buy an apartment, rather than getting it from the company they work for, or that they have to pay for every service they use. The life is sometimes more comfortable in a weak state, than in a strong state. But, in the end weak states deliver very steep bills to their citizens, because they are not able to secure their safety.
Do you get the impression that the public here is suspicious of our experts who left the country but did not cut all of their links, and occasionally come back, teach, publish books...?
My friend Boris Buden wrote the book "Kaptolski Kolodvor" [Kaptol train station; Kaptol is a part of Zagreb], which was published in Belgrade, and the title came from the first sentence in Miroslav Krleza's novel "Filip Latinovicz Return". Just like Filip Latinovicz, Buden and I left our country and keep facing that question - whether we should return, when and how. But, Filip Latinovicz can only return to a non-existent train station. There is no train station in Zagreb, on Kaptol, Kaptol train station does not exist. First of all, the country we left does not exist any more. Secondly, the country we would return to would not be any different ten years from now from the countries where we live now. Third, it is true that there are huge obstacles erected by those who stayed behind and are afraid of returnees and everything they bring with them. Therefore, Kaptol train station is yet to be built. Perhaps, the fact that I published the book, that was originally written in English, first in Serbocroatian language is my small contribution towards that end. Although, one keeps wondering - why bother?