by Zeljko CVIJANOVIC
Above all, the agreement Djidjic-Kostunica, if we can call that an agreement, was not a reflection of their shared political views. On the contrary, it is simply a deal on fair play, the agreement that in the future they will not whack each other with sticks studded by rusted nails, but will resort to sportsmanlike conduct and only use sticks without nails. Precisely that part of the agreement hides the chief Kostunica's victory. At least for some time, the clash between Kostunica and the Prime Minister of Serbia has been brought back from the street - by which I am referring to all those places where, as a rule, political conflict should not be resolved, although that has been the case over the last few months. The DSS has returned to the Parliament, the Parliament has adopted the Law About Election of the President of the Republic, Beba [Djidjic's public relations chief] was sent to the deserved vacation, [Goran] Vesic [senior official of Djindjic's Democratic Party] is apparently missing, nails have been pulled out, all of which indicates that the conflict has moved from the field where rules of speed, cheekiness, and lack of scruples reign to the field where some rules do exist, where Natasa Micic interprets the rules of parliamentary procedure, which, with all the disadvantages, is not a negligible gain. Moreover because Kostunica has a hard time with street-style brawls, which is usually later blamed on his lack of information, as in post-Milosevic Serbia the fact that someone stays on his feet even with a nail stuck in his scull and is able to strike back with his nail-enhanced club is a definite sign of political refinement and skill.
Djindjic's gain, on the other hand, is even more tangible. Among his enemies, he has found volunteers in sufficient numbers to pass the budget in the parliament, which means that the government should survive into next year. Furthermore, he has a written promise that the government will not be brought down until a new Constitution is adopted, naturally, provided that happens before some reasonable deadline, June 2003 according to Kostunica, and end of 2004 according to Djindjic, when new general elections would have to be held anyway.
Namely, they both now have what they most wanted: Kostunica gets rules, Djindjic power. Of course, this would be akin to a happy ending, an agreement of two rivals with compatible interests, if Djindjic were able to stay in power until the end of 2004 respecting the rules. That is why the agreement failed the moment it was signed because both of them were shooting for the same target. Kostunica believes that he agreed that the proper way to get money from a bank is to approach the till through the entrance door, while Djindjic is convinced that the best route to the money is a shortcut, even if it leads through the back door and requires that one wears stockings over his head. However, the problem is that when these two ambitions encounter each other in modern Serbia, the bank simply won't be able to satisfy both of them.
The moment of truth, when it is decided which entrance the people from the current DOS will take in their march to the power, will come soon, after the repeated elections for the president of Serbia. The very adoption of the new law about the election of the president indicated a rather controversial ambition within the DOS. Namely, that coalition does not have a winning presidential candidate, but it does want to control the election process, so that no one can become the president until Djindjic and comrades agree. Therefore, the moment of truth will come like this: either Djindjic's team will field its own candidate, who will be humiliated in the election by coming third in the election, behind Kostunica and Seselj, and failing to qualify for the second round, even though he is supported by the coalition that controls and rules everything that can be controlled and ruled in Serbia. Or, to avoid disgrace, which will be the same as boycott, they will fail to field a candidate, even though that is likely to lead to another failure of the election and will anger both William Montgomery and EU ambassadors in Belgrade, whose political influence in Serbia is measured by the difference between what Serbia eats and what Serbia earns, which is quite large.
Of course, the DOS, as many times before, is trying to avoid that moment of truth by searching for half-solutions. For starters, Djindjic is prepared to support Kostunica in the election, for a minimal price, but Kostunica declined the favor faster than anything else he has so far done in politics. Naturally, that move made sense as over the last year Kostunica has built his political image as an opponent of Djindjic's government, so that Prime Minister's support was likely to benefit only Seselj.
Naturally, Djindjic has a few other half-solutions, because anything is better than the truth. For example, why not find a future president of Serbia in one of the DOS parties that supported Kostunica in the failed September election. For example Velja Ilic, a joke of a politician who would be ideal for Djindjic, as he would totally disgrace the institution of the president of Serbia; or Dragoljub Micunovic as one of few individuals within the DOS with the supernatural capability of still being on speaking terms with everyone. Just as he did with unfortunate Miroljub Labus a month ago, Djindjic wants to test Micunovic's greed. If he (Micunovic) insists so much on a presidential candidate supported by the DOS, so that the candidate can help Kostunica win the election, then he should be that candidate.
Of course, Micunovic, although he is not ambitionless, knows that he hadn't stayed in opposition for 25 years only to become another Labus. Therefore, in a better denouement, as far as Djindjic is concerned, he will first wait to see whether Kostunica will run again, and then reply. In the worse denouement, he will immediately treat Djindjic's offer as a joke, a joking response to recent Micunovic's proposal that Djindjic become the first president of the new state, Serbia-Montenegro.
All that indicates that Djindjic and comrades, after being given a cold shoulder by Ilic and Micunovic can only propose Dragan Mariscanin [senior official of Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS] and finally realize that the truth cannot be avoided. The moment when they decide whether they will field a candidate of wreck another election, will be a new reason for divisions within the DOS. Of course, that is not to be feared. The real problem will be if nails reappear on clubs.
And here we've reached the main fault of the agreement Djindjic-Kostunica. Namely, why would someone who had two years to think about and work on the new Constitution, and failed to do anything, now suddenly wrap the whole thing up within six months, or perhaps even a year? Clearly, the new constitution will not happen! Djindjic's talk about the constitution is yet another attempt to postpone elections. That means that the only possible way to resolve this crisis - general elections - will be one day held under Milosevic's rules. That again means that the agreement Djindjic-Kostunica will, once this torture is over, be remembered as a moment of their shared weariness, when both of them reached for what was needed the most. We shall also recall that Serbia paid for temporary disarming of clubs by a new postponement of a direly needed resolution.