by Zeljko CVIJANOVIC
Therefore, as far as Pavkovic was concerned, Mladic could have been taken to the Hague last weekend. However, as far as Carla Del Ponte was concerned, her understanding of politics is probably less objectionable than the manner in which she puts together her indictments. That is, she from the very beginning knew that not only she wasn't returning to the Hague with Mladic in her bag, but also that she is not likely to see Mladic in the Hague before the forthcoming elections in Serbia.
All that means that in the coming three months it will not matter whether General Mladic is hiding in some beehive near Valjevo or is eating ice cream in Knez Mihajlova street in the center of Belgrade, as much as that it was General Tomic who brought him there, and that General Tomic is close to Kostunica, while in turn, Kostunica is showing a perverse inclination to run for the president of Serbia.
Briefly, Mladic, just like Pavkovic, will appear in the Serbian political life in the next three months only to the extent it is necessary to discredit Kostunica abroad. In return, the foreigners are supposed to pressure Kostunica into refraining from running for president of Serbia. Of course, Kostunica is paying for three biggest mistakes of his tenure so far. First, his decision to protect Pavkovic for a year and a half [after the overthrow of Milosevic], then excessively close links with military intelligence services, and finally never clearly stated attitude towards the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.
After all of that, of course, the best he can hope for is to listen to Pavkovic testify in front of the committee of the Serbian parliament. And the general will explain there that under these authorities there simply is no civilian control of the military such as when Milosevic, of course a civilian, controlled the military, even during election rallies of his political party [at which Pavkovic, then the chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army, participated]. Therefore, only with Kostunica's rule, Pavkovic will solemnly aver in his testimony in front of the committee, conditions are ripe to answer whether Aca Tomic has ever met Ratko Mladic on some highway. The general will confirm that Tomic has naturally met Mladic, and consequently the foreigners will pressure Kostunica, at least until the elections, to deliver Mladic and thereby prove his pre-electoral pro-reform stance.
No one in Serbia recalls a fair election campaign, and it is very likely that the forthcoming election campaign will also not be remembered as fair. Nevertheless, Del Ponte, who did not come to get Mladic, but to get Kostunica, and the committee of the Serbian parliament, not directed by Copola, but by the Godfather personally, all indicate that the coming election campaign will actually be especially dirty. How come?
Namely, in this election Kostunica was cast in the same role as Milosevic in the September 2000 election, while he knows that if he fails to run for president that would be the end of his political career. Fine, it won't exactly be a referendum for and against Kostunica, but in the coming days you'll definitely have a chance to hear the following formulations: if Kostunica wins foreigners will definitely cross Serbia off the map of the world; Europe will set up a corridor to the south through Afghanistan [instead of Serbia] because Afghanistan is more secure and stable a country; they will impose worse sanctions than under Milosevic; they will pour concrete over Serbia and turn it into the biggest car park in Europe; public opinion polls will suddenly indicate that Kostunica is supported only by all those troglodyte child eaters who voted for Milosevic two years ago, while all those who voted for Kostunica then will now vote for Labus...
Of course, these are all lies, but why would Serbia vote at all if the election were not a fateful one? And if to boot Kostunica's party, and one should not doubt their inertia, agree that the elections are indeed fateful, but that this time the main issue is not sanctions but the survival of the state, which, naturally, can only survive if they are in power, that will be, regardless of the ultimate winner, the type of election from Milosevic's time that each time took a lot out of Serbia. Why? Because the September 2000 elections were the first ones in which powerful foreigners and a convincing majority of voters were on the same side, for Kostunica and the DOS. Regardless of different motivation (while citizens went to the elections spurred by the reflex of a defeated nation casting away the chief symbol and creator of its defeat, the foreigners wanted to get rid of the last European leader who did not understand the new rules of the game), the matching choice of both foreigners and the local voters was the best indicator that Serbia had a chance to join civilized European countries. However, neither of the factions in power understood that, no one wanted to work on that. For example, since then no one has been taken to the Hague, or left willingly, because they were guilty of something. No one in either faction in power wanted to deal with crimes and the guilt of those who committed them. That is why all defendants went to the Hague in exchange for money, because of threats or blackmail. And all of that indicates that the authorities in Serbia put way more trust in the signals coming from the digestive tract of its citizens than in their conscience and feeling of justice.
That is why every defendant went to the Hague almost as a self-sacrificing righteous saint. And that is why, when Milosevic ended up there under the same conditions, the break up of the DOS started. But another, much more serious split, was also engendered then, the one between foreigners and Serbian voters. Essentially, that was the most important step back taken by Serbia after the overthrow of Milosevic.
The person who initiated such presidential elections, Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, not only did initiate them to postpone the likely holding of general elections until year 2004 (which in itself is not a sin, as it is in nature of all authorities to try to remain in power as long as possible), but also decided to play the card of that split, in which most voters, just like foreigners, will have opposing candidates. That again implies that the future president of Serbia will be selected well before the elections that are supposed to be held on September 29. Namely, barring a spectacular turnaround, Miroljub Labus' trump cards will be valid until September 9, when the deadline for registration of candidates expires. That date will also mark the end of the period during which Kostunica will be under pressure not to run for president of Serbia. If Kostunica does run, Labus' chances will depend on how successful Kostunica will be in explaining something very obvious, that federal deputy prime minister, although a person of enviable personal integrity, is running for office in these elections only to prolong Djindjic's rule over Serbia.
The electoral clash of a pro-reform politician (Labus) and a conservative (Kostunica) has thus become yet another false dilemma forced upon Serbia by Djindjic. Whether this dilemma becomes real at one point, only depends on how dirty the campaign between group G17 plus, as the team with highest international standing in Serbia and the Democratic Party of Serbia, as the political party with highest rating among the local voters, will get. And all that's needed for that is that Goran Vesic [senior Democratic Party official], whose support Labus would very gladly give up, says that Kostunica's victory would be a defeat of reforms, or that someone on the other side says that Labus is running for president only because Djindjic wants him to, because he is too unpopular to be elected to any office himself.